Politiek en mensen

Sony pakt uit met homo-label

2006-01-12T18:58:00.000Z

12/01 Sony pakt uit met apart homo-label

Met het nieuwe label Music With A Twist wil de platenmaatschappij Sony een nieuwe markt aanboren, met name die van de homo's en lesbiennes, zo heeft de BBC woensdag bericht op zijn website.Sony is momenteel naarstig op zoek naar getalenteerde holebi's om hun muziek op de wereld los te laten. Of de luisteraars ook aanhangers zijn van de homoseksuele liefde moeten zijn, werd niet bekendgemaakt. Met het nieuwe label wil Sony het signaal de wereld insturen dat homoseksualiteit "ok" is. De platenreus vindt dat een label voor homo's niet anders is dan een label voor pakweg hiphoppers. Aangezien hiphop ook een eigen label gekregen heeft bij verschillende platenbonzen, verdient de holebimuziek dat volgens Sony dus ook. Music With A Twist wil in juni een eerste plaat op de markt brengen, om samen te vallen met de National Gay Pride, een feest waarop de holebi's in de VS volledig uit de bol gaan. Daarnaast staan ook nog verschillende compilatiealbums op het programma.

American Muslim

2006-01-12T18:05:00.000Z

American Muslim’s Haj Guide Is a Big Hit in MinaSiraj Wahab, Arab News

“Every good deed done by a Muslim, however small, will be rewarded by Allah,” says Yousuf Baaghil.

MINA, 12 January 2006 — Nothing could be more rewarding for a Muslim than to be able to do good deeds while in preparation for the journey of a lifetime. One American Muslim, Yousuf Baaghil, a lawyer from San Francisco, has been able to do just that.
Prior to setting off on the pilgrimage, last year Baaghil and his wife went to a local Islamic center and took classes in order to learn about the Haj rituals. It was a very intensive training course during which an enormous amount of material was presented.

At home, after the final class, Baaghil’s wife attempted to create a semblance of order out of all the information they had been given. It was a difficult task and the harder she tried to make some sense of the stack of information before her, the more confused she became.
Baaghil soon joined in the effort and even after consulting all their notes and turning to numerous textbooks on Haj, they were more confused than ever.

Most of the books explaining the pilgrimage were weighty volumes, filled with hundreds of pages of information. A straightforward guide to the rituals simply did not exist. So the couple made it their mission to create one.
“Haj and Umrah at a Glance,” is a one-page guide based upon the books of Sheikh Muhammad Naasirruddeen Al-Baanee. The idea behind the guide is that Muslims can fold the guide into a small size, tuck it anywhere and carry it at all times during the pilgrimage. An attempt was made to cram on the one sheet every detail of importance to a first-time pilgrim. This includes tiny illustrations of key points and a diagram of the Holy Mosque, plus prayers and supplications that are written in Arabic with transliteration and translation in English.

“While every Haj group has a well-informed guide it is not possible to catch hold of this person all the time and there are moments when you are all by yourself and you have no idea how to perform the ritual or you need clarification on what ritual will come next,” said Baaghil.
Initially, Baaghil distributed printed copies of the guide himself. Then with help, he set up a website, www.islamicbulletin.org, to enable individuals to download the guide in PDF format, wherever they might be.
Within just a few months of the guide appearing on the Internet, Baaghil was deluged with requests to create similar guides in other languages. Through the website people volunteered their language services and now the guide is available in six languages — English, Turkish, Indonesian, French, Spanish and Urdu. All can be downloaded free of charge.
This year, Baaghil and his wife made the trip to Saudi Arabia in order to perform Haj. While in the Kingdom, Baaghil took the opportunity to present himself at the offices of the Ministry of Haj to discuss the possible distribution of “Haj and Umrah at a Glance” to the pilgrims.
“I was pleasantly surprised that the staff at the ministry were already aware of the guide!” exclaimed Baaghil with a smile. “They ran a trial this year in which they downloaded the PDF files in different languages, printed the guide on glossy paper in color and distributed thousands of copies to pilgrims before the Haj. I was told that it was well received. Every good deed done by a Muslim, however small, will be rewarded by Allah. This is a small deed from my side and I hope it will aid many Muslims in enriching their Haj experience.”

Hadj : Stampede kills 345 pilgrims

2006-01-12T17:59:00.000Z

Stampede kills 345 Hajj pilgrims

Hundreds of pilgrims have been crushed to death and hundreds more injured, during a stoning ritual on the last day of the Hajj, the kingdom's health minister has said.
Hamad bin Abdullah al-Manei, Saudi Arabia's health minister, said: "So far, the number of confirmed death is 345 and the number of injured in hospital is 289."

Al-Maneh said the stampede was caused by "unruly pilgrims, and a problem of luggage."

"Today, just after sunset, there was a big rush among the pilgrims which led a group of them to be killed or wounded."

A medical source at Mina General Hospital told AFP the number of injured had reached 600.

Following the crush at the northern entrance of Mina's Jamarat Bridge, an eyewitness, who gave his name only as Saeed, told Al Jazeera: "It was very difficult to reach the first Jamarat-throwing and I saw bodies lined up on the ground. One pilgrim has lost his family among the crowd."

Police made a circle around the place trying to get people out, he added. The incident took place at noon prayer.

One Egyptian pilgrim on the scene told AFP: "I saw pilgrims falling under the feet of other pilgrims. I don't know how many people died, but I know that it is in the dozens."
Dangerous ritual
"I saw pilgrims falling under the feet of other pilgrims"Egyptian eyewitnessThe stoning of Satan is the riskiest episode of the Hajj as pilgrims jostle to ensure their pebbles touch the pillar. Weaker people risk being trampled on by the masses.
A total of 251 people were trampled to death in the 2004 Hajj as people panicked during the ritual stoning.
The stoning ritual, which is spread out over three days, marks the final part of the Hajj pilgrimage for the more than two million Muslims who have flocked to Makka from around the world.

In 2003, 14 pilgrims, including six women, were killed in a stampede during the first day of the stoning ritual, and 35 died in 2001, while in 1998 the Hajj saw 118 killed and more than 180 hurt at Mina.
The deadliest toll of the pilgrimage was in July 1990 when 1426 pilgrims were trampled or asphyxiated to death in a stampede in a tunnel, also in Mina.
Following a journey made by Prophet Mohammed over 1400 years ago, pilgrims flocked to the plain of Arafat, south of Mina, on Monday to pray for mercy in the central rite of the Hajj.Five pillars
Security has been increased forthis year's HajjBefore coming to Mina on Tuesday, many spent the night in the sacred site of Muzdalifah where they collected pebbles for the stoning ritual.The Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam and a once-in-a-life time duty for all Muslims physically able to undertake it.
The latest tragedy comes days after 76 people were killed when a hostel in the heart of Makka collapsed last week.
Almost 60,000 security, health, emergency and other personnel were involved in organising this year's Hajj, trying to prevent the deadly incidents that have marred it in recent years from being repeated.
Aljazeera + Agencies

It's the demography, stupid

2006-01-12T11:28:00.000Z

Features

It’s the demography, stupid
By Mark Steyn

Most people reading this have strong stomachs, so let me lay it out as baldly as I can: Much of what we loosely call the western world will not survive this century, and much of it will effectively disappear within our lifetimes, including many if not most western European countries. There’ll probably still be a geographical area on the map marked as Italy or the Netherlands— probably—just as in Istanbul there’s still a building called St. Sophia’s Cathedral. But it’s not a cathedral; it’s merely a designation for a piece of real estate. Likewise, Italy and the Netherlands will merely be designations for real estate. The challenge for those who reckon western civilization is on balance better than the alternatives is to figure out a way to save at least some parts of the west.
One obstacle to doing that is the fact that, in the typical election campaign in your advanced industrial democracy, the political platforms of at least one party in the United States and pretty much all parties in the rest of the west are largely about what one would call the secondary impulses of society—government health care, government day care (which Canada’s thinking of introducing), government paternity leave (which Britain’s just introduced). We’ve prioritized the secondary impulse over the primary ones: national defense, family, faith, and, most basic of all, reproductive activity—“Go forth and multiply,” because if you don’t you won’t be able to afford all those secondary-impulse issues, like cradle-to-grave welfare. Americans sometimes don’t understand how far gone most of the rest of the developed world is down this path: In the Canadian and most Continental cabinets, the defense ministry is somewhere an ambitious politician passes through on his way up to important jobs like the health department. I don’t think Don Rumsfeld would regard it as a promotion if he were moved to Health & Human Services.
The design flaw of the secular social-democratic state is that it requires a religious-society birth rate to sustain it. Post-Christian hyper-rationalism is, in the objective sense, a lot less rational than Catholicism or Mormonism. Indeed, in its reliance on immigration to ensure its future, the European Union has adopted a twenty-first-century variation on the strategy of the Shakers, who were forbidden from reproducing and thus could only increase their numbers by conversion. The problem is that secondary- impulse societies mistake their weaknesses for strengths—or, at any rate, virtues—and that’s why they’re proving so feeble at dealing with a primal force like Islam.
Speaking of which, if we are at war—and half the American people and significantly higher percentages in Britain, Canada, and Europe don’t accept that proposition—than what exactly is the war about?
We know it’s not really a “war on terror.” Nor is it, at heart, a war against Islam, or even “radical Islam.” The Muslim faith, whatever its merits for the believers, is a problematic business for the rest of us. There are many trouble spots around the world, but as a general rule, it’s easy to make an educated guess at one of the participants: Muslims vs. Jews in “Palestine,” Muslims vs. Hindus in Kashmir, Muslims vs. Christians in Africa, Muslims vs. Buddhists in Thailand, Muslims vs. Russians in the Caucasus, Muslims vs. backpacking tourists in Bali. Like the environmentalists, these guys think globally but act locally.
Yet while Islamism is the enemy, it’s not what this thing’s about. Radical Islam is an opportunist infection, like AIDS: it’s not the HIV that kills you, it’s the pneumonia you get when your body’s too weak to fight it off. When the jihadists engage with the U.S. military, they lose—as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq. If this were like World War I with those fellows in one trench and us in ours facing them over some boggy piece of terrain, it would be over very quickly. Which the smarter Islamists have figured out. They know they can never win on the battlefield, but they figure there’s an excellent chance they can drag things out until western civilization collapses in on itself and Islam inherits by default.
That’s what the war’s about: our lack of civilizational confidence. As a famous Arnold Toynbee quote puts it: “Civilizations die from suicide, not murder”—as can be seen throughout much of “the western world” right now. The progressive agenda —lavish social welfare, abortion, secularism, multiculturalism—is collectively the real suicide bomb. Take multiculturalism: the great thing about multiculturalism is that it doesn’t involve knowing anything about other cultures—the capital of Bhutan, the principal exports of Malawi, who cares? All it requires is feeling good about other cultures. It’s fundamentally a fraud, and I would argue was subliminally accepted on that basis. Most adherents to the idea that all cultures are equal don’t want to live in anything but an advanced western society: Multiculturalism means your kid has to learn some wretched native dirge for the school holiday concert instead of getting to sing “Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer” or that your holistic masseuse uses techniques developed from Native American spirituality, but not that you or anyone you care about should have to live in an African or Native-American society. It’s a quintessential piece of progressive humbug.
Then September 11 happened. And bizarrely the reaction of just about every prominent western leader was to visit a mosque: President Bush did, the Prince of Wales did, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom did, the Prime Minister of Canada did… . The Premier of Ontario didn’t, and so twenty Muslim community leaders had a big summit to denounce him for failing to visit a mosque. I don’t know why he didn’t. Maybe there was a big backlog, it was mosque drivetime, prime ministers in gridlock up and down the freeway trying to get to the Sword of the Infidel-Slayer Mosque on Elm Street. But for whatever reason he couldn’t fit it into his hectic schedule. Ontario’s Citizenship Minister did show up at a mosque, but the imams took that as a great insult, like the Queen sending Fergie to open the Commonwealth Games. So the Premier of Ontario had to hold a big meeting with the aggrieved imams to apologize for not going to a mosque and, as The Toronto Star’s reported it, “to provide them with reassurance that the provincial government does not see them as the enemy.”
Anyway, the get-me-to-the-mosque-on-time fever died down, but it set the tone for our general approach to these atrocities. The old definition of a nanosecond was the gap between the traffic light changing in New York and the first honk from a car behind. The new definition is the gap between a terrorist bombing and the press release from an Islamic lobby group warning of a backlash against Muslims. In most circumstances, it would be considered appallingly bad taste to deflect attention from an actual “hate crime” by scaremongering about a purely hypothetical one. Needless to say, there is no campaign of Islamophobic hate crimes. If anything, the west is awash in an epidemic of self-hate crimes. A commenter on Tim Blair’s website in Australia summed it up in a note-perfect parody of a Guardian headline: “Muslim Community Leaders Warn of Backlash from Tomorrow Morning’s Terrorist Attack.” Those community leaders have the measure of us.
Radical Islam is what multiculturalism has been waiting for all along. In The Survival of Culture, I quoted the eminent British barrister Helena Kennedy, QC. Shortly after September 11, Baroness Kennedy argued on a BBC show that it was too easy to disparage “Islamic fundamentalists.” “We as western liberals too often are fundamentalist ourselves,” she complained. “We don’t look at our own fundamentalisms.”
Well, said the interviewer, what exactly would those western liberal fundamentalisms be? “One of the things that we are too ready to insist upon is that we are the tolerant people and that the intolerance is something that belongs to other countries like Islam. And I’m not sure that’s true.”
Hmm. Lady Kennedy was arguing that our tolerance of our own tolerance is making us intolerant of other people’s intolerance, which is intolerable. And, unlikely as it sounds, this has now become the highest, most rarefied form of multiculturalism. So you’re nice to gays and the Inuit? Big deal. Anyone can be tolerant of fellows like that, but tolerance of intolerance gives an even more intense frisson of pleasure to the multiculti masochists. In other words, just as the AIDS pandemic greatly facilitated societal surrender to the gay agenda, so 9/11 is greatly facilitating our surrender to the most extreme aspects of the multicultural agenda.
For example, one day in 2004, a couple of Canadians returned home, to Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto. They were the son and widow of a fellow called Ahmed Said Khadr, who back on the Pakistani-Afghan frontier was known as “al-Kanadi.” Why? Because he was the highest-ranking Canadian in al Qaeda—plenty of other Canucks in al Qaeda but he was the Numero Uno. In fact, one could argue that the Khadr family is Canada’s principal contribution to the war on terror. Granted they’re on the wrong side (if you’ll forgive me being judgmental) but no can argue that they aren’t in the thick of things. One of Mr. Khadr’s sons was captured in Afghanistan after killing a U.S. Special Forces medic. Another was captured and held at Guantanamo. A third blew himself up while killing a Canadian soldier in Kabul. Pa Khadr himself died in an al Qaeda shoot-out with Pakistani forces in early 2004. And they say we Canadians aren’t doing our bit in this war!
In the course of the fatal shoot-out of al-Kanadi, his youngest son was paralyzed. And, not unreasonably, Junior didn’t fancy a prison hospital in Peshawar. So Mrs. Khadr and her boy returned to Toronto so he could enjoy the benefits of Ontario government healthcare. “I’m Canadian, and I’m not begging for my rights,” declared the widow Khadr. “I’m demanding my rights.”
As they always say, treason’s hard to prove in court, but given the circumstances of Mr. Khadr’s death it seems clear that not only was he providing “aid and comfort to the Queen’s enemies” but that he was, in fact, the Queen’s enemy. The Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, the Royal 22nd Regiment, and other Canucks have been participating in Afghanistan, on one side of the conflict, and the Khadr family had been over there participating on the other side. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister of Canada thought Boy Khadr’s claims on the public health system was an excellent opportunity to demonstrate his own deep personal commitment to “diversity.” Asked about the Khadrs’ return to Toronto, he said, “I believe that once you are a Canadian citizen, you have the right to your own views and to disagree.”
That’s the wonderful thing about multiculturalism: you can choose which side of the war you want to fight on. When the draft card arrives, just tick “home team” or “enemy,” according to taste. The Canadian Prime Minister is a typical late-stage western politician: He could have said, well, these are contemptible people and I know many of us are disgusted at the idea of our tax dollars being used to provide health care for a man whose Canadian citizenship is no more than a flag of convenience, but unfortunately that’s the law and, while we can try to tighten it, it looks like this lowlife’s got away with it. Instead, his reflex instinct was to proclaim this as a wholehearted demonstration of the virtues of the multicultural state. Like many enlightened western leaders, the Canadian Prime Minister will be congratulating himself on his boundless tolerance even as the forces of intolerance consume him.
That, by the way, is the one point of similarity between the jihad and conventional terrorist movements like the IRA or ETA. Terror groups persist because of a lack of confidence on the part of their targets: the IRA, for example, calculated correctly that the British had the capability to smash them totally but not the will. So they knew that while they could never win militarily, they also could never be defeated. The Islamists have figured similarly. The only difference is that most terrorist wars are highly localized. We now have the first truly global terrorist insurgency because the Islamists view the whole world the way the IRA view the bogs of Fermanagh: they want it and they’ve calculated that our entire civilization lacks the will to see them off.
We spend a lot of time at The New Criterion attacking the elites and we’re right to do so. The commanding heights of the culture have behaved disgracefully for the last several decades. But, if it were just a problem with the elites, it wouldn’t be that serious: the mob could rise up and hang ’em from lampposts—a scenario that’s not unlikely in certain Continental countries. But the problem now goes way beyond the ruling establishment. The annexation by government of most of the key responsibilities of life—child-raising, taking care of your elderly parents—has profoundly changed the relationship between the citizen and the state. At some point—I would say socialized health care is a good marker—you cross a line, and it’s very hard then to persuade a citizenry enjoying that much government largesse to cross back. In National Review recently, I took issue with that line Gerald Ford always uses to ingratiate himself with conservative audiences: “A government big enough to give you everything you want is big enough to take away everything you have.” Actually, you run into trouble long before that point: A government big enough to give you everything you want still isn’t big enough to get you to give anything back. That’s what the French and German political classes are discovering.
Go back to that list of local conflicts I mentioned. The jihad has held out a long time against very tough enemies. If you’re not shy about taking on the Israelis, the Russians, the Indians, and the Nigerians, why wouldn’t you fancy your chances against the Belgians and Danes and New Zealanders?
So the jihadists are for the most part doing no more than giving us a prod in the rear as we sleepwalk to the cliff. When I say “sleepwalk,” it’s not because we’re a blasé culture. On the contrary, one of the clearest signs of our decline is the way we expend so much energy worrying about the wrong things. If you’ve read Jared Diamond’s bestselling book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, you’ll know it goes into a lot of detail about Easter Island going belly up because they chopped down all their trees. Apparently that’s why they’re not a G8 member or on the UN Security Council. Same with the Greenlanders and the Mayans and Diamond’s other curious choices of “societies.” Indeed, as the author sees it, pretty much every society collapses because it chops down its trees.
Poor old Diamond can’t see the forest because of his obsession with the trees. (Russia’s collapsing even as it’s undergoing reforestation.) One way “societies choose to fail or succeed” is by choosing what to worry about. The western world has delivered more wealth and more comfort to more of its citizens than any other civilization in history, and in return we’ve developed a great cult of worrying. You know the classics of the genre: In 1968, in his bestselling book The Population Bomb, the eminent scientist Paul Ehrlich declared: “In the 1970s the world will undergo famines—hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death.” In 1972, in their landmark study The Limits to Growth, the Club of Rome announced that the world would run out of gold by 1981, of mercury by 1985, tin by 1987, zinc by 1990, petroleum by 1992, and copper, lead, and gas by 1993.
None of these things happened. In fact, quite the opposite is happening. We’re pretty much awash in resources, but we’re running out of people—the one truly indispensable resource, without which none of the others matter. Russia’s the most obvious example: it’s the largest country on earth, it’s full of natural resources, and yet it’s dying—its population is falling calamitously.
The default mode of our elites is that anything that happens—from terrorism to tsunamis—can be understood only as deriving from the perniciousness of western civilization. As Jean-François Revel wrote, “Clearly, a civilization that feels guilty for everything it is and does will lack the energy and conviction to defend itself.”
And even though none of the prognostications of the eco-doom blockbusters of the 1970s came to pass, all that means is that thirty years on, the end of the world has to be rescheduled. The amended estimated time of arrival is now 2032. That’s to say, in 2002, the United Nations Global Environmental Outlook predicted “the destruction of 70 percent of the natural world in thirty years, mass extinction of species… . More than half the world will be afflicted by water shortages, with 95 percent of people in the Middle East with severe problems … 25 percent of all species of mammals and 10 percent of birds will be extinct …”
Etc., etc., for 450 pages. Or to cut to the chase, as The Guardian headlined it, “Unless We Change Our Ways, The World Faces Disaster.”
Well, here’s my prediction for 2032: unless we change our ways the world faces a future … where the environment will look pretty darn good. If you’re a tree or a rock, you’ll be living in clover. It’s the Italians and the Swedes who’ll be facing extinction and the loss of their natural habitat.
There will be no environmental doomsday. Oil, carbon dioxide emissions, deforestation: none of these things is worth worrying about. What’s worrying is that we spend so much time worrying about things that aren’t worth worrying about that we don’t worry about the things we should be worrying about. For thirty years, we’ve had endless wake-up calls for things that aren’t worth waking up for. But for the very real, remorseless shifts in our society—the ones truly jeopardizing our future—we’re sound asleep. The world is changing dramatically right now and hysterical experts twitter about a hypothetical decrease in the Antarctic krill that might conceivably possibly happen so far down the road there’s unlikely to be any Italian or Japanese enviro-worriers left alive to be devastated by it.
In a globalized economy, the environmentalists want us to worry about First World capitalism imposing its ways on bucolic, pastoral, primitive Third World backwaters. Yet, insofar as “globalization” is a threat, the real danger is precisely the opposite—that the peculiarities of the backwaters can leap instantly to the First World. Pigs are valued assets and sleep in the living room in rural China—and next thing you know an unknown respiratory disease is killing people in Toronto, just because someone got on a plane. That’s the way to look at Islamism: we fret about McDonald’s and Disney, but the big globalization success story is the way the Saudis have taken what was eighty years ago a severe but obscure and unimportant strain of Islam practiced by Bedouins of no fixed abode and successfully exported it to the heart of Copenhagen, Rotterdam, Manchester, Buffalo …
What’s the better bet? A globalization that exports cheeseburgers and pop songs or a globalization that exports the fiercest aspects of its culture? When it comes to forecasting the future, the birth rate is the nearest thing to hard numbers. If only a million babies are born in 2006, it’s hard to have two million adults enter the workforce in 2026 (or 2033, or 2037, or whenever they get around to finishing their Anger Management and Queer Studies degrees). And the hard data on babies around the western world is that they’re running out a lot faster than the oil is. “Replacement” fertility rate—i.e., the number you need for merely a stable population, not getting any bigger, not getting any smaller—is 2.1 babies per woman. Some countries are well above that: the global fertility leader, Somalia, is 6.91, Niger 6.83, Afghanistan 6.78, Yemen 6.75. Notice what those nations have in common?
Scroll way down to the bottom of the Hot One Hundred top breeders and you’ll eventually find the United States, hovering just at replacement rate with 2.07 births per woman. Ireland is 1.87, New Zealand 1.79, Australia 1.76. But Canada’s fertility rate is down to 1.5, well below replacement rate; Germany and Austria are at 1.3, the brink of the death spiral; Russia and Italy are at 1.2; Spain 1.1, about half replacement rate. That’s to say, Spain’s population is halving every generation. By 2050, Italy’s population will have fallen by 22 percent, Bulgaria’s by 36 percent, Estonia’s by 52 percent. In America, demographic trends suggest that the blue states ought to apply for honorary membership of the EU: in the 2004 election, John Kerry won the sixteen with the lowest birth rates; George W. Bush took twenty-five of the twenty-six states with the highest. By 2050, there will be 100 million fewer Europeans, 100 million more Americans—and mostly red-state Americans.
As fertility shrivels, societies get older—and Japan and much of Europe are set to get older than any functioning societies have ever been. And we know what comes after old age. These countries are going out of business—unless they can find the will to change their ways. Is that likely? I don’t think so. If you look at European election results—most recently in Germany—it’s hard not to conclude that, while voters are unhappy with their political establishments, they’re unhappy mainly because they resent being asked to reconsider their government benefits and, no matter how unaffordable they may be a generation down the road, they have no intention of seriously reconsidering them. The Scottish executive recently backed down from a proposal to raise the retirement age of Scottish public workers. It’s presently sixty, which is nice but unaffordable. But the reaction of the average Scots worker is that that’s somebody else’s problem. The average German worker now puts in 22 percent fewer hours per year than his American counterpart, and no politician who wishes to remain electorally viable will propose closing the gap in any meaningful way.
This isn’t a deep-rooted cultural difference between the Old World and the New. It dates back all the way to, oh, the 1970s. If one wanted to allocate blame, one could argue that it’s a product of the U.S. military presence, the American security guarantee that liberated European budgets: instead of having to spend money on guns, they could concentrate on butter, and buttering up the voters. If Washington’s problem with Europe is that these are not serious allies, well, whose fault is that? Who, in the years after the Second World War, created NATO as a post-modern military alliance? The “free world,” as the Americans called it, was a free ride for everyone else. And having been absolved from the primal responsibilities of nationhood, it’s hardly surprising that European nations have little wish to re-shoulder them. In essence, the lavish levels of public health care on the Continent are subsidized by the American taxpayer. And this long-term softening of large sections of the west makes them ill-suited to resisting a primal force like Islam.
There is no “population bomb.” There never was. Birth rates are declining all over the world—eventually every couple on the planet may decide to opt for the western yuppie model of one designer baby at the age of thirty-nine. But demographics is a game of last man standing. The groups that succumb to demographic apathy last will have a huge advantage. Even in 1968 Paul Ehrlich and his ilk should have understood that their so-called “population explosion” was really a massive population adjustment. Of the increase in global population between 1970 and 2000, the developed world accounted for under 9 percent of it, while the Muslim world accounted for 26 percent of the increase. Between 1970 and 2000, the developed world declined from just under 30 percent of the world’s population to just over 20 percent, the Muslim nations increased from about 15 percent to 20 percent.
1970 doesn’t seem that long ago. If you’re the age many of the chaps running the western world today are wont to be, your pants are narrower than they were back then and your hair’s less groovy, but the landscape of your life—the look of your house, the lay-out of your car, the shape of your kitchen appliances, the brand names of the stuff in the fridge—isn’t significantly different. Aside from the Internet and the cellphone and the CD, everything in your world seems pretty much the same but slightly modified.
And yet the world is utterly altered. Just to recap those bald statistics: In 1970, the developed world had twice as big a share of the global population as the Muslim world: 30 percent to 15 percent. By 2000, they were the same: each had about 20 percent.
And by 2020?
So the world’s people are a lot more Islamic than they were back then and a lot less “western.” Europe is significantly more Islamic, having taken in during that period some 20 million Muslims (officially)—or the equivalents of the populations of four European Union countries (Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, and Estonia). Islam is the fastest-growing religion in the west: in the UK, more Muslims than Christians attend religious services each week.
Can these trends continue for another thirty years without having consequences? Europe by the end of this century will be a continent after the neutron bomb: the grand buildings will still be standing but the people who built them will be gone. We are living through a remarkable period: the self-extinction of the races who, for good or ill, shaped the modern world.
What will Europe be like at the end of this process? Who knows? On the one hand, there’s something to be said for the notion that America will find an Islamified Europe more straightforward to deal with than Monsieur Chirac, Herr Schröder, and Co. On the other hand, given Europe’s track record, getting there could be very bloody. But either way this is the real battlefield. The al Qaeda nutters can never find enough suicidal pilots to fly enough planes into enough skyscrapers to topple America. But, unlike us, the Islamists think long-term, and, given their demographic advantage in Europe and the tone of the emerging Muslim lobby groups there, much of what they’re flying planes into buildings for they’re likely to wind up with just by waiting a few more years. The skyscrapers will be theirs; why knock ’em over?
The latter half of the decline and fall of great civilizations follows a familiar pattern: affluence, softness, decadence, extinction. You don’t notice yourself slipping through those stages because usually there’s a seductive pol on hand to provide the age with a sly, self-deluding slogan—like Bill Clinton’s “It’s about the future of all our children.” We on the right spent the 1990s gleefully mocking Clinton’s tedious invocation, drizzled like syrup over everything from the Kosovo war to highway appropriations. But most of the rest of the west can’t even steal his lame bromides: A society that has no children has no future.
Permanence is the illusion of every age. In 1913, no one thought the Russian, Austrian, German, and Turkish empires would be gone within half a decade. Seventy years on, all those fellows who dismissed Reagan as an “amiable dunce” (in Clark Clifford’s phrase) assured us the Soviet Union was likewise here to stay. The CIA analysts’ position was that East Germany was the ninth biggest economic power in the world. In 1987 there was no rash of experts predicting the imminent fall of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact, and the USSR itself.
Yet, even by the minimal standards of these wretched precedents, so-called “post-Christian” civilizations—as a prominent EU official described his continent to me—are more prone than traditional societies to mistake the present tense for a permanent feature. Religious cultures have a much greater sense of both past and future, as we did a century ago, when we spoke of death as joining “the great majority” in “the unseen world.” But if secularism’s starting point is that this is all there is, it’s no surprise that, consciously or not, they invest the here and now with far greater powers of endurance than it’s ever had. The idea that progressive Euro-welfarism is the permanent resting place of human development was always foolish; we now know that it’s suicidally so.
To avoid collapse, European nations will need to take in immigrants at a rate no stable society has ever attempted. The CIA is predicting the EU will collapse by 2020. Given that the CIA’s got pretty much everything wrong for half a century, that would suggest the EU is a shoo-in to be the colossus of the new millennium. But even a flop spook is right twice a generation. If anything, the date of EU collapse is rather a cautious estimate. It seems more likely that within the next couple of European election cycles, the internal contradictions of the EU will manifest themselves in the usual way, and that by 2010 we’ll be watching burning buildings, street riots, and assassinations on American network news every night. Even if they avoid that, the idea of a childless Europe ever rivaling America militarily or economically is laughable. Sometime this century there will be 500 million Americans, and what’s left in Europe will either be very old or very Muslim. Japan faces the same problem: its population is already in absolute decline, the first gentle slope of a death spiral it will be unlikely ever to climb out of. Will Japan be an economic powerhouse if it’s populated by Koreans and Filipinos? Very possibly. Will Germany if it’s populated by Algerians? That’s a trickier proposition.
Best-case scenario? The Continent winds up as Vienna with Swedish tax rates.
Worst-case scenario: Sharia, circa 2040; semi-Sharia, a lot sooner—and we’re already seeing a drift in that direction.
In July 2003, speaking to the United States Congress, Tony Blair remarked: “As Britain knows, all predominant power seems for a time invincible but, in fact, it is transient. The question is: What do you leave behind?”
Excellent question. Britannia will never again wield the unrivalled power she enjoyed at her imperial apogee, but the Britannic inheritance endures, to one degree or another, in many of the key regional players in the world today—Australia, India, South Africa—and in dozens of island statelets from the Caribbean to the Pacific. If China ever takes its place as an advanced nation, it will be because the People’s Republic learns more from British Hong Kong than Hong Kong learns from the Little Red Book. And of course the dominant power of our time derives its political character from eighteenth-century British subjects who took English ideas a little further than the mother country was willing to go.
A decade and a half after victory in the Cold War and end-of-history triumphalism, the “what do you leave behind?” question is more urgent than most of us expected. “The west,” as a concept, is dead, and the west, as a matter of demographic fact, is dying.
What will London—or Paris, or Amsterdam—be like in the mid-Thirties? If European politicians make no serious attempt this decade to wean the populace off their unsustainable thirty-five-hour weeks, retirement at sixty, etc., then to keep the present level of pensions and health benefits the EU will need to import so many workers from North Africa and the Middle East that it will be well on its way to majority Muslim by 2035. As things stand, Muslims are already the primary source of population growth in English cities. Can a society become increasingly Islamic in its demographic character without becoming increasingly Islamic in its political character?
This ought to be the left’s issue. I’m a conservative—I’m not entirely on board with the Islamist program when it comes to beheading sodomites and so on, but I agree Britney Spears dresses like a slut: I’m with Mullah Omar on that one. Why then, if your big thing is feminism or abortion or gay marriage, are you so certain that the cult of tolerance will prevail once the biggest demographic in your society is cheerfully intolerant? Who, after all, are going to be the first victims of the west’s collapsed birth rates? Even if one were to take the optimistic view that Europe will be able to resist the creeping imposition of Sharia currently engulfing Nigeria, it remains the case that the Muslim world is not notable for setting much store by “a woman’s right to choose,” in any sense. I watched that big abortion rally in Washington in 2004, where Ashley Judd and Gloria Steinem were cheered by women waving “Keep your Bush off my bush” placards, and I thought it was the equivalent of a White Russian tea party in 1917. By prioritizing a “woman’s right to choose,” western women are delivering their societies into the hands of fellows far more patriarchal than a 1950s sitcom dad. If any of those women marching for their “reproductive rights” still have babies, they might like to ponder demographic realities: A little girl born today will be unlikely, at the age of forty, to be free to prance around demonstrations in Eurabian Paris or Amsterdam chanting “Hands off my bush!”
Just before the 2004 election, that eminent political analyst Cameron Diaz appeared on the Oprah Winfrey show to explain what was at stake:
“Women have so much to lose. I mean, we could lose the right to our bodies… . If you think that rape should be legal, then don’t vote. But if you think that you have a right to your body,” she advised Oprah’s viewers, “then you should vote.”
Poor Cameron. A couple of weeks later, the scary people won. She lost all rights to her body. Unlike Alec Baldwin, she couldn’t even move to France. Her body was grounded in Terminal D.
But, after framing the 2004 Presidential election as a referendum on the right to rape, Miss Diaz might be interested to know that men enjoy that right under many Islamic legal codes around the world. In his book The Empty Cradle, Philip Longman asks: “So where will the children of the future come from? Increasingly they will come from people who are at odds with the modern world. Such a trend, if sustained, could drive human culture off its current market-driven, individualistic, modernist course, gradually creating an anti-market culture dominated by fundamentalism—a new Dark Ages.”
Bottom line for Cameron Diaz: There are worse things than John Ashcroft out there.
Longman’s point is well taken. The refined antennae of western liberals mean that, whenever one raises the question of whether there will be any Italians living in the geographical zone marked as Italy a generation or three hence, they cry, “Racism!” To fret about what proportion of the population is “white” is grotesque and inappropriate. But it’s not about race, it’s about culture. If 100 percent of your population believes in liberal pluralist democracy, it doesn’t matter whether 70 percent of them are “white” or only 5 percent are. But, if one part of your population believes in liberal pluralist democracy and the other doesn’t, then it becomes a matter of great importance whether the part that does is 90 percent of the population or only 60, 50, 45 percent.
Since the President unveiled the so-called Bush Doctrine—the plan to promote liberty throughout the Arab world—innumerable “progressives” have routinely asserted that there’s no evidence Muslims want liberty and, indeed, Islam is incompatible with democracy. If that’s true, it’s a problem not for the Middle East today but for Europe the day after tomorrow. According to a poll taken in 2004, over 60 percent of British Muslims want to live under sharia—in the United Kingdom. If a population “at odds with the modern world” is the fastest-breeding group on the planet—if there are more Muslim nations, more fundamentalist Muslims within those nations, more and more Muslims within non-Muslim nations, and more and more Muslims represented in more and more transnational institutions—how safe a bet is the survival of the “modern world”?
Not good.
“What do you leave behind?” asked Tony Blair. There will only be very few and very old ethnic Germans and French and Italians by the midpoint of this century. What will they leave behind? Territories that happen to bear their names and keep up some of the old buildings? Or will the dying European races understand that the only legacy that matters is whether the peoples who will live in those lands after them are reconciled to pluralist, liberal democracy? It’s the demography, stupid. And, if they can’t muster the will to change course, then “what do you leave behind?” is the only question that matters.
This article originally appeared in The New Criterion, Volume 24, January 2006

Eid days in Jordan

2006-01-11T16:55:00.000Z

Eid Days

The Jordan Times took to the streets of the capital to find out how citizens will be spending the Eid holiday

Mohammad Hani
Supermarket owner
Every Eid Al Adha Mohammad Hani heads off to prayer with his sons. To him, Eid is a time of the year to step back and look at the bigger picture.
“It's a very spiritual time for our family during which we like to think of others; from family members we haven't seen for a while to other people in need of help,” Mohammad explains.
The family follows their morning prayers by the annual tradition of sacrificing and offering the meat to the less fortunate; “ it is our duty to God. I do it to thank Him for the blessings in our lives by sharing a little with others less fortunate. We should try to give more often,” says Mohammad.
The rest of the day he spends with the family visiting relatives where they drink Arabic coffee and try fresh home made mamoul cookies, a holiday speciality stuffed with dates, walnuts or pistachio.
Mohammad speaks of his life-long aspiration of performing Hajj with great passion.
“It is not just a duty but an obligation in Islam and one of its five pillars.” Already have performed the umrah, a less essential pilgrimage in Islam, Hajj is in his plans for the near future.
“I know it will be a physically trying experience, but it is all worth it to reach that point of inner peace and closeness to God.”

Adel Khalil
Cosmetics shop owner
“I will start the first day of Eid Al Adha, with the Eid prayer, a special prayer for Muslims performed at dawn on the first day of Eid. I will accompany three of my children to the prayer,” said the 39-years- old businessman.
Khalil said that after the prayers he will go with his 59-year old father, his children and some of his relatives, to the graveyard to visit the tombs of his relatives and friends.
“This is something traditional in Islam, I usually go with other members of my family members to visit the tombs of our relatives and beloved friends and pray for them over the Eid period. To visit the tombs of relatives and friends and pray for them is something common in Islam,” Khalil told The Jordan Times.
“After we return from the graveyard, all my family members, my parents and sisters gather for breakfast and share opinions on what to do during Eid. Then, after breakfast I give my kids and parents the Eidiah (a money gift usually given to children and female relatives during Eid).
After afternoon prayers, Khalil said he will buy a sheep, slaughter it, keep some of it and distribute the rest to poor neighbours.
“I usually buy two or three sheep at Al Adha Eid but this Eid I will buy only one because I cannot afford it because the price of sheep is now more than JD132,” said Khalil.
“During the rest of Eid, I will visit relatives, friends and accompany my children to the amusement park. After all, Eid is for kids and us fathers are there just to provide the money,” said Khalil laughing.

Sara Dudin
University student
To Sara, Eid is all about spending time with her family. “Everyone is so busy throughout the year, so Eid is an excellent occasion for us to get together,” she explains.
This Tuesday, Sara will be waking up early to visit her relatives and enjoy lunch in a restaurant with her parents and four sisters.
“As a kid, Eid was about the presents and getting money from my parents. I've come to realise growing up a different meaning to it in spending time with my family and its spiritual aspect.”
“Now I see myself as a child in my younger sisters,” she adds. Sara smiles as she points to her eight-year-old sister Dina, who shyly hides behind Sara's back.
By the spiritual aspect, Sara means Hajj, a dream she has not fulfilled but is in her plans for the future. “I can imagine it to be an extraordinary experience — for all these people to come together regardless of race or background and join each other for the single purpose of worshipping God.”
While sacrificing is not an annual tradition in her family, it is still a valuable part of Eid Al Adha. “It helps us become less self-centred and think of others less fortunate.”
With the first day of Eid all about the family, following days give Sara time to share the celebrations with her friends.
“We like to visit each other on the second day, and in the later days we go out somewhere. Unfortunately this year final exams won't give us the chance.”

Khalid Daoud
Marketing specialist at Motorola International
“I came to Jordan last Thursday to visit my grandfather and grandmother and the rest of my relatives. I also wanted to spend the Eid here in Amman to visit two of my friends, who will get married during the Eid and then leave for the US. They are so dear to my heart and I wanted badly to see them because they are planning to remain in the US for good and it will probably be years before I get the chance to see them,” said Daoud, a Jordanian expatriate who lives in Dubai.
Daoud believes that this Eid is special for him.
“This Eid is special as I came to Amman over the past Eids as a university student, but this time I came to Amman to sign a deal for my work,” said the 25-year old marketing specialist.
Daoud says he prefers to spend Eid in Amman rather than in Dubai with his immediate family, as he misses his friends here and enjoys catching up on the news and spending time visiting the places he loves.
“I plan to stay until next Saturday and during this time I will meet with old friends, university colleagues and hang out in Petra, Wadi Rum and Aqaba.
“It seems that the Eid will be rainy and cold in Amman, so we will travel to where it is warmer,” Daoud told The Jordan Times.
Interviews By Razan Nasser and Mohammad Ghazal -Jordan times

Hadj pilgrims

2006-01-10T16:20:00.000Z

Hajj pilgrims begin stoning ritual

More than two million Muslim pilgrims have begun the ritual stoning of the devil that signifies the climax of the annual Hajj pilgrimage.
Pilgrims flocked to the site at Mena's Jamarat Bridge to cast the first set of stones before the crowds arrived.They must stand and stone three thick walls in a symbolic casting out of the devil and rejection of temptation.The occasion is subject to strict security as it had witnessed deadly stampedes in the past, like in 2004 when 250 pilgrims were trampled to death.In a message marking Tuesday's Eid al-Adha holiday, King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia said: "We ask God to make this Eid one of peace and stability for Muslims and the whole world and unite Muslims in goodness and inspire them to do what is right."Tight securityThis year's pilgrimage has been overshadowed by the collapse of a Makka hostel that killed 76 people on Thursday and warnings of a possible spread of bird flu due to the huge crowds.Saudi Arabia has deployed a record 60,000-strong security force to control the huge crowds and avert attacks by Islamist militants opposing the US-allied Saudi royal family.
An estimated 2.5 million pilgrimsare expected in MakkaPilgrims must perform the stoning ritual three times. Many will stay in Jamarat until Thursday, the end of the five-day Hajj, whose rules were laid out by the Prophet Mohammad 1400 years ago. The Hajj is a journey every able-bodied Muslim is urged to complete at least once in his/her lifetime.
The government has reorganised access to the Jamarat area and promised to remove pilgrim squatters who camp there.Symbol of equality
Pilgrims, male and female, complete the first stoning session and then go to Makka to circle the Kaaba, which symbolises the house of God, dressed in white robes meant to eradicate class and make all Muslims equal.The state-appointed preacher at the Grand Mosque, Sheikh Abdulrahman al-Sudeis, urged Muslims in his Eid sermon to remember their Muslim brothers in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in Iraq
He also said the West was using the phenomenon of terrorism to scare people away from Islam. "Muslims are being described in insulting terms to distort the image of Islam and scare people away from it," he said.
During Eid, Muslims slay livestock as a reminder of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son Ismail at God's command. Pilgrims buy special coupons from hajj organisers that represent the slain animal.
The collapse of a Makka hostelhas cast a shadow on the Hajj
Makka, a trading city that relies on the pilgrim traffic to sustain the local economy, comes alive as pilgrims flock to the Grand Mosque and circle the Kaaba and then queue at barbers for a haircut.The Saudi authorities were embarrassed by the collapse of the hostel in Makka, which was only 30 years old, amid the midday bustle of a narrow market street. The legitimacy of Saudi Arabia's ruling house rests in the eyes of many Muslims on its ability to host some 2.5 million hajj pilgrims every year.
Reuters

Asylum and immigration in Britain today

2006-01-08T17:53:00.000Z

Asylum and immigration in Britain today

At the New Labour and Tory Party conferences, inflammatory speeches reaffirmed that both parties are prepared to whip up prejudice against asylum seekers and immigrants. This issue clearly has the potential to deeply divide society and raises many questions which have to be addressed by working class and trade union activists. HANNAH SELL outlines the socialist approach.
INDELIBLY MARKED AS a liar by the Hutton enquiry, Tony Blair went to this year’s Labour Party conference a wounded man, desperate to use his annual address to rebuild his standing. The resulting speech had many nauseating qualities but perhaps the foulest was his blatant attempt to restore his own popularity by whipping up prejudice by talking about ‘derailing the gravy train’ for asylum seekers.
Nor was this just a one-off conference ploy. Home Secretary David Blunkett is implementing a series of measures designed to create the impression that New Labour is heroically manning the barricades to prevent a flood of ‘bogus’ asylum seekers entering the country (see box 1). At Tory Party conference, Oliver Letwin went even further, talking about locking up all asylum seekers on a ‘far, faraway island’. Perhaps it is not surprising that he had no idea which island would agree to his plans. After all, his first brainwave was the poll tax when he worked as an assistant to Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s!
However, none of the proposals of New Labour or the Tories will prevent immigration into the country, any more than any of the increasingly repressive legislation of the previous decade has been able to do. Nor are they primarily designed to do so. Rather, they are political ploys arising from a fear of the far-right gaining from anti-asylum sentiment and, in Labour’s case, aimed at distracting workers from the government’s responsibility for the decay of our public services. Far from undercutting the far-right by stealing their clothes, however, New Labour increases the possibility of the British National Party (BNP) and its ilk growing. BNP leader, Nick Griffin, has described Blunkett as the BNP’s ‘best recruiting sergeant’.
It is not the immigration policies of successive governments that have led to an increase in the number of asylum seekers over the last decade. Capitalism at the start of the 21st century means an increasingly unstable and violent world, and this has led to growing numbers of people leaving their homes to try and find safety and security elsewhere. Repressive regimes, war and conflict, economic crises and environmental disasters are the conditions that create refugees internationally. In the modern world, where travel is more possible than ever before, it is inevitable that people try to escape from terrible conditions. And those conditions are the consequences of the capitalist system which is based on exploitation, competition and the pursuit of profit; a system which New Labour and the other main political parties represent. This system condemns 1.2 billion people to live on less than $1 a day. The richest 200 companies have combined sales worth more than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all but ten nations in the world. Globally, $1 trillion a year is wasted on military spending. It is a system of economic crises, increasingly leading to whole states ‘failing’, a system that is stagnating on a global scale.
While capitalism’s instability has increased the numbers who leave their homelands, international migrants – defined as people who live outside their homeland for a year or more – only account for under 3% of the world’s population: a total, in 2000, of maybe 150 million people, less than the population of Brazil. Only twelve million of these are refugees or asylum seekers – people who have been forced to leave their countries to escape war, persecution or natural disaster. The rest have moved for economic or other reasons. And the vast majority of those who are refugees do not come to Europe. It is the world’s poorest countries that both produce and bear responsibility for most refugees. During 1992-2001, 86% of the world’s refugees originated from developing countries, and also provided asylum to 72% of the global refugee population. If you consider global refugee and asylum seeking populations in relation to the host country’s size, population and wealth, the UK ranks 32nd. Taking the greatest burden are Iran, Burundi and Guinea.
Still it is true that there has also been an increase in immigration to the European Union (EU), including Britain. Over the last decade, an average of 1.2 million people entered the EU legally each year. Overall, the numbers have tailed off over the last couple of years, although they remain at a higher level than they were before the 1990s. It is, however, very difficult to get an accurate picture. The Economist magazine compared information from the Belgian and Italian governments on migration between the two countries and found it was completely different!
In a country like Britain, with relatively few internal checks, it is even harder to keep accurate records. Nonetheless, two definite conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, net immigration has been at a higher level than at any time over the last 150 years. Secondly, only a minority of these are asylum seekers. In fact, the majority come for a specific job and pay taxes from the moment they arrive. Contrary to the tabloid media’s attempts to lump together all immigrants, in 1999, for example, only 28% of non-British immigrants were asylum seekers. However, the number of asylum seekers has increased. In 2002, 84,130 people applied for asylum in Britain.
A boost to profits
THIS IS A change from the previous century. Between 1870 and 1920 Jewish immigration to Britain from Russia and Eastern Europe was at least as great as current levels of immigration. However, despite this there was a net outflow of over 2.6 million. This was largely due to emigration to the British colonies and the US. Only in the 1950s was there net immigration as the capitalist class appealed to workers from South Asia and the Caribbean to fulfil the need for cheap labour. Even so, net immigration was only about 12,000 over the decade. Also, this was against the background of the post-war economic expansion which meant that, unlike today, living standards for many workers in Britain were improving significantly. In the 1980s, when Thatcher declared immigration a ‘problem’, there was a net outflow.
The propaganda of the capitalist media and the mainstream political parties declares that current levels of immigration are unmanageable. But this is not their real position. On the contrary, immigration, both legal and illegal, is useful to them. The Economist argued in its 2002 survey of migration: "The gap between labour’s rewards in the poor and the rich countries, even for something as menial as clearing tables, dwarfs the gap between the prices of traded goods from different parts of the world. The potential gains [profits] from liberalising migration therefore dwarf those from removing barriers to world trade".
Immigration offers an invaluable opportunity for capitalists to compensate for an aging population in Europe and, at the same time, force wages down. It is an extension of neo-liberal policies. The globalisation of the world economy has been used to increase profits. One aspect of this is the moving of production to countries where labour is cheaper. Now they are trying to globalise labour by encouraging cheap-labour workers to travel to richer countries, thereby driving down wages there. This is particularly true with public and private services which cannot be moved around. This is taking place across Europe. The European Commission concluded that "more sustained immigration flows are increasingly likely and necessary. The trend towards a shrinking working-age population in Europe in combination with various push factors in the developing countries is likely to generate a sustained flow of immigrants over the next decade". In Britain, the government’s Actuary Department (which calculates population) estimates that immigration will account for 60% of the growth in the working-age population between 2002 and 2006.
Risk of social upheaval
THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS, from the capitalist point of view, that the limitations to this are not practical but political: "But those gains can be made only at great political cost. Countries rarely welcome strangers in their midst".
The arrival of new immigrants has always had the potential to create dangerous instability. The nation state is the basic unit of capitalist society, whilst at the same time holding back its development. Today, in the era of globalisation, the productive forces – industry, science and technique – have long outgrown their national base. Therefore, the capitalists strain against the limitations of the nation state. However, they can only partially surmount it. The big corporations are, almost without exception, still based in, and tied to, particular countries. They rely on the market and political superstructure of their home nation. An intrinsic part of that superstructure is a national consciousness which the capitalist class taps into, for example, to win support for its wars. However, the capitalists cannot switch national consciousness on and off at will.
British capitalism felt it had no choice but to limit immigration at the end of the 1960s, despite the economic advantages it could have gained by speeding it up, because they feared the potential for social instability. Recently published cabinet papers from 1972 reveal how Tory prime minister Ted Heath called for harsh measures to prevent a second influx of Ugandan Asians, despite feeling that this was against Britain’s interests and his own better judgement. Today, when the lives of workers in Britain are, in general, becoming more difficult – as working hours increase and public services deteriorate – the potential for instability and conflict is clear.
New Labour has attempted to bridge the gap between the political advantages of attacking asylum seekers and cracking down on ‘illegal’ immigrants, and the capitalists’ desire for cheap labour by increasing the number of legal ‘economic’ migrants into Britain. The anti-asylum seeker propaganda that runs through its ‘crackdown’ has massively increased prejudice against asylum seekers, immigrants in general, and against more long-standing ethnic minority communities.
At the same time, the number of people working legally in Britain who were born abroad has increased from 1.8 million in 1995 to 2.6 million today. The largest increases are in South Africans and Australians. The sectors that use most migrant labour are healthcare, education, cleaning, food manufacture, catering and hotels. Until recently, the government’s policy of dramatically increasing ‘economic’ migration has been formally limited to skilled workers taking specific jobs. Many of these are in the public sector, such as nurses, teachers and doctors.
A recent opinion poll showed that 70% of people support immigrants taking these jobs if it means that a skills shortage will be filled. However, the shortages that exist in many parts of the public sector reflect New Labour’s unwillingness to adequately resource training or public-sector workers’ wage rises, in particular. As a result of stress and low pay, 40% of newly qualified teachers leave teaching within their first three years in the job. The response of New Labour has not been to increase wages and staffing levels to tempt more teachers to teach. Instead, in London in particular, it has relied on immigrant workers to plug the gap. With the promise of better pay and conditions, teachers and nurses from other countries are encouraged to move to Britain. As a result, the Jamaican government has complained that 600 teachers moved abroad this year to work, mainly in Britain and the US. Last year, South Africa accused the British government of ‘plundering’ staff. However, the better pay and conditions are far from luxurious. In one London school, immigrant teachers were housed in Portakabins in the school playground!
Unskilled labour
IN THE FUTURE, New Labour intends to go further by allowing a quota of unskilled workers into the country every year. At the same time, it is claiming to clamp down on illegal immigration. For the capitalists, however, illegal immigration is the best unskilled labour of all. The Economist said: "Illegal migrants are the most employment-hungry, market-sensitive arrivals of all. In the United Sates, points out Roberto Suro, director of the Pew Hispanic Centre, they provide just-in-time labour: ‘A meat-packing plant in Iowa can say to the foreman, next month, we need 5% more workers for three months. On the day they are needed, they’ll be there. It’s extremely efficient’. To convince their voters that migration is under control, governments have to curb the illegal sort. But they would be foolish, in doing so, to lose the flexibility and employability that illegals contribute".
In the same article, The Economist described a survey by the National Research Council (NRC) into the effects illegal immigrants have in the US. NRC concluded that, overall, immigration had reduced the wages of groups competing with immigrants – predominantly the low paid – by 1-2%.
This is one reason that Blunkett’s plan to introduce ID cards may not be carried through. Many in the cabinet are opposed because they see it as an expensive and bureaucratic scheme which will bring limited benefits. Some sections of big business, as reflected in The Economist, are opposed for the same reasons. They are happy with large numbers of ‘illegals’. Britain already has a low-paid, ‘flexible’ workforce. But as far as capitalism is concerned, wages can never be too low or employment practises too ‘flexible’. Workers with no rights and on slave wages are a useful tool in forcing down wages.
ID cards are not the only policy of Blunkett’s which is unlikely to be implemented. Most of his proposals, while they may serve his propaganda purposes, are impractical. For example, the much vaunted policy of building twelve to 15 asylum centres, mostly in the countryside, theoretically to house 40% of all asylum seekers, is running into problems. The residents of rural and suburban ‘Middle England’, whom New Labour sees as a key audience, have not proved amenable to having the centres built in their ‘backyards’. As a result, New Labour has not yet come up with one definite site. The government may be forced to rethink, just as it was on the call for ‘asylum centres’ outside of the EU.
Without doubt, however partially they are implemented, New Labour’s plans will lead to increased misery for asylum seekers. But they will not stop people fleeing persecution and war coming to Britain. As long as capitalism remains, asylum seekers will continue to exist in large numbers. In Britain, as in other countries, the numbers will ebb and flow with the passage of crises and wars. For example, the increase in asylum applications last year was mainly from Iraq and Zimbabwe. Occasionally, policy decisions – such as the government declaring that Iraq and Zimbabwe are safe – can cut numbers. But the next war or famine will lead to a new upsurge.
A socialist approach
WHAT ATTITUDE SHOULD socialists take to the question of asylum? We are fighting for the abolition of capitalism and for the development of socialism on a world scale. Only on this basis would it to be possible to harness science and technique to build a society that could meet the needs of all humanity. In a socialist world no-one would need to flee hunger or war. At the same time, part of the struggle for socialism is for humanity’s right to move. Passports and immigration controls are portrayed by the capitalists as permanent and immutable yet they were introduced over the last 100 years. Under modern capitalism, capital is free to traverse the world. Yet people are considered criminals if they try and leave their home country (unless, of course, they are required as cheap labour). Only on the basis of socialism would it be possible to have the genuine free movement of peoples.
Under capitalism the issue of immigration remains a powerful propaganda weapon in the hands of the ruling class. To counter this, socialists must adopt a skilful approach. We have to steadfastly oppose the scapegoating of asylum seekers and economic migrants, and fight for their rights. However, in doing so we are aiming to convince as many workers as possible of this position. To adopt, as some on the left do, a headline slogan like ‘asylum seekers welcome here’ is a mistake. It will never gain the ear of the vast majority of working-class people in Britain. Even amongst the most thinking sections of workers, who are aware of how the government uses asylum to deflect attention from its neo-liberal policies, there is a feeling that Britain cannot cope with more than a limited number of asylum seekers. Amongst broader sections of the working class the wave of anti-asylum seeker propaganda has had a marked effect. There is a feeling that their numbers are partly responsible for the dilapidated state of public services. And while racism is clearly a strong element in the most vitriolic anti-asylum feeling, this is not a simple question. It is undoubtedly true that the anti-asylum feeling is stronger in towns with small black and Asian populations, or in predominantly white suburbs on the edges of more mixed towns, than it is in London, where two-thirds of immigrants settle and 28% of the population are from ethnic minorities. (Incidentally, this proves that it is not overcrowding that causes anti-asylum feeling, as London is by far the most densely-populated part of Britain.) Nonetheless, anti-asylum seeker feeling does not only exist among white workers, but also among second and third generation immigrants from the neo-colonial world. Several opinion polls show that, as a result of the deluge of propaganda against them, the broadest hostility is towards Eastern European refugees rather than those from Africa or Asia.
That is not in any way to suggest that racism is no longer an issue in Britain. Racism has been an integral part of capitalism since its infancy when it was used to justify the slave trade. Later, racism was adapted to justify the colonial powers carving up the world between them. Today, racism is still ingrained in British society. The increased wealth and privilege of a small minority of black and Asian people is used to disguise the fact that we continue to live in a deeply unequal society. On average, black and Asian workers earn only three-quarters of the wage of their white counterparts. And black people are five times as likely to be stopped by the police. Nonetheless, hostility towards asylum seekers, as the newest arrivals on the bottom rung of the ladder, is not simply a question of race.
Socialists have to counter this hostility with a class approach. It is the poor, the world’s huddled masses, who have to face impossible obstacles to claiming asylum and the vitriol of the mainstream parties and media. Even though many asylum seekers do not come from the poorest strata in their country of origin, by the time they have spent their resources to cross the world, they generally arrive in Britain with nothing. By contrast, anyone with over £250,000 in their bank account, from wherever they came, is welcomed with open arms. Russian oligarchs, like Boris Berezovsky (who made his millions on the backs of Russian workers, and faces charges of money laundering in Russia), are granted political asylum. At the same time, it is not the rich but the poorest sections of the indigenous working class who are on the sharp end of low pay and New Labour’s cuts, and who have been most affected by anti-asylum seeker vitriol.
Whilst defending the rights of asylum seekers we must link that directly to our programme to fight to improve the living conditions of working people as a whole and to the struggle for socialism. Socialists have to oppose the persecution and jailing of asylum seekers, along with the rest of Blunkett’s reactionary legislation, highlighting issues such as the building of detention centres and the prosecution of those without papers. We have to defend the right of asylum, of families to be reunited and of asylum seekers to work. We should call for an end to the forced dispersal system and for asylum seekers to live where they choose, with central government providing local authorities with the necessary resources. Any plans to provide housing for asylum seekers in new areas should not be done secretly through NASS (National Asylum Support Service – the secretive government agency that currently deals with asylum seekers) but openly and under local authority control.
Trade union action
AT THE SAME time, it is necessary to work out a more detailed programme in individual communities where there has been a sudden influx of asylum seekers. We always fight to prevent working-class communities having to suffer further over-stretching of limited services. Government policy means that this is the effect of the sudden arrival of new asylum seekers. We have to call for community campaigns to secure extra resources – more teachers, doctors, language support and so on – in some cases, even as a precondition to the arrival of new groups of asylum seekers. In doing so we should always strive to build a united campaign of asylum seekers and local communities.
However, probably the most critical aspect of this discussion is the role of immigrants in the workplace. The organisation of immigrants into trade unions is not a new issue for the British working class, but it will form a vital aspect of both the struggle against low pay and the struggle against racism in the coming years. As far back as 1839, when William Cuffay (who was born in St Kitts in the Caribbean), founded the garment workers’ union, immigrant workers have played a role greater than their numbers in the British labour movement. The labour movement at its best has also played the key role in fighting racism. In the 1950s, for example, the railway workers’ union played the leading role in getting rid of the colour bar in many London pubs. This flowed from a realisation that the only way to stop bosses using workers from the Caribbean as cheap labour was to unionise them and launch a common struggle for decent pay. In the 1970s trade unions were instrumental in the battle to defeat the far-right racist National Front.
It is as a result of these traditions that black and Asian workers formed a strong bond with the labour movement, even though the majority did not come from an urban background in their home countries. In the 1970s, black and Asian workers played a key role in many industrial struggles. The Grunwick strike against low pay in 1976, which largely involved Asian women, was one of the most important battles of the decade. Even today, after the general fall in union membership in the 1990s, Afro-Caribbean workers still have a higher level of union membership (32.4%) than the workforce as a whole (26.6%). However, amongst newer immigrants, levels are much lower – 11% for workers born in Eastern Europe, for example.
If the trade union movement fails to win the new generation of immigrants, the pay and conditions of all workers will be undermined. The potential for heroic struggles was demonstrated in the US by the strike of Mexican janitors. They faced the risk not only of the sack but deportation and hostility from the trade union bureaucracy (dramatised in the Ken Loach film, Bread and Roses). However, it is not automatic that immigrant workers will be won to the labour movement. Socialists have to argue for a programme around which to do that. Key to this would be launching a serious struggle for a minimum wage of £8 an hour with no exemptions. We should specify that all workers, regardless of their legal status, should receive the minimum wage. There are currently between 48 and 123 government inspectors investigating employers who do not pay the minimum wage. Of the 56,000 complaints made by workers only 26 resulted in action being taken against the employers! The trade union movement should launch a massive ‘crackdown’ on the slave-labour bosses, in opposition to government ‘crackdowns’ on illegal immigrants working.
We must also campaign for the trade union movement to fight for all migrant workers to be employed on equal pay and conditions to indigenous workers in order to prevent immigration being used to lower wages. This is particularly urgent in the public sector, where there is a higher level of union organisation and New Labour is using migrant workers to plug gaps.
If the trade union movement as a whole launched a serious struggle against low pay, specifically taking up the rights of immigrant workers, it would transform the political landscape. At the same time as arguing for such a struggle, where socialists have significant influence, a campaign on this kind of programme can have a real effect in uniting the different sections of workers in Britain, both immigrant and indigenous.

Box 1
New Labour’s latest crackdowns
2002
July: The ‘right’ of asylum seekers to apply for special permission to work is taken away.
November: Any applications from ten EU accession states – Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – are automatically considered unfounded, with no right of appeal. Applications from these states fell from 285 in October to 40 in March.
December: Sangatte centre at Calais closed after intense pressure from the British government.
2003
January: Those who do not claim asylum immediately they enter Britain lose the right to benefits.
January: Anyone with refugee status in another part of the European Economic Area cannot receive benefits.
January: Visas become necessary for Jamaicans travelling to Britain.
February: Treaties with Bulgaria and Romania make it easier to return failed asylum seekers.
February: Asylum applications by post are banned.
February: Visas become necessary for Zimbabweans travelling to Britain.
February: Applications from Albania, Bulgaria, Jamaica, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro are automatically considered unfounded.
More measures planned by the government include:
The introduction of a citizenship ceremony and a requirement that those seeking citizenship should have a knowledge of life in Britain.
The arrest and prosecution of any asylum seeker without documentation.
The building of twelve to 15 asylum centres each holding around 750 people, with the capacity to hold around 40% of all asylum seekers. Several of these to be located in rural areas.
The possible introduction of ID cards which would have to be shown to get a job, or use the NHS or other services.
Box 2
What are conditions really like?
If an asylum seeker gets into Britain, this is what they face as they wait for a judgment:
A person over 25 is entitled to £38.26 a week in state benefits; 18-25 year-olds get £30.28.
These benefits are 70% of the income support level considered to provide the ‘absolute necessities of existence’. Asylum seekers are not allowed to work.
Asylum seekers are entitled to housing but a fifth of the housing they occupy is classified as unfit for human habitation.
Previously it was the duty of local authorities to provide this. Responsibility is now with the National Asylum Support Service (NASS). NASS has a policy of ‘dispersing’ asylum seekers across Britain. In order to get housed, asylum seekers are forced to move to wherever NASS chooses. Only 58 of 440 English and Welsh councils are part of the dispersal system. The overwhelming majority are in poorer working class areas where resources are overstretched.
Most asylum seekers are in privately-rented accommodation. Often it is in low quality property converted into overcrowded, substandard housing for rent to asylum seekers via NASS. Councils have no control over this and usually are not informed. One result is that, when an asylum claim is successful, NASS immediately stops funding their housing. Penniless asylum seekers, who have not yet had any opportunity to find work or save for a deposit on a house or flat, are left homeless and at the mercy of a local authority that was previously unaware of their existence.

Sources
Overworked, Underpaid and Over Here, TUC, July 2003
Survey on Migration, The Economist, November 2002
Special reports on Diasporas, Migration, and Emigration, The Economist, January, August, September 2003
Asylum City, The Asylum Coalition, September 2002
Response to the Lord Chancellor’s Consultation on Proposed Changes to Publicly Funded Asylum Work, Asylum Aid, August 2003
Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 2002, National Statistics Office, August 2002
British Public Attitudes and Ethnic Minorities, Cabinet Office Innovation Unit, July 2001
Progress Report on the Minimum Wage 2002, Low Pay Commission, January 2003

Hadj

2006-01-08T13:11:00.000Z

Muslims pray for salvation as Hajj draws near

MECCA (AP) — Pilgrims, their eyes welling with tears, circled the Kaaba, raising their hands heavenward in prayer Saturday, asking for God's bounty and forgiveness.
Millions of Muslim faithful, the men in white robes and women covered head to toe, were in Islam's holiest city to prepare for the Hajj, the faith's most sacred ritual, which begins Sunday. They clutched prayer books and recited the Holy Koran, asking salvation during their visit to the Baitullah, or House of God. For many Muslims, the Hajj — one of Islam's five pillars — signals their spiritual rebirth and the burial of past transgressions.
The pilgrimage is required of all Muslims who are able, as is the profession that there is only one God and Mohammad is His prophet, prayer five times daily, the giving of alms and fasting during the Holy Month of Ramadan.
Facing the Kaaba, Zeinab Abdouazizi from a Bangladesh raised her voice in prayer: "Oh Allah, give me health and strength so that I can raise my children and make them stand on their feet. I beg you to give similar strength to my husband and make his trade bloom and make my children good Muslims and obedient."
Rabee'a Assuity, an Egyptian government clerk, was candid and clear. Resting a moment under the scorching sun, he paused and prayed: "Oh, God you know best what I need, an apartment for my son Adel so he can get married and a job for my daughter Samiha." Nearby, Ahmed Zain from Lebanon spoke into his cellphone asking his wife at home what he should pray for her.
After listening, he could be heard to say "I prayed for that. What else do you want?" It was not unusual to hear pilgrims issuing prayers brought from distant lands on behalf of friends. The faithful believe the Almighty is especially close and receptive in the House of God.
Abdi Berri Youssef, who lost his legs in the Somali civil war and whose son pushed him through the crowd in a wheelchair, raised his hands and called out: "Oh, God of the whole world, I am defenceless, give me strength and endurance, nothing else." Daouwd Zeinalabidine, a Nigerian lawyer: "Oh Allah, my creator and my benefactor praise is for you. You are the one who deserves to be obeyed till the end. I ask you forgiveness and seek purity of my soul." He told a reporter he had also prayed for "peace for myself, for my country and for the whole world." In a corner of the vast, marbled-columned mosque, a group of Iraqis sought peace as well.
"Oh Allah, the God of all human all beings, bring peace and tranquility back to our country," the group responded after a prayer leader.
Like most Shiites pilgrims, Jawadi Azghar from Iran held the book of supplications, the Mafatih Al Jinan, or the "Keys of Paradises," as he prayed: "Oh God, you are the most generous. You answer the wishes of your obedient servant and never disappoint him. Whenever he knocks at your door you open it wide and bring him closer to you. Oh God, you forgive all the sinners who come asking mercy. How can I ask others for help when you are my guide? How can I forget you when you sit deep in my heart.
“I ask you to bestow all your bounty on me. I ask you to reward me with a conscience that assures my heart and clears my insight."
As he finished, he broke into tears.
In the Koran, God tells Muslims: "Pray to me, I listen to your needs." About two million pilgrims from around the world were expected to perform the rites of the Hajj, which begins Monday.
About 60,000 troops are at the ready to ensure everything runs smoothly, which they all-too-often haven't in recent decades.
Jordan Tmes 8/1/06

Arabs and Globalization

2006-01-08T10:30:00.000Z

Arabs and Globalization: Encroaching Identity Crisis Ramzy Baroud, Aljazeera.net English. —

Thanks to “Western imperialism” and the “shrewd ways of international Zionism” Arabs, we are told, remain out of touch with an array of social and cultural crises that have plagued their societies.
Problems and challenges in the Arab world are molded in so clever a way that the blame for them falls on someone else.
Contextualizing social diseases within a larger political framework is often helpful, but in the Arab world this practice is grossly misused. Washington’s Middle East foreign policy tells a great deal about the US political culture, the Middle East’s receptiveness to the abuses imposed by that culture and mute response to the subsequent challenges posed. But these US abuses should provide neither a platform for corruption nor an excuse for Arab nations’ utter failure to provide any sort of alternative. Nor should these abuses serve as justification for the Arab world’s ills and problems such as official corruption, institutional nepotism, political extremism, indifference regarding human rights, racism, and the unscrutinized embrace of globalization.
Equally demoralizing to many Arabs, who are hoping to face these challenges head on, is this overindulgence in cosmetic touches. Governments, or officially funded organizations try to battle their poor reputation by holding conferences, seminars, symposiums and many other “impressive” gatherings to discuss issues such as education, human rights and family issues. They invite “experts” who are often selected by virtue of their glamour-generating names and titles, rather than the value of their expertise. Nothing comes out of such gatherings or is expected.
Meanwhile, the invaluable human assets in the Arab world are squandered. Millions of Arab scholars, scientists, physicians and other professionals feel compelled to emigrate to the West, despite the dire need for their leadership and guidance back at home. Lack of enough opportunities at home is only one of the reasons.
The other is that in corrupt societies, individuals are valued and therefore classified based on anything but their merit. Globalization becomes more problematic in weak nations or “client states” with easily penetrable economies. In Western societies accustomed to the nature and progression of free market economies, a filtering process is not totally unfeasible. Arab nations, deeply rooted in their own tradition, are left hapless before the cheap commercialization of the global market and unfiltered social trends that follow.
I have seen little Arab kids, innocently celebrating the end of Ramadan in a special Burger King tent on the rhythm of a hip-hop song replete with obscenities. As appalling as this may sound, the unfiltered global market culture is undoubtedly forging a collective identity crisis among the young generation in the Arab world.
Erik Erikson, who is known as the “father of psychosocial development” is renowned for constructing the concept of the “eight stages of development” in the life of the human being. According to Erikson, failure to fulfill the growth requirements of any of the eight designated stages ultimately leads to an identity crisis. I see no way around denying this collective identity crisis plaguing the Arab world. Furthermore, the current strategy of hosting fancy yet unproductive conferences with beautiful buffets and generous honoraria is as empty an answer as blindly pinning the blame on an overgeneralized foe. It is uncertain which developmental stage Arab nations find themselves in today. But if this current identity predicament is left untreated, then the subsequent desperation, alienation and extremism we now witness may become the reprehensible norm, rather than the exception.

— Ramzy Baroud is a veteran Arab-American journalist and editor in chief of PalestineChronicle.com and head of Research & Studies Department at Aljazeera.net English.

Hadj naar Mekka

2006-01-08T10:27:00.000Z

2,5 miljoen moslims trekken van Mekka naar Mina

MEKKA - Zo'n 2,5 miljoen moslims zijn zondag begonnen aan de hadj, de jaarlijkse bedevaart van Mekka naar Mina, zoals de profeet Mohammed 1.400 jaar geleden ook deed.De hadj is een tocht die elke moslim een keer in zijn leven moet ondernemen. Mannen en vrouwen van alle leeftijden en nationaliteiten, gekleed in het wit en met sandalen aan de voeten, begonnen na het ochtendgebed aan de tocht naar het even verderop gelegen Mina. Elk jaar vallen er helaas ook doden bij de pelsgrimstocht. Ook dit jaar begon de hadj al met een drama toen drie dagen geleden een hotel in het hartje van de stad Mekka instortte. Daarbij kwamen 76 mensen om en raakten 62 anderen gewond. De reddingoperaties liepen vrijdag af en de brokstukken van het hotel werden geruimd De Saudische autoriteiten zijn in de hoogste staat van paraatheid om verdere drama's te vermijden. Dit jaar zijn zo'n 60.000 veiligheidsagenten en hulpverleners gemobiliseerd om de hadj in goede banen te leiden. In 2004 vielen er 251 doden in het gewoel en in 1990 kwamen 1.426 mensen om. In 1997 vielen bij een brand 343 doden onder de pelgrims. De autoriteiten willen ook vermijden dat er onrust of ziektes uitbreken onder de pelgrims of dat er aanslagen worden gepleegd.

evaluatie WTO slotverklaring door M.Maes 11.11.11

2006-01-04T17:20:00.000Z

/ Top niveau / Nieuws /
WTO: Te weinig ontwikkeling in de de nieuwe slottekst

De nieuwe versie van de slotverklaring is uit! Dat geeft altijd aanleiding tot enig trek- en duwwerk aan de het documentatiecentrum van de conferentie. De tekst was aangekondigd tegen de middag en haalde die belofte net: om 14u was hij er.

Er was abnormaal veel volk in het conferentiecentrum en in het NGO-centrum. Iedereen heeft zijn zeg gehad. Nu was de tijd gekomen om te kijken wat dat opgeleverd had.

Iedereen dook dus meteen met zijn/haar neus in de tekst. In het NGO-centrum gingen mensen in groepjes bij elkaar zitten om opinies uit te wisselen.
Om 18u30 begon de vergadering van de delegatieleiders (in feite mogen er vier of vijf personen per delegatie binnen).

Het was helemaal geen levendige bijeenkomst: was iedereen moe (er was de hele nacht vergaderd - door sommigen toch), of was niemand enthousiast over de tekst. Gezien toch meer dan 60 landen het woord namen, was er blijkbaar toch nog een en ander mis. De bijeenkomst duurde uiteindelijk maar liefst vijf uur en half.

Ik zat in de vergadering en heb dus niets gemerkt van de hevige rellen in de stad, hoewel ik iets vermoedde toen ik hoorde dat EU-Commissaris Mandelson, met de boot gekomen was. Het Conferentiecentrum kijkt uit op de zee tussen Hong Kong-eiland en Kowloon en dat is tenminste een toegangsweg waar er nooit opstroppingen zijn. Mandelson was in zijn nopjes over zijn zeelanding en gaf het gastland een pluim voor de goede organisatie. Dat is iets waarover trouwens iedereen het eens is, tenzij misschien de 900 opgepakte manifestanten. Volgens de lokale TV waar ik heel even een glips van zag na de bijeenkomst van de delegatieleiders, waren dit de ergste rellen in 16 jaar. Maar binnen was daar dus nauwelijks iets van te merken.

Terug naar de delegatiebijeenkomst. Ondanks de grote verscheidenheid aan opmerkingen was er toch een grote eensgezindheid over een drietal punten:
- algemene ontgoocheling dat de tekst over tariefvrije en quotavrije markttoegang zo zwak was en een veel te grote achterpoort openliet (vooral omdat de VSA wil een aantal belangrijke producten uitzonderen en zich niet vastpinnen op een termijn);
- algemene ontgoocheling dat er nog geen regeling was voor de Afrikaanse katoenlanden(vooral omdat de VSA zijn steun aan de Amerkaanse katoenboeren niet wil of kan afschaffen);
- algemene ontgoocheling dat de EU nog altijd geen datum wil plakken op de afschaffing van haar exportsubsidies (er staan wel twee datums in de tekst, maar tussen vierkante haakjes: 2010 en "5 jaar na de inwerkkingtreding").

De ontwikkelingslanden, en vooral de G90 (Afrika, ACP, minstontwikkelde landen) vonden verder dat er veel teweinig "ontwikkeling" in de tekst zat. Daarmee bedoelden ze dat er wel allerlei regelingen instonden voor de aanpak van de liberalisering in landbouw, industriele producten, diensten enz, maar teweinig over hoe de ontwikkelingslanden dit moesten gaan toepassen en wat dit aan ontwikkeling zou opbrengen. De kleine Caribische landen zeiden dat de rijke landen teveel aan hun eigen belangen dachten. Ze vonden ook dat "ontwikkeling" in de WTO-teksten altijd verschijnt als "iets minder liberaliseren' dan ontwikkelingslanden, maar dat er geen echte doordachte ontwikkelingsaanpak inzit, geen reflectie over hoe ontwikkelingslanden hier beter van worden.
Zambia zei namens de minstontwikkelde landen dat de paragrafen in de tekst over de minstontwikkelde landen niets betekende, maar gewoon holle rhetoriek was.

Voor wat NAMA betreft (markttoegang voor niet-landbouwproducten, vooral industriele producten) waren vooral de Afrikaanse landen niet bereid om zomaar de Zwitserse formule te aanvaarden die zeer scherpe tariefverminderingen met zich mee zouden brengen. Daarvoor moest er bijvoorbeeld eerst meer duidelijk komen over de mate waarin de ontwikkelingslanden die formule zouden moeten toepassen. Ook India en Brazilie hadden daar vragen over.

De G90 (ACP-Afrika-Mistontwikkelde landen) waren ook nog lang niet gelukkig met de wijzigingen aan de GATS-bijlage. Ze erkenden dat er al een aantal zaken waren opgenomen die ze hadden voorgesteld, maar dat de tekst toch nog tevergaand was.

Vooral Sint Lucia, die sprak namens de Caribische landen, was daar zeer duidelijk over: voor ons zijn deze onderhandelingsteksten niet zomaar teksten, zij maken het verschil tussen eten op tafel of niet, tussen onderwijs of niet, tussen gezondheidszorg of niet. En Jamaica voegde er aan toe: wij zijn er van overtuigd dat de nieuwe aanpak in de GATS-onderhandelingen niet onschadelijk is, maar integendeel gevaarlijk. Conclusie: de GATS-bijlage moet nog verder worden verbeterd.

Ondanks de opmerkingen van de ontwikkelingslanden was EU-Commissaris Mandelson niet onder de indruk: we vinden dat er hier een algemeen gebrek is aan "ambitie' en we kunnen niet begrijpen waarom. Er zit niets voor ons in NAMA en GATS en in landbouw is er onvoldoende erkenning van de hervormingen die we gedaan hebben.
Toegegeven: Mandelson vond het ook maar niets dat de tekst nog zo zwak was over de vrije marktoegang voor de minstontwikkelde landen.

Mandelson vond ook, en hij werd daar in bijgetreden door de VSA, dat er nog een werkplan voor 2006 in de tekst moest en vooral een datum tegen wanneer er cijfers op tafel zouden komen. De VSA had al een datum in het hoofd: 31 maart.

De vergadering (is eigenlijk geen goed woord, want de delegaties praten niet met elkaar, ze geven gewoon en voor een hun opmerkingen) eindigde om 23u55 met de aankondiging van verdere consultaties en onderhandelingen (in de Green Room) en een nieuwe bijeenkomst van de delegatieleiders tegen zondagmiddag.

Ondertussen is die Green Room aan de gang en volgens de informatie die er uit sijpelt is zou de EU nu toch toegegeven hebben op de datum voor de afschafing van de exportsubsidies: namelijke 2013 (wat ongeveer hetzelfde is als "5 jaar na de inwerkkingtreding").

Eerder op de avond hadden wij al gehoord dat de 20 van de 25 Europese Ministers het eens konden zijn met deze datum. Vijf landen waren tegen: Frankrijk, Italie, Hongarije, Ierland en Polen. Belgie kon akkoord gaan als de EU in ruil nog wat kon binnen halen in NAMA en Diensten (dit is spijtig omdat de ontwikkelingslanden zo al vinden dat er nu al zoweinig ontwikkeling in de nieuwe ontwerpslotverlaring zit).

Marc Maes is medewerker van 11.11.11, de koepel van de Vlaamse Noord-Zuidbeweging.

Reynders belooft Van der Maelen controle op eigendommen Belgen in buitenland

2006-01-02T14:37:00.000Z

Fiscus jaagt op belastinggeld buitenverblijven

BRUSSEL - De fiscus voert de controle op eigendommen van Belgen in het buitenland op. Dat heeft minister van Financiën Didier Reynders beloofd aan SP.A-Kamerlid Dirk Van der Maelen.Tienduizenden Belgen 'vergeten' hun tweede woning aan te geven aan de Belgische fiscus en ontsnappen zo vaak aan de belastingen. Reynders heeft beloofd om in een aantal populaire vakantielanden informatie over de Belgische eigendommen op te vragen bij de lokale fiscus, of desnoods de onderhandelingen op te starten om zo'n informatie-uitwisseling mogelijk te maken.

'Fiscus jaagt op belastinggeld buitenverblijven'
(belga) - De fiscus gaat de controle op eigendommen van Belgen in het buitenland opvoeren. Dat heeft minister van Financiën Didier Reynders (MR) beloofd aan sp.a-Kamerlid Dirk Van der Maelen.
Dat schrijft de krant Het Laatste Nieuws maandag. Tienduizenden Belgen 'vergeten' hun tweede woonst aan te geven aan de Belgische fiscus en ontsnappen op die manier vaak aan de belastingen. Reynders heeft beloofd om in een aantal populaire vakantielanden (Spanje, Italië, Nederland, Duitsland, Griekenland, Turkije) informatie over de Belgische eigendommen op te vragen bij de lokale fiscus, of desnoods de onderhandelingen op te starten om zo'n informatie-uitwisseling mogelijk te maken.
Met de meeste Europese landen bestaan nu al basisakkoorden om een dubbele belasting te vermijden. Deze akkoorden kunnen worden uitgebreid, o.a. practischer uitwisseling van inlichtingen. Reynders zal daar nu werk van maken en ook de bevoegde belastingdiensten zullen worden versterkt.
Vorig jaar raakte bekend dat in Frankrijk alleen al 49.000 eigendommen in handen zijn van 29.000 eigenaars. Toch waren er slechts 12.000 buitenverblijven aangegeven bij de fiscus. De Belgische fiscus voert momenteel onderzoek naar dat vastgoed in Frankrijk.

The Top Ten - seen from the USA

2005-12-31T11:06:00.000Z

The Top Word Lists for 2005:

1. Refugee: Though the word was considered politically incorrect in the US, 'refugees' were often considered the lucky ones in streaming away from a series of global catastrophes unmatched in recent memory.
2. Tsunami: From the Japanese tsu nami for 'harbor wave', few recognized the word before disaster struck on Christmas Day, 2004, but the word subsequently flooded with unprecedented (and sustained) media coverage.
3. Poppa/Papa/Pope: (Italian, Portuguese, English, many others). The death of beloved Pope John Paul II kept the words on the lips of the faithful around the world.
4. Chinglish: The new second language of China from the Chinglish formation: CHINese + EngLISH.
5. H5N1: A looming global pandemic that could dwarf the Boubonic Plague of the Middle Ages (and AIDS) boggles the comtemporary imagination.
6. Recaille: A quick trip around the Romance languages (French jargon, scum; Spanish, rabble or swine; Italian, worthless dregs) illustrates the full freight of the word used to describe youthful French rioters of North African and Muslim descent.
7. Katrina: Name will become synonymous with natural forces responsible for the total and utter descruction of a city.
8. Wiki: Internet buzzword (from the Hawai'ian wiki wiki for 'quick, quick') that describes collaboration software where anyone can contribute to the on-going effort.
9. SMS: Short Message Service. The world's youth sent over a trillion text messages in 2005. Currently being texted are full-length novels, news, private messages and everything in between.
10. Insurgent: Politically neutral term used to describe enemy combatants..

Last year the Top Ten Words words were incivility, Red States/Blue States, and Blogosphere.

The Top Ten Phrases of 2005:

1. Out of the Mainstream: Used to describe the ideology of any political opponent.
2. Bird Flu/Avian Flu: the H5N1 strain of Flu that resembles that of the 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic where 60 million died.
3. Politically Correct: Emerges as a worldwide phenomenon.
4. North/South Divide In the US it might be Red States and Blue States but globally the 'haves' and 'have nots' are divided by a geographical if not psychological boundary.
5. Purple Thumb: The badge of honor worn by Iraqi voters proving that they voted in their ground-breaking elections.
6. Climate Change: Or Global Warming. No matter what your political persuasion, the fact remains that New York City was under 5,000 feet of ice some 20,000 years ago.
7. String Theory: The idea that the universe is actually constructed of 11-dimensional, pulsating planes of existence.
8. The Golden Quatrilateral: India's new superhighway system that links the key cities of the Subcontinent.
9. Jumping the Couch. Apparently losing complete emotional control; made popular by the escapades of Tom Cruise on the Oprah television show.
10. Deferred success: The idea introduced in the UK that there is no such thing as failure, only deferred success.

Last year the Top Phrases were Red States/Blue States, Moral Values, and Two Americas.

The Top Ten Names of 2005:

1. (Acts of) God: The world watches helplessly as a superpower is humbled as one of its great cities is laid asunder (Hurricane Katrina).
2. Tsunami snuffs out nearly 300,000 lives, and an earthquake takes another 200,000 (Kashmir). A Higher Power, indeed.
3. Katrina: Greek ?a?a??? (katharos) for 'pure'. Before the hurricane, the name was borne by two saints, Empress Catherine the Great of Russia, and three of Henry VIII's wives.
4. John Paul II. The death of beloved Pope John Paul II kept his name on the lips of the faithful around the world.
5. Wen Jiabao: Premier of the People's Republic of China since March 2003; leading perhaps the largest economic transformation in history.
6. Saddham Hussein: Should re-read Karl Marx: the first time is history, the second is but farce.
7. Dubya: Every more 'weeble-like': Dubya wobbles but he won't fall down.
8. Oprah: Now a global phenomenon with an ever-expanding media (and charitable) empire.
9. Shakira: the Columbian songstress is captivating ever wider circles.
10. John Roberts: New Chief Justice of the American Supreme Court.
11. Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad: President of Iran since August 2005; he has recently suggest that the Jewish Homeland be moved to Europe.
Last year the Top Names were Dubya Rove (W. and Karl Rove), Mel (Gibson) (Michael) Moore, and Saddam Hussein.

Top Global Musical Terms:

1. Reggaeton (pronounced Reggae-TONE): Part Latin, part hip hop, with liberal helpings of Dancehall and Caribbean music thrown in for good measure, several Reggaeton radio staples this year made their way into the public consciousness.
2. Baile (pronounced Bye-Lay) Funk: Brazilian dance music that has gained popularity worldwide, championed by such trend-setters as Norman Cook in the UK, and Philadelphia DJ Diplo.
3. Podcast: New broadcast medium; think of it as Tivo for your radio. Even your nighbor is podcasting.
4: Rootkit: Thanks to an overzealous copy-protection scheme, thousands of music fans who tried to encode Sony artists' music onto their computer unwittingly installing a malicious piece of code that exposed their computers to attack. After intense media scrutiny and public outcry, Sony recalled the CD's from shelves and offered free downloads of affected albums.
5. Live 8: Millions of people tuned in to the sequel to Sir Bob Geldoff's1985 Live Aid benefit, this time to raise awareness of poverty and Third World debt and to pressure countries in the G8 to do something about it.

The Top Ten Global YouthSpeak Words:

1. Crunk: A Southern variation of hip hop music; also meaning fun or amped.
2. Mang: Variation of man, as in "S'up, mang?"
3. A'ight: All Right, "That girl is nice, she's a'ight"
4. Mad: A lot; "She has mad money"
5. Props: Cheers, as in "He gets mad props!"
6. Bizznizzle: This term for" business" is part of the Snoop Dogg/Sean John-inspired lexicon, as in "None of your bizznizzle!'
7. Fully: In Australia an intensive. as in 'fully sick'.)
8. Fundoo: In India, Hindi for cool
9. Brill! From the UK, the shortened form of brilliant!
10. "s'up": Another in an apparently endless number of Whazzup? permutations.

Southern California YouthSpeak Bonus: Morphing any single syllable word into 3, 4 or even 5 syllables.

Last year the Top YouthSpeak terms were: Word, Peace (or Peace out), and Proper.

Hezbollah in Lebanon

2005-12-31T10:53:00.000Z

The west calls them terrorists, but in Lebanon they are poised to become major political players

BEIRUT -- Lebanon's militant political group Hezbollah (Party of God) has become a global brand name. But for Hezbollah -- and those who must deal with the group -- the overarching question is, "What's the brand?"

The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the parliament of the
European all designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and not without some evidence.
Litany of Terror AttacksThe U.S. government blames Hezbollah for a litany of acts that nearly defined Middle East terrorism in the mid-'80s, including: the Beirut truck bombings in October 1983 that killed 241 U.S. Marines; the April 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut which killed 63 people and a second bombing of the U.S. Embassy that killed 22 people in September 1984; and the 1985 hijacking of Rome-to-Athens TWA Flight 847 in which a
U.S. Navy' diver was killed (the man convicted for the murder was just released by German authorities after serving 19 years in prison).
Hezbollah denies involvement in any of these attacks.
The U.S. also claims the group carried out a series of kidnappings of Westerners from 1982-92, including the torture and killings of CIA station chief William Buckley and U.S. Army Colonel William Higgins; and the abductions of American journalist Terry Anderson and the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, Terry Waite.
Complex OrganizationMost experts and observers agree that Hezbollah is a complex organization. In a 2003 report, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group wrote:
"Fully penetrating Hezbollah's decision-making process is almost impossible. The movement enjoys a highly effective regime of internal discipline and concealment."
In addition to its militia, Hezbollah has a full-scale multimedia operation including a media relations department (ironically, when I arrived there to conduct interviews, I was not allowed to videotape and only managed to take this photo).
Still, Hezbollah's media wing is savvy. It publishes a monthly magazine called Qubth Ut Alla, (The Fist of God) and runs television network Al-Manar (The Lighthouse) and radio station al-Nour (The Light).
Hezbollah also maintains an aggressive program of charitable work, including building schools and hospitals for the Shia community in Lebanon.
And though it defines itself through opposition to Israel and the U.S., it has also condemned the 9/11 attacks and spoken out against some of the beheadings by insurgents in
Iraq' Hezbollah, made up of Shia Muslims, also says it has no connection to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda (dominated by Wahabist Sunnis who consider Shias heretics).

"This organization should be considered the most patriotic in Lebanon."— Hezbollah Director of Foreign Media Hussein Naboulsi
In an interview at their businesslike media relations office in west Beirut, Director of Foreign Media Hussein Naboulsi tries to clarify for me some of the enigma that is Hezbollah.

"Hezbollah is Hezbollah," he says, "there's no change in its definition. It's a political, religious party created as a reaction to Israel's invasion [of Lebanon] in 1982. Politically it's represented in both cabinet and parliament, and considered by all to be a legitimate party. But if you're against Israel, the U.S. administration labels you as they want."
Israel is uncompromising on its view of Hezbollah. Reached for comment on Hezbollah's emergence as a political force in Lebanon, Jeremy Issacharoff, deputy chief of the Israeli embassy to the U.S., said, "Israel's position regarding the blatant terroristic nature of Hezbollah is well known and needs no further elaboration."

Liberators?And despite the terrorist allegations, many in Lebanon, especially among the majority Shia community (an estimated 40% of the population) consider Hezbollah a resistance movement. Some even regard Hezbollah as liberators that forced Israel to retreat from southern Lebanon in 2000.
"This organization should be considered the most patriotic in Lebanon," says Naboulsi. "We fought the Israelis and forced them to leave. Hezbollah sacrificed 1,800 martyrs and thousands of wounded soldiers for the sake of this country --for the sake of dignity and honor of this country."
Because of that perception, Hezbollah is the only faction in the country allowed to keep weapons, ostensibly as a buffer against Israeli incursions. Naboulsi says the militia has earned the right to be armed.

"Fighting the Israelis is not a picnic; it's blood spilled. It's not a reward in a festival," he says, his voice rising with emphasis. "No one can take that mission unless he has faith -- extreme faith and loyalty to this country."
Political EntityNow Hezbollah is deep into several phases of another mission: that of becoming a credible and viable political entity in the fractious sphere of Lebanese politics.
The first time it got involved in the political process was in 1992, winning 12 seats in the 128-seat parliament. But in an alliance with the Shia Amal party, it nearly doubled those numbers in the 2005 general election, taking 23 seats.
Hezbollah was also given cabinet posts when it cast its lot with the current alliance of parties forming the Lebanese government.

"There's a great ambition," says Naboulsi, "We want to see real reform in Lebanon. But that reform should begin with a just electoral law -- not based on sectarian factors, but proportional representation. In proportional representation, I win and you win. Everybody has a seat in the parliament. It's good for all Lebanese."
But not all Lebanese agree. The current Lebanese democracy is based on a decades-old practice of what's called "consensus politics," a complicated formula in which Lebanon's different ethnic and religious factions are apportioned specific government slots, regardless of their makeup in the total population. Christian groups particularly are concerned that changes in the electoral law could lead to dominance by a Shia or Muslim alliance.
TheocracyHezbollah has said in the past that it would like to see Lebanon become a theocratic state in the model of one of its primary funders and supporters:

But it has quietly backed off a bit from those statements recently, perhaps in the hopes of appearing more conciliatory.
And it may need to be, to offset what may end up being a costly political position for these days: that of providing full support to its other primary financial supporter,
Syria "Fully penetrating Hezbollah's decision-making process is almost impossible. The movement enjoys a highly effective regime of internal discipline and concealment."— The International Crisis Group
Hezbollah actively opposed what was dubbed "Cedar Revolution," the democratic outcry following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Along with international pressure, the events led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops after nearly 30 years in Lebanon.
"The Syrians played a key role in the stability of Lebanon, putting an end to the civil war," says Naboulsi. "And Syria really supported the resistance which ended up forcing the Israeli enemy out of Lebanon."
But being that outspoken has a price. Some Christian parties want to see Hezbollah disarmed (something already called for by
United Nations resolution 1559) and may have used that threat, some say, to push Hezbollah and the Amal party to support an expanded UN investigation into the Hariri killing -- something which they both initially opposed.
Key PlayerThe government is still in a deadlock, near collapse. But Hezbollah is rumored to be a key player in an unlikely alliance with a longtime foe: former Lebanese general Michel Aoun, a staunch anti-Syrian who recently returned from 15 years of exile in France, following the Syrian troop withdrawal.

Naboulsi says Hezbollah reached out to Aoun first.
"Even when Michel Aoun was in Paris and no one dared to speak to him," he says. "We were the first to begin the open dialogue. You can't make other sects your enemy."
If Aoun's supporters and Hezbollah make a deal to get the government running again, it could provide Hezbollah with more credibility. It would also seem to demonstrate a commitment beyond its own interests and that of Syria's, to a unified Lebanon.
"Hezbollah is an essential part of Lebanon which no one can ignore," says Naboulsi. "It's the biggest party of the biggest sector of the population and because of consensus democracy, no one can form a government without our contribution."
And for its own political base, Hezbollah's anti-Israeli, anti-American rhetoric is part of the appeal. Hezbollah has called for the destruction of Israel and even offered to open up a second front against the Israelis during the Palestinian intifada.
As for the U.S. designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, Naboulsi is matter-of-fact: any future dialogue is doubtful.
"The American government has labeled us as terrorists," he says. "They say they don't negotiate with terrorists -- and neither do we."

--Note: Kevin plans to report from Israel and the Palestinian territories in late January.

La Grande-Bretagne légalise l'adoption pour les couples homosexuels

2005-12-30T18:38:00.000Z

La Grande-Bretagne légalise l'adoption pour les couples homosexuels

LEMONDE.FR 30.12.05 18h50

Les couples homosexuels, ainsi que les couples non mariés, peuvent désormais adopter ensemble un enfant en Angleterre et au pays de Galles, avec l'entrée en vigueur, vendredi 30 décembre, d'une loi qui fait de la Grande-Bretagne l'un des pays les plus libéraux au monde en la matière.
Votée en novembre 2002, après la volte-face surprise de la chambre des Lords, pourtant réputée pour son conservatisme, mais entrée en application trois ans plus tard seulement, cette nouvelle loi est une véritable révolution, après 30 ans d'immobilisme. "Il n'y avait pas eu de nouvelle loi depuis 1976", a souligné vendredi Felicity Collier, la directrice exécutive de l'Association britannique pour l'adoption et le parrainage (BAAF), selon qui ce texte va avoir "un impact sur des milliers de familles".

Auparavant, ne pouvaient légalement adopter en Angleterre et au pays de Galles que les couples mariés ou les personnes seules. En cas de couple hétérosexuel non marié ou homosexuel, seul un des partenaires était considéré comme le parent légal de l'enfant adopté.
Après avoir obtenu le droit de se marier, le 21 décembre, les couples homosexuels anglais et gallois ont donc accompli une nouvelle étape.
Mais cette loi sur l'adoption est également un soulagement pour de nombreux couples hétérosexuels adoptants qui refusaient de passer par le mariage. Jusqu'à présent, leurs enfants adoptés n'avaient officiellement qu'un seul parent. Dans le cas d'une famille mêlant enfants adoptés et naturels, les enfants n'avaient donc pas tous le même statut.
5 500 ADOPTIONS PAR AN
De même, la nouvelle législation britannique sur l'adoption introduit des droits supplémentaires pour les familles d'accueil ou les proches s'occupant d'un enfant éloigné de ses parents pour raison judiciaire par exemple, en leur permettant d'obtenir un "mandat de parrainage" jusqu'à la majorité de l'enfant. Ce document permettra d'éviter que ces enfants soient légalement sous la responsabilité des autorités locales.
La loi de 2002 accorde enfin des droits aux parents ou aux mères ayant confié leurs enfants pour adoption, en leur permettant désormais de savoir ce qu'il est advenu d'eux, via un service dédié. Cette réforme ne leur donne cependant pas la possibilité légale automatique de les revoir.
Avec 5 500 adoptions par an environ et quelque 400 enfants à la recherche d'une nouvelle famille chaque mois, selon les statistiques de la BAAF, le phénomène de l'adoption est important en Grande-Bretagne : "Nous sommes très heureux de cette nouvelle loi", explique Felicity Collier, "car nous ne comprenions pas que des pans entiers de la société soient automatiquement écartés".
Excepté l'Angleterre et le pays de Galles – Ecosse et Irlande du Nord n'ont pas encore franchi le pas au sein du Royaume-Uni –, seuls quatre pays, l'Espagne, la Suède, le Canada et l'Afrique du Sud, donnent sans restriction le droit d'adopter aux deux partenaires d'un couple non marié ou homosexuel.
Le 1er avril 2001, les Pays-Bas, pionniers en la matière, ont limité le droit à l'adoption de ces couples aux enfants de nationalité néerlandaise. Quant au Danemark, premier pays à avoir légalisé le mariage homosexuel en 1985, il autorise certes l'adoption pour les couples homosexuels, mais seulement pour leurs propres enfants nés de relations antérieures. Aux Etats-Unis, l'Etat du New Jersey a lui aussi permis en décembre 1997 l'adoption conjointe d'un enfant par un couple homosexuel et certains autres Etats donnent aux homosexuels le droit d'adopter l'enfant de leur conjoint.
Avec AFP

homoseksuele koppels mogen kinderen adopteren

2005-12-30T18:34:00.000Z

Ongehuwde & homoseksuele Britse koppels mogen kinderen adopteren

Ongehuwde heteroseksuele en homoseksuele koppels uit Engeland of Wales mogen voortaan samen kinderen adopteren. Een wet die hierover werd goedgekeurd in 2002, werd vrijdag van kracht. Vroeger mochten enkel gehuwde koppels of alleenstaanden legaal een kind adopteren.Bij ongehuwde of homoseksuele koppels werd er dan ook vaak individueel geadopteerd, waardoor de partner wettelijk niet als ouder van het kind werd erkend. Momenteel kunnen ongehuwde en homoseksuele koppels slechts in vier landen kinderen adopteren zonder restricties, met name in Spanje, Zweden, Canada en Zuid-Afrika. In Nederland mogen deze koppels enkel kinderen met de Nederlandse nationaliteit adopteren. In Denemarken mogen ze enkel kinderen uit vorige relaties van hun partner adopteren. In België werd in november de wet over holebiadoptie in de Kamer goedgekeurd. (svr) (Belga/AG 13:05)

adverteren voor gays loont

2005-12-29T15:14:00.000Z

Adverteren voor gays loont

Volgens het Britse Media Week is het onbegrijpelijk dat reclamejongens een lucratieve doelgroep als de Europese homomarkt links laat liggen. In de VS maakt gay marketing een belangrijk deel uit van promotiebudgetten.
"Terwijl de weekendbijlagen van de dagbladen uitpuilen met advertenties staan er van de grote merken vrijwel geen reclame-uitingen in de gay magazines", constateert Media Week. Een Brits onderzoek dat uitgevoerd werd door Out Now toont aan dat het erg onverstandig is niet in homomedia te adverteren, want de doelgroep is goed opgeleid, reist vaker en duurder dan de gemiddelde toerist en is vooral bewezen trendsetting.Wetenschappens becijferen dat in het Verenigd Koninkrijk 4 à 8% van de bevolking homo is. 40% Is hoger opgeleid en gemiddeld hebben ze een aanzienlijk hoger inkomen dan de doorsnee Brit, meer dan 20.000 pond per jaar. Homo's boeken jaarlijks gemiddeld meer dan twee internationale vluchten en betalen iedere maand voor zo'n 424 pond met hun credit card.Deze cijfers waren voor bedrijven als Lufthansa en Toyota reden om zich eindelijk speciaal tot deze markt te richten. "Andere bedrijven negeren het feit dat deze Dinky's (double income, no kids) alleen al aan reizen meer dan 2 miljard euro per jaar uitgeven", zegt Theodora Varsamis, hoofd van de marketing afdeling bij Lufthansa. In de nabije toekomst zal Lufthansa, dat in het VK erg goede resultaten boekt met advertenties in homobladen, extra campagnes starten in Duitsland en Nederland.Volgende maand worden de resulateten van soortgelijk onderzoek bekend gemaakt. Out Now tekende voor het research in Nederland, in opdracht van de Gay Krant.bron: Gay Krant

Fiscale fraude : wetsvoorstel Van der Maelen

2005-12-29T15:00:00.000Z

Fiscale fraude

Niemand betaalt graag belastingen want iedereen vindt ze te hoog. Dirk Van der Maelen, sp.a-fractieleider in de Kamer, meent dat de bovengrens van de fiscale druk bereikt is. Belgische loontrekkenden bijvoorbeeld, worden op twee landen na het zwaarst belast in heel de Europese Unie. Als iedereen betaalt wat hij moet betalen, zal de belastingdruk globaal dalen, redeneert Van der Maelen. Wat de ene nu niet betaalt en dus ontduikt, moet de andere bijbetalen. Dat is oneerlijk op fiscaal en sociaal vlak.Om die onrechtvaardigheid uit de wereld te helpen, voert Van der Maelen al enkele jaren strijd tegen de fiscale fraude, een fenomeen waarvan hij de jaarlijkse omvang raamt op ruim 17,5 miljard euro. En dat is dan nog een onderschatting, vermoedt hij. Het gaat hoe dan ook om een flink aantal miljarden dat de schatkist door belastingontduiking jaarlijks misloopt.Opeenvolgende regeringen hebben de afgelopen vijftig jaar eveneens de strijd tegen de fiscale fraude aangekondigd. Gewoonlijk als stoplap om de begroting te doen kloppen: de strijd tegen fiscale fraude moet dit jaar ‘x’ aantal miljarden opbrengen. De resultaten waren nooit opzienbarend. Dat werd eigenlijk ook nooit verwacht vermits de controleurs en de inspecteurs van Financiën amper werden uitgerust met de nodige instrumenten om die strijd met uitzicht op succes aan te vatten.Het is in elk geval de verdienste van het sp.a-Kamerlid dat hij aan de boom blijft schudden en het thema warm houdt. Over de manier waarop hij deze vorm van fraude wil aanpakken, zijn de meningen kennelijk verdeeld.Vanuit de oppositie krijgt Van der Maelen kritiek op de geloofwaardigheid van zijn strijd. De sp.a heeft immers de operaties fiscale amnestie en fiscale regularisatie mee ontworpen en goedgekeurd in het parlement. Dat is tegelijk warm en koud blazen, sakkert de oppositie. Overigens heeft België een bijzonder complexe fiscale wetgeving die tal van legale uitwegpistes biedt, onder meer via de aftrekmogelijkheden. Worden deze mogelijkheden, ook al zijn ze soms bij de haren getrokken, bij de fiscale fraude gerekend?Het zou alvast niet onnuttig zijn als de belastingwetgeving ingrijpend wordt vereenvoudigd en belastingplichtigen niet langer uitnodigt tot allerlei spitsvondige constructies. Het zou even nuttig zijn als de fiscale administratie elke aangifte kan onderzoeken. Nu ontbreekt het de controle- en inspectiediensten vaak aan mankracht en apparatuur. Bijgevolg treden ze met ongelijke wapens in de arena en dat leidt niet direct tot sterke motivatie.Dirk Van der Maelen wil in de eerste plaats de grote fraudegevallen aanpakken en de dossiers sneller laten afsluiten. Hij heeft daarover een wetsvoorstel ingediend dat niet te nemen of te laten is. Als de andere partijen het ernstig menen met de strijd tegen de fiscale fraude, kunnen ze zijn voorstellen bezwaarlijk zonder discussie terzijde schuiven. Dirk CASTREL - GvA

Wetsvoorstel Dirk Van der Maelen : bestrijding fiscale fraude

2005-12-28T14:33:00.000Z

Wetsvoorstel voor een efficiëntere bestrijding van ernstige fiscale fraude

Mijn wetsvoorstel van 16/12/2005 wil tegemoet komen aan de hiervoor geschetste problematiek door middel van een aantal maatregelen die moeten leiden tot een efficiëntere organisatie van de strijd tegen de ernstige fiscale fraude. In de huidige stand van de fiscale wetgeving ontspringen malafide belastingplichtigen vaak de dans omwille van het feit dat de overheid niet over voldoende middelen beschikt om fraude te ontdekken. Het gevoel van straffeloosheid dat hierdoor bij malafide belastingplichtigen ontstaat werkt de ernstige fiscale fraude alleen maar in de hand. Het is duidelijk dat hieraan een einde moet komen. Het wetsvoorstel voorziet in dit verband in verschillende maatregelen.
Maatregel I - De versterking van de samenwerking tussen de parketten en de fiscale administratie
Op dit ogenblik is er bijna geen samenwerking mogelijk tussen de parketten en de fiscale administratie. Dit vormt een groot obstakel in de fiscale fraudebestrijding. De strikte scheiding tussen het fiscaal onderzoek en het strafonderzoek en het verbod op een doorgedreven samenwerking tussen het openbaar ministerie en de fiscale administratie hebben tot gevolg dat het onderzoek in fiscale fraudezaken vaak voor een groot deel door het parket moet worden overgedaan. Vandaar de veelvuldige berichten over de zeer lange doorlooptijd van fiscale fraudeonderzoeken. Dit is niet langer aanvaardbaar. Net zoals bij de handhaving van de sociale en economische regelgeving, alsook deze inzake stedenbouw, leefmilieu, volksgezondheid, moet het bij de handhaving van de fiscale reglementering mogelijk zijn dat het parket beroep doet op de knowhow en expertise van de fiscale administratie. Mijn wetsvoorstel maakt dit mogelijk.
Maatregel II - De oprichting van het fiscaal auditoraat
Een ander knelpunt in de strijd tegen de fiscale fraude is het gebrek aan fiscale expertise bij het parket. Om hieraan tegemoet te komen werd al het ambt van substituut-procureur des konings gespecialiseerd in fiscale zaken gecreëerd. Hoewel dit een lovenswaardig initiatief is, blijkt dat dit in de praktijk onvoldoende is. Een van de redenen hiervoor is dat deze gespecialiseerde substituten ook in de normale werking van het parket werden ingezet en dat zij onvoldoende beroep kunnen doen op de fiscale expertise die bij de fiscale administratie berust. Daarom wordt in mijn wetsvoorstel een apart parket opgericht, bestaande uit fiscale specialisten, dat zich uitsluitend op de vervolging van fiscale misdrijven moet concentreren. Dit fiscaal auditoraat kan worden bevolkt door het huidig kader van de fiscale substituten.
Maatregel III - De uitbreiding van de bevoegdheden van de administratie van de Bijzondere Belastinginspectie
Om het openbaar ministerie toe te laten meer en beter met de fiscale administratie samen te werken wordt voorgesteld de administratie van de B.B.I. om te vormen naar het voorbeeld van de Nederlandse Financiële Opsporingsdienst ( FIOD ) en het Duitse Finanzamt für Fahndung und Steuerstrafsachen. Het is mijn bedoeling om aan de administratie van de B.B.I. zowel fiscale toezicht- als opsporingstaken te geven. Dit betekent dat de B.B.I. tevens een strafrechtelijke opdracht zal krijgen en samen met het fiscaal auditoraat zal instaan voor de vervolging van de fiscale fraude. Een aantal ambtenaren van de B.B.I. krijgen hiertoe het statuut van officier van gerechtelijke politie en dit onder toezicht van naargelang het geval de fiscale auditeur of de onderzoeksrechter. Deze ambtenaren van de B.B.I. zullen zelf de bevoegdheid hebben om fiscale misdrijven vast te stellen en om de nodige informatie in te winnen in hun hoedanigheid van officier van gerechtelijke politie, daar waar het parket in de huidige stand van de wetgeving een beroep moet doen op derden die dit statuut bezitten. Met deze hervorming wordt de fiscale expertise op overheidsniveau aldus optimaal benut om de ernstige fiscale fraude te bestrijden. De ambtenaren van de B.B.I. en de fiscale auditeurs zijn ongetwijfeld het best geplaatst om het belang en de ernst te beoordelen van overtredingen op de fiscale wetgeving. Bovendien wordt het onderzoek van de ernstige fiscale fraudegevallen door deze hervorming niet meer op het administratieve niveau geconcentreerd, doch wel op het strafrechtelijk niveau. Dit heeft als consequentie dat tijdens het strafonderzoek veel ingrijpender onderzoeksmaatregelen kunnen worden genomen dan tijdens het fiscaal onderzoek, hetgeen uiteraard enkel maar voordelen kan bieden bij het achterhalen van de fiscale waarheid. Bovendien heeft een dergelijk systeem ook een preventieve werking. Belastingplichtigen met potentiële frauduleuze bedoelingen weten dat zij in het nieuwe systeem veel vlugger in het strafrechtelijk vervolgingscircuit zullen terechtkomen hetgeen ongetwijfeld op potentiële fiscale criminelen een drempelverhogende werking zal hebben
Maatregel IV - De oprichting van een overlegstructuur voor de strijd tegen de fiscale fraude
In het kader van de strijd tegen het zwartwerk en de sociale fraude bestaat er een permanente overlegstructuur voor het coördineren van de verschillende acties van de arbeidsinspecties en sociale inspecties. Zowel de sociale inspectiediensten als de fiscale administratie, het parket van de procureur des Konings en de Federale Politie maken deel uit van deze overlegstructuur. Met het oog op de naleving van de fiscale wetgeving voorziet mijn wetsvoorstel in een gelijkaardig overlegplatform tussen het gerecht en de fiscale administratie zodat de Regering over een soepel en doeltreffend permanent institutioneel kader beschikt om het hoofd te bieden aan de fiscale fraude.
Maatregel V - Wijziging in de bestraffing van fiscale fraude
Het wetsvoorstel heeft tevens tot doel eenheid te brengen in de wijze waarop fiscale overtredingen worden bestraft door de overheid. Als dusdanig beoogt het voorstel hiermee eenheid en transparantie te creëren in het fiscaal sanctiebeleid en aldus rechtszekerheid te bieden aan rechtsonderhorigen die de fiscale wetgeving hebben overtreden. Anders dan hetgeen nu het geval is heeft het voorstel tot doel duidelijkheid te verschaffen aan de rechtsonderhorigen op het vlak van de sanctionering die zij mogen verwachten wanneer zij de fiscale wetgeving overtreden. Het voorstel beoogt hiermee preventief te werken ten aanzien van potentiële fraudeurs. Zo is er op financieel vlak een groot verschil tussen de fiscaal-administratieve sancties en de fiscaal-strafrechtelijke geldboetes. Daar waar de fiscaal-administratieve sancties kunnen oplopen tot 200% van de ontdoken belasting en aldus astronomisch hoog kunnen zijn, blijven de fiscaal-strafrechtelijke geldboeten beperkt tot maximaal 12.500 Euro welke ook de omvang van de fraude moge zijn. Het wetsvoorstel maakt aan deze anomalie een einde door te voorzien dat ook de strafrechtelijke sancties kunnen oplopen tot 200% zodanig dat de strafrechter zware fraudeurs evenredig zwaar kan bestraffen door hen financieel te treffen. Tezelfdertijd voorziet het voorstel in de vervanging van het bestaande systeem van cumulatieve fiscale sanctionering door een systeem van alternatieve fiscale sanctionering. Naar analogie met het huidige systeem van sanctionering van sociale fraude, zal de overheid op het vlak van de sanctionering van fiscale fraude de keuze moeten maken om de zaak hetzij administratief, hetzij strafrechtelijk af te handelen. Hiermee wordt de dubbele bestraffing vermeden die over het algemeen als onrechtvaardig wordt beschouwd en die strijdig is met het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens.

Iraq and the White House

2005-12-28T14:21:00.000Z

From the White House: Some Candor, But Not Enough

By * Dr. James ZogbyDec 24, 2005 - Vol.VIII Issue 50

In the lead-up to the Iraq elections, the White House has embarked on a new public relations strategy. For months now, the President has responded to critics of the war by presenting an exaggerated rosy picture of success. Not only has this failed to win converts, it has made the President appear either out of touch with reality or dishonest. As a result, not only has Bush’s performance poll numbers dropped to record low levels, but almost 60% of the public indicate they no longer trust the President to tell the truth.And so during the last two weeks the White House changed direction. In delivering what were called four major speeches on Iraq, Bush mixed candor with admissions of mistakes and appeals for support until the war is won.On November 30th, in the first in the series of speeches, the President acknowledged that the training of Iraqi troops hadn’t gone well. On December 7th, he acknowledged similar problems with the reconstruction effort. On December 12th, Bush, for the first time recognized publicly the number of Iraqi civilians killed in the war (he put the number at 30,000) and added with regret that “things didn’t always go as planned.” Finally, on December 14th, Bush accepted that “much of the intelligence [used in pre-war arguments] turned out to be wrong” and then went on to accept full responsibility for the decision to invade Iraq.All of this is refreshing candor from a President who, it will be recalled, in a press conference a year ago, could not name a mistake he had made during his career. It may help him rebuild some public trust, but it remains to be seen whether or not these acknowledgements will build support for the war effort itself.What may be helpful to the White House are the just completed Iraqi elections, and if they are smart, they will use this milestone to declare, whatever the outcome, “mission truly accomplished,” and begin the process of extricating US forces from this war. They won’t do that, of course, because even with the candor, what the Administration is seeking in this public relations effort, is a vote of confidence allowing them to remain in Iraq until some still undefined “victory” is won.What the White House still cannot acknowledge is the reality that the continued presence of US forces in Iraq only serves to inflame the insurgency while making a target of Iraq’s government, infrastructure and those whom the insurgency identifies as collaborating with the “occupiers.” It is disturbing to note that a recent poll shows that 80% of Iraqis don’t support the “occupation” and almost one-half of Iraqis support attacks on US forces!Having said this, it must be clears that the US should not withdraw from Iraq as unilaterally and irresponsibly as it entered in 2003. They should, however, set a date and begin a redeployment of troops out of Iraq, all the while, using political leverage to seek a United Nations mandate to create a permanent political and security arrangement to assist Iraq in the post-US withdrawal period. Such an effort, for example, could build on the recently convened all-party conference held in Cairo. The point here is that it is clear that Iraq’s government can and must solve its own internal problems and will continue to need security and reconstruction assistance. But this should no longer be under a US umbrella.While the President’s new candor is refreshing, it is neither complete, nor is it sufficient. The original sin of this war was not just the failed intelligence on WMDs and the supposed 9/11 connections. It was also the failure to understand the consequences of the war, its costs and the commitments it would require. One thousand days ago, the White House entered Iraq, believing the war would be a “cake walk.” Fantasy and ideology combined to create this mess; providing no security or services for the civilian population; dismantling the apparatus of the state and military; enabling cronyism and corruption and all the rest.One thousand days later, some candor and some admission of mistakes, but still no strategy and no clear sense of what will constitute real victory.Because the US presence has become a part of the problem plaguing Iraq today, and because the legitimate government in Iraq still needs help, it is time for the US to leave. But to leave responsibly, there must be in place an internationally recognized support system that can assist the new government in making needed changes in its constitution, provide security, reconstruct its infrastructure and end the insurgency.This, not just a public relations effort, is what is required.
* President of the Arab American Institute. For comments or information

Les réflexes nationalistes turcs

2005-12-27T10:57:00.000Z

Les réflexes nationalistes turcs ont la vie dure

M.-M. M. [27 décembre 2005] Figaro

A LA VEILLE du récent procès de l'écrivain Orhan Pamuk, le commissaire européen à l'Elargissement, Olli Rehn, a eu le mot juste, soulignant la valeur de «test» de cette comparution du romancier, et ajoutant même : «Ce n'est pas Orhan Pamuk qui sera jugé, c'est la Turquie.» Ce procès et tous ceux qui lui font cortège agissent effectivement comme un test, au sens chimique du terme. Le sérum de vérité révèle aux Turcs eux-mêmes l'étendue de leurs contradictions et la persistance des tabous qui verrouillent les esprits, alors que les négociations d'adhésion à l'Union européenne ont été officiellement lancées au début octobre. Surtout lorsque l'on touche à la sacro-sainte unité nationale de la Turquie, imaginée comme une citadelle toujours menacée, tant à l'extérieur qu'à l'intérieur, où la présence de minorités religieuses reste associée à l'idée d'une menace confuse et tenace.
Adeptes de cette vision monolithique du pays, les ultranationalistes turcs sont le moteur de l'offensive judiciaire en cours. Leur slogan a le mérite de la clarté. «La Turquie est comme elle est ! clament-ils à chaque manifestation. Aimez-la ou quittez-la !» Inquiet pour la sécurité d'Orhan Pamuk, le journaliste Serdar Turgut réclamait récemment une protection policière pour l'écrivain : «Nous n'avons pas le droit de laisser une soixantaine de fascistes semer ainsi la terreur», ajoutait le journaliste, dans les colonnes du journal Aksam.
Majoritaires, les nationalistes, au sein de la société turque ? Il est difficile de mesurer le soutien apporté à leur campagne, relayée par des juges plus ou moins complaisants. Quoi qu'il en soit, les procès à répétition expriment, de la part de ceux qui les suscitent, une volonté de couper court au débat d'idées qui s'est timidement engagé dans le pays. Et de saborder au passage les négociations d'adhésion à l'Union européenne qui, dans les cercles du nationalisme turc, ont toujours été considérées avec la plus grande méfiance.
De bon ton d'accuser l'Europe
Dans un tel contexte, le premier ministre, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, qui s'était fait le chantre de l'adhésion européenne et de l'ouverture du pays, apparaît depuis plusieurs mois nettement en retrait en matière de réformes. Soucieux de ménager son électorat en vue d'éventuelles élections législatives anticipées en 2006, il n'hésite pas à se montrer offensif à l'égard de ses partenaires européens quand il s'agit de se mettre au diapason de l'ensemble de la classe politique turque pour dénoncer leur supposée ingérence dans les affaires intérieures. Depuis quelques semaines, en Turquie, il est devenu de bon ton d'accuser l'Europe de tous les maux : de se mêler de ce qui ne la regarde pas ; de ne pas respecter l'indépendance des juges... et de ne pas avoir su désamorcer à temps les chausse-trapes de ce nouveau Code pénal souhaité par Bruxelles. Cependant, comme le rappelle une diplomate européenne en poste à Ankara, «lors du processus de criblage, les analystes de l'Union européenne ont exprimé des réserves très claires. Or il n'était pas possible d'aller plus loin. Le Parlement turc reste souverain, tout de même !»
Evoquant l'effet déplorable de la procédure engagée contre Orhan Pamuk, le député européen Joost Lagendijk a averti : «S'il y a de nouveaux procès de ce genre, le processus d'adhésion s'arrêtera.» Joost Lagendijk vient à son tour de faire l'objet d'une plainte déposée par un syndicat d'avocats. Le député a fait une déclaration mettant en cause les responsabilités de l'armée turque dans la persistance du conflit armé qui l'oppose aux séparatistes kurdes du PKK.

Charia ou raki, la Turquie doit choisir

2005-12-27T10:52:00.000Z

L'écriteau est apposé à l'entrée des guinguettes du Mogangülü, petit lac de la périphérie d'Ankara, destination traditionnelle pour le bol d'air dominical : «La consommation d'alcool est formellement interdite».

Dans les établissements des parcs des périphéries de la capitale turque, raki (traditionnel alcool anisé), bière ou vin sont désormais proscrits sauf dans quelques restaurants de luxe. Et maintenant le maire, Melih Gökcek, membre de l'AKP, le parti au pouvoir issu du mouvement islamiste, accentue encore son offensive en annonçant l'interdiction totale de l'alcool dans le Gençlikpark, le «parc de la jeunesse» en plein coeur de la ville, quand rouvriront, l'an prochain, les 40 bars et restaurants fermés pour rénovation. Une mesure sonnant comme un défi dans la capitale fondée par Mustafa Kemal, le père de la République, lui-même grand buveur devant l'éternel et mort d'une cirrhose du foie, dont un grand portrait lumineux orne l'entrée de ce jardin qu'il aimait fréquenter. Depuis, le lieu s'est dégradé, comme tout ce quartier datant des années 30, mais ce jardin reste un symbole.

Moralisme islamiste. «J'aime le raki et je suis un fils de la République. En Europe on respecte la liberté des buveurs, mais l'AKP a la charia dans sa tête et tente de grignoter jour après jour les conquêtes de la laïcité», grommelle Satilmis Cimen, retraité, attablé dans une maison de thé en lisière du parc. Comme beaucoup d'autres vieux Ankariotes, il craint que la municipalité ne profite des travaux pour enlever aussi les deux grandes statues années 30 d'Adam et Eve, dont les seins nus irritent de longue date le moralisme islamiste. Pour la mairie, ce parc est devenu «un lieu de perdition». «Les familles n'osent plus venir après une certaine heure parce qu'on y vend de l'alcool, ce qui change le comportement des gens, qui deviennent agressifs», a expliqué mi-novembre au grand quotidien Hürriyet le maire, ex-militant ultranationaliste reconverti dans l'islam politique. Si hors des parcs ou des établissements municipaux on peut toujours se rincer librement le gosier dans la capitale, les municipalités d'arrondissement les plus radicales interdisent toute vente d'alcool après 23 heures.

Loin de se limiter à la capitale, la campagne antialcoolique a gagné tout le pays. Le Premier ministre, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, qui trinque au jus de fruit lors des repas officiels, défend le régime sec dans les établissements municipaux «qui ne doivent pas donner le mauvais exemple», mais il répète dans ses interviews qu'il est hors de question d'interdire l'alcool. «Ce serait une absurdité, même le sultan Murat IV, au XVIIe siècle, n'avait pas réussi, mais comme dans tous les autres pays européens il y a des lois pour en contrôler la consommation que nous voulons renforcer», explique Nihat Ergün, un des vice-secrétaires généraux du parti en charge des collectivités locales. En fait ils laissent faire leurs maires les plus fanatiques qui ont désormais le pouvoir en matière de réglementation sur la consommation d'alcool, dépendant auparavant des préfectures. Une enquête de l'agence Merkez montre que de nouvelles restrictions ont été prises dans 61 chefs-lieux de province sur 81.

Certains élus locaux ne cachent pas leur volonté de «ghettoïser» l'alcool hors des centres-ville. «Nous allons créer des rues rouges pour l'alcool comme en Europe pour la prostitution», expliquait ainsi crûment le maire adjoint d'Osmangazi, petite ville du Nord-Ouest. A Istanbul, le maire de l'arrondissement d'Usküdar, sur la rive asiatique, multiplie les obstacles bureaucratiques pour renouveler les licences et ne cache pas vouloir mettre tout le quartier au régime sec, à l'exception de quelques enclaves. Les élus de l'AKP estiment ce thème porteur vis-à-vis des secteurs les plus islamistes de leur électorat, jusqu'ici frustré par le bilan des trois ans de pouvoir. Remportant, en novembre 2002, quelque 30 % des voix et près des deux tiers des sièges, le parti a réussi à stabiliser l'inflation, et à mener, au moins sur le papier, nombre des réformes exigées par l'Union européenne, obtenant l'ouverture des négociations d'adhésion. Mais il n'a rien pu faire sur des revendications symboles, comme le droit au foulard. D'où cette bataille identitaire, menée théoriquement au nom de la santé publique, tel que le stipule l'article 58 de la Constitution.

«Ces mesures n'ont rien à voir avec la protection de la jeunesse. Mais comme ils ont peur des réactions ils n'osent pas dire ouvertement qu'ils agissent au nom de motivations religieuses», martèle Muzaffer Eryilmaz, maire de l'arrondissement de Çankaya, quartier chic d'Ankara resté aux mains des «kémalistes» du Parti républicain du peuple (CHP), qui dénonce «l'hypocrisie» de l'AKP. Nombre de mosquées portent d'énormes pancartes clamant que «l'alcool est la source de tous les vices». «Ne nous laissons pas tromper, le parti d'Erdogan est en train de lentement nous envelopper dans une couverture islamiste», s'énerve Tufan Türenç, un des grands éditorialistes d'Hürriyet. Longtemps prudents vis-à-vis de l'AKP, les grands journaux se déchaînent, annonçant à gros titres chaque nouvelle initiative contre l'alcool.

Inexplicable. Quant au succès de cette campagne, nul ne se fait d'illusion. Ainsi Konya, la ville la plus religieuse du pays, gérée depuis plus de vingt ans par les islamistes, où il est quasiment impossible de boire de l'alcool dans un local public, est aussi celle qui détient le record de consommation de raki par habitant, selon les statistiques de Tekel, l'ex-monopole des alcools. Envers et contre tout, les Turcs continuent de lever le coude malgré les quelque 80 % de taxes grevant les prix du raki comme des autres spiritueux. Désormais, les dirigeants de l'AKP mettent un bémol. Poids lourd du parti, Murat Mercan rappelle haut et fort qu'«une interdiction serait inexplicable vis-à-vis des Européens» et que «la prohibition tentée jadis aux Etats-Unis a créé encore plus de problèmes».

Opvoeden - verantwoordelijkheid

2005-12-27T10:48:00.000Z

Van de hond gebeten

De federale ministerraad heeft een nieuw Koninklijk Besluit over honden goedgekeurd.

Minister Rudy Demotte wil kopers van honden verplichten om een uitgebreide vragenlijst in te vullen in de winkel of bij de fokker waar ze hun hond kopen.Met die vragenlijst wordt gepeild naar de manier waarop de koper leeft. Heeft hij kinderen? En heeft hij ook een tuin waarin de hond kan ravotten? Op zich is de maatregel misschien niet slecht. Door zo’n vragenlijst zal de potentiële koper mogelijk eens twee minuten - de tijd om de lijst in te vullen - nadenken over zijn aankoop. Want te veel mensen kopen een hond omdat het beestje zo’n leuk kopje heeft. Een hond kopen, moet degelijk worden overwogen. Uiteindelijk gaat het om een levend wezen en moet het de bedoeling zijn dat zowel baasje als beestje zich in hun onderlinge relatie goed voelen. Dat is niet altijd het geval. Bewijs daarvan zijn de tientallen honden die voor elke vakantieperiode worden achtergelaten.De minister heeft nog een andere doelstelling. Hij wil verhinderen dat honden in een niet-aangepast gastgezin terechtkomen, waardoor ze agressief gedrag gaan vertonen.Terwijl de hondenkwestie voor- en tegenstanders in de pen doet kruipen, heeft een 17-jarige jongen vorig weekend twee moorden bekend. Twee weken geleden heeft hij een vriend in een bos met een slagersmes doodgestoken. Jagers vonden zijn met takken bedekte lichaam. De 17-jarige werd als verdachte verhoord. Hij bekende niet alleen deze moord, maar ook een van enkele jaren geleden. Als 14-jarige wurgde hij een vriendje. De moord werd toen niet opgelost. Nu is er de bekentenis. De jongens kenden elkaar. Ze waren alle drie geplaatst in een instelling voor gedragsmoeilijke kinderen.Alle drie jongeren met een rugzak des levens vol ellende. Alle drie kinderen die op een of andere manier waren verworpen. Drie jongens die gedumpt werden door ouders die de opvoeding van hun kroost niet aankonden. We kunnen geen steen gooien naar de instelling. Het is soms een bijna onmogelijke opdracht om kinderen die pedagogisch, fysisch, psychisch en emotioneel zijn verwaarloosd, genoeg bagage te geven om ze te laten meedraaien in een veeleisende maatschappij.Ze verdienen medailles, de opvoeders die zich dag en nacht inzetten om kinderen opnieuw vertrouwen, eigenwaarde en (zelf)respect te geven. We kunnen ook niet zomaar een steen gooien naar de ouders. Zij hebben misschien wel alles gedaan wat binnen hun mogelijkheden lag, maar waren hun mogelijkheden beperkt en hun eigen draagkracht niet groot genoeg om een kind groot te brengen.Misschien waren er te weinig mensen die hen vooraf hebben verteld wat het inhoudt om een kind op te voeden, misschien hebben ze er nooit bij stilgestaan dat een kind een levenslang engagement vereist. Een kind krijgen, is een heel zware verantwoordelijkheid. Misschien moeten alle volwassenen die een kind willen, diep in zichzelf, ook eerst eens een vragenlijst invullen... Désirée De POOT -GvA

Danneels en euthanasie

2005-12-26T09:24:00.000Z

Danneels krijgt ook tegenwind van SP.A

BRUSSEL - Na de VLD heeft ook de SP.A kritiek op de uitspraken van kardinaal Godfried Danneels tijdens de middernachtmis over euthanasie. ,,Heeft kardinaal Danneels dan de wetsvoorstellen die ingediend werden in de senaat, niet gelezen?'', vraagt senator Jacinta De Roeck zich af in een communiqué.
De senator wijst erop dat in beide wetsvoorstellen ,,heel duidelijk staat dat men in een wilsverklaring vooraf - én nog in volle bewustzijn - om euthanasie kan vragen indien men later lijdt aan een vorm van dementie''. Wat men niet wil, moet ook in de wilsverklaring beschreven zijn.
,,De uitspraken van Danneels verzwijgen dus duidelijk een belangrijk deel van de vraag om euthanasie. Ik kan alleen besluiten dat de kardinaal de wetsvoorstellen niet kan of wil begrijpen'', zegt De Roeck.
Het parlement moet zich nog buigen over het voorstel om de huidige Belgische wetgeving rond euthanasie uit te breiden tot dementen en minderjarigen. Kardinaal Danneels vroeg tijdens de middernachtmis in de Brusselse Sint-Michiels- en Sint-Goedelekathedraal meer respect voor het leven en zei dat euthanasie bij wilsonbekwamen (dementen of minderjarigen) voor hem niet kan.

Osama Bin Laden

2005-12-25T17:28:00.000Z

YOUNG OSAMA

by STEVE COLL

How he learned radicalism, and may have seen America.

Issue of 2005-12-12Posted 2005-12-05

Osama bin Laden’s old school—the Al Thagher Model School—sits on several dozen arid acres lined by eucalyptus trees, whose branches have been twisted by winds from the Red Sea. The campus spreads north from the Old Mecca Road, near downtown Jedda, the Saudi Arabian port city where bin Laden spent most of his childhood and teen-age years. The school’s main building is a two-story rectangle constructed from concrete and fieldstone in a featureless modern style. Inside, dim hallways connect two wings of classrooms. In bin Laden’s day—he graduated in 1976—there was a wing for middle-school students, and another for the high school. Between them is a spacious interior courtyard, and from the second floor students could lean over balcony railings and shout at their classmates below, or pelt them with wads of paper. Most Al Thagher students, including bin Laden, were commuters, but there were a few boarders; they lived on the second floor, as did some of the school’s foreign teachers. It was in this upstairs dormitory, a schoolmate of bin Laden’s told me, that a young Syrian physical-education teacher led an after-school Islamic study group for a few outstanding boys, and it was there, beginning at about age fourteen, that bin Laden received his first formal education in some of the precepts of violent jihad.
During the nineteen-sixties and early seventies, Al Thagher was the most prestigious high school in Jedda; compared with other schools in Saudi Arabia, it had a relatively secular flavor. Many wealthy Saudi parents sent their sons abroad for secondary education—to Lebanon, Egypt, England, or the United States—but for those who kept their boys in Jedda “Al Thagher was the school of the élite,” Saleha Abedin, a longtime Jedda educator, said. (Abedin is now a vice-dean of Jedda’s Dar Al-Hekma College, a private women’s college.) Al Thagher—the name means, roughly, “the haven”—was founded in the early nineteen-fifties, initially in the nearby city of Taif, with support from Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, who became the King of Saudi Arabia in 1964. Faisal was a complicated man; he developed the kingdom’s schools, roads, and hospitals very rapidly, yet he also tried to preserve Saudi Arabia’s austere Islamic traditions, partly as a defense against international Communism. The Al Thagher Model School showcased Faisal’s interest in science and Western methods of education; in the nineteen-sixties, it was the only school in Jedda with air-conditioning. Its students did not wear the national dress, a thobe and cloth headdress, but, rather, a uniform that imitated the styles of English and American prep schools: white button-down shirts with ties, gray slacks, black shoes and socks, and, in the winter months, charcoal blazers.
Each year’s graduating class numbered about sixty boys. Among them were young princes from the Saudi royal family, as well as privileged commoners like bin Laden. Every morning, the students would assemble in rows for a military-style call to order; on a stool to one side sat a schoolmaster with a cane, ready to discipline boys who misbehaved, by beating them on the soles of their bare feet. The school’s curriculum included English-language instruction given by teachers from Ireland and England and demanding courses in mathematics. At the same time, as with all institutions in Saudi Arabia, Al Thagher adhered to Islamic ritual. At midday, students would kneel together for the Zuhr, or noon prayer.
Assuming that bin Laden is still alive, he is now forty-eight years old. He developed his vision for his global jihad organization, Al Qaeda, over the course of more than three decades, and his formative experiences have included participation in combat during the anti-Soviet Afghan war of the nineteen-eighties; prolonged exile from Saudi Arabia; the survival of at least two assassination attempts; at least four marriages, which produced at least a dozen children; and, lately, the trials of being the world’s most wanted fugitive. (Several American intelligence officers and diplomats have told me in recent months that they assume bin Laden is hiding somewhere in Pakistan, or perhaps in a remote area of Afghanistan, but there has been no visible progress in the effort to locate him. His most recent videotaped speech was a rambling diatribe broadcast four days before the last United States Presidential election. A few weeks later, the Al Jazeera television network broadcast an audiotape attributed to bin Laden, in which he praised Al Qaeda’s new leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Since then, bin Laden has not been heard from, and there has been speculation—not for the first time—that he is dead. Late last month, the Senate Democratic leader, Harry Reid, told a television interviewer, “I heard today that he may have died in the earthquake that they had in Pakistan.”)
Bin Laden has never spoken publicly about his time at Al Thagher, and the record of other reliable testimony is thin. Still, from interviews with people who knew him as a teen-ager, or who knew his family or the school, a portrait of bin Laden’s high-school years has begun to emerge, one that may help to explain some of the earliest sources of his beliefs.
In a 1998 interview, later broadcast on Al Jazeera, bin Laden said that he was born in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, on March 10, 1957. “Then God was gracious to us as we went to Holy Medina six months after I was born,” he continued. The rest of his youth, he said, was spent in the western Saudi Arabian province known as the Hejaz, which lies between the Red Sea and central Arabia; it is the site of the two holiest cities in Islam, Mecca and Medina, where the most important events in the life of the Prophet Muhammad occurred.
Bin Laden is the only child of the marriage between Alia Ghanem, who was born in Syria, and Muhammad bin Laden, who was born in Yemen but migrated as a child to Jedda, where he made his fortune as a building contractor for the Saudi royal family during the nineteen-fifties and sixties. Osama’s parents divorced soon after he was born, according to Khaled M. Batarfi, a Saudi journalist who knew Osama during the nineteen-seventies. Osama’s mother then married a man named Muhammad al-Attas, who worked at her former husband’s company. The couple had four children, and Osama lived in the new household with three stepbrothers and one stepsister. Bin Laden’s natural father, who had more than fifty children by more than a dozen wives, died on September 3, 1967, when his company airplane, a twin-engine Beechcraft, which was being flown by an American charter pilot, crashed as it attempted to land on a mountain airstrip in Saudi Arabia’s southern Asir province, where bin Laden had been overseeing road-construction projects.
The next year, Osama bin Laden enrolled at Al Thagher, according to Brian Fyfield-Shayler, a Briton who taught English at the school at the time. Fyfield-Shayler has said that when bin Laden arrived at the school he was already unusually tall (today, his height is estimated at six feet four). He was not, however, a particularly forceful personality. In an intermediate-English class, “I was trying to push the spoken aspects of the language,” Fyfield-Shayler recalled in an interview for a documentary film produced in Britain last year. “To succeed, the student needs to be prepared to make mistakes. They need to make a bit of an exhibition of themselves, and Osama was rather shy and reserved and perhaps a little afraid of making mistakes.” Seamus O’Brien, an Irishman who taught English at Al Thagher, told me that he remembers Osama as “a nice fellow and a good student. There were no problems with him. . . . He was a quiet lad. I suppose silent waters run deep.”
A schoolmate of bin Laden’s told me that during the eighth or ninth grade, around 1971 or 1972, bin Laden was invited to join the Islamic study group. In that period at Saudi high schools and universities, it was common to find Syrian and Egyptian teachers, many of whom had become involved with dissident Islamist political groups in their home countries. Some of these teachers were members of, or were influenced by, the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization founded in Egypt in 1928 by a schoolteacher, Hassan al-Banna. The Brotherhood was initially a religious-minded movement opposed to British colonial rule in Egypt; later, following Britain’s withdrawal from the region, the Brotherhood’s leaders continued their struggle against the secular, socialist Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took power in 1952. In his approach to the Brotherhood, Nasser alternated between periods of accommodation and brutal crackdowns. Some of the Brotherhood’s organizers were forced into exile, and they began to form new chapters across the Muslim world. Their aim was to replace secular and nationalist Arab leaders with Islamic governments, and they often operated clandestinely. Today, the movement typically recruits its members from élite, well-educated families; its goals include the imposition throughout Muslim societies of sharia—law as set forth in the Koran—and the empowerment of Islamic scholars as cultural arbiters and dispensers of justice. Brotherhood members have openly held seats in elected parliaments in Kuwait and Jordan; last month, the movement’s members made a strong showing in parliamentary elections in Egypt, despite being formally banned there. Over the years, the Brotherhood has operated both in the open and in secret, through peaceful political campaigning and through support for terrorism.
In Saudi Arabia during the nineteen-sixties, King Faisal welcomed exiled teachers from Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, even if they were influenced by the Brotherhood, because he believed that they had been unfairly persecuted for their religious and political beliefs. He also hoped that their emphasis on Islamic teachings might help to inoculate Saudi Arabia against ideas such as socialism and secular pan-Arab nationalism, which were then spreading through Arab societies. Moreover, as he expanded Saudi Arabia’s schools, Faisal faced a shortage of qualified instructors of all kinds. The King “needed teachers,” Khaled al-Maeena, a prominent Jedda newspaper editor, told me. “Where would you get them?” Egypt and Syria offered Saudi Arabia a ready source at a time when the kingdom, barely a generation removed from widespread poverty and illiteracy, was struggling to produce teachers from its own population.
Formal political activity was banned in Saudi Arabia, so the Brotherhood-influenced teachers had to be careful. “When they came here, they realized the system does not allow any association” that might smack of politics, said Muhammad Salahuddin, a magazine publisher and journalist in Jedda who came to Saudi Arabia from Egypt. Rather than organize a political network, the teachers often introduced their students more informally to the Brotherhood’s precepts of Islamic activism, political consciousness, and violent jihad against Christian occupiers or secular leaders. The principal mission at Al Thagher, as laid out by the headmaster and wealthy supporters in the Jedda merchant community, was to prepare élite young Saudis for roles in the kingdom’s modernizing economy; it had nothing to do with the Brotherhood’s goals. The after-school Islamic study group that bin Laden joined was initially offered to exceptional students with the promise of earning extra credit.
Bin Laden’s experience in the group was described for me during several interviews with a schoolmate who is now a successful professional in Saudi Arabia, and who asked not to be further identified, because, he said, he did not want to risk reprisals from bin Laden’s sympathizers. The schoolmate had never given interviews about Al Thagher’s after-school Islamic study group, but he decided to do so, he said, because he hoped his account might warn other Saudi parents about the potential dangers of such informal tutoring, particularly of the young and impressionable. His specific account of the group’s meetings is in accord with the more general recollections of several other Saudis who knew bin Laden during his Al Thagher years.
The Syrian physical-education teacher who led the group at Al Thagher was “tall, young, in his late twenties, very fit,” the schoolmate recalled. “He had a beard—not a long beard like a mullah, however. He didn’t look like he was religious. . . . He walked like an athlete, upright and confident. He was very popular. He was charismatic. He used humor, but it was planned humor, very reserved. He would plan some jokes to break the ice with us.
“Some of us were athletes, some of us were not,” the schoolmate said of the group’s initial membership, which, besides bin Laden, included the sons of several prominent Jedda families. The Syrian “promised that if we stayed we could be part of a sports club, play soccer. I very much wanted to play soccer. So we began to stay after school with him from two o’clock until five. When it began, he explained that at the beginning of the session we would spend a little bit of time indoors at first, memorizing a few verses from the Koran each day, and then we would go play football. The idea was that if we memorized a few verses each day before soccer, by the time we finished high school we would have memorized the entire Koran, a special distinction.
“Osama was an honorable student,” the schoolmate continued. “He kept to himself, but he was honest. If you brought a sandwich to school, people would often steal it as a joke or eat it if you left it on the desk. This was a common thing. We used to leave our valuables with Osama, because he never cheated. He was sober, serious. He didn’t cheat or copy from others, but he didn’t hide his paper, either, if others wanted to look over his shoulder.”
At first, the study group proceeded as the teacher had promised. “We’d sit down, read a few verses of the Koran, translate or discuss how it should be interpreted, and many points of view would be offered. Then he’d send us out to the field. He had the key to the goodies—the lockers where the balls and athletic equipment were kept. But it turned out that the athletic part of it was just disorganized, an add-on. There was no organized soccer. I ended up playing a lot of one-on-one soccer, which is not very much fun.”
As time passed, the group spent more and more time inside. After about a year, bin Laden’s schoolmate said, he began to feel trapped and bored, but by then the group had developed a sense of camaraderie, with bin Laden emerging as one of its committed participants. Gradually, the teen-agers stopped memorizing the Koran and began to read and discuss hadiths, interpretive stories of the life of the Prophet Muhammad, of varied provenance, which are normally studied to help illuminate the ideas imparted by the Koran. The after-school study sessions took place in the Syrian gym teacher’s room, on the second floor. The teacher would light a candle on a table in the middle of the room, and the boys, including bin Laden, would sit on the floor and listen. The stories that the Syrian told were ambiguous as to time and place, the schoolmate recalled, and they were not explicitly set in the time of the Prophet, as are traditional hadiths. “It was mesmerizing,” he said, and increasingly the Syrian teacher told them “stories that were really violent. I can’t remember all of them now, except for one.”
It was a story “about a boy who found God—exactly like us, our age. He wanted to please God and he found that his father was standing in his way. The father was pulling the rug out from under him when he went to pray.” The Syrian “told the story slowly, but he was referring to ‘this brave boy’ or ‘this righteous boy’ as he moved toward the story’s climax. He explained that the father had a gun. He went through twenty minutes of the boy’s preparation, step by step—the bullets, loading the gun, making a plan. Finally, the boy shot the father.” As he recounted this climax, the Syrian declared, “Lord be praised—Islam was released in that home.” As the schoolmate recounted it, “I watched the other boys, fourteen-year-old boys, their mouths open. By the grace of God, I said ‘No’ to myself. . . . I had a feeling of anxiety. I began immediately to think of excuses and how I could avoid coming back.”
The next day, he stopped attending the after-school sessions. Eventually, after an awkward period of pulling away from his study-group friends, he joined a different circle of boys. During the next several years, he said, he watched as bin Laden and the others in his former group, who continued to study with the Syrian, openly adopted the styles and convictions of teen-age Islamic activists. They let their young beards grow, shortened their trouser legs, and declined to iron their shirts (ostensibly to imitate the style of the Prophet’s dress), and, increasingly, they lectured or debated other students at Al Thagher about the urgent need to restore pure Islamic law across the Arab world. It is unclear whether the Syrian teacher was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood or was simply influenced by some of its ideas about political activism and violent jihad against unbelievers; his whereabouts today are unknown. Bin Laden’s schoolmate said the teacher left Al Thagher twenty-five years ago.
Khaled Batarfi is a soft-spoken man in his mid-forties who works as a senior editor at Al Madina, an Arabic-language newspaper in Jedda, and who also writes a weekly column for Arab News, an English-language paper in the city. He earned a doctoral degree at the University of Oregon and, since September 11, 2001, has become an occasional interlocutor for American journalists and diplomats who visit the kingdom. Batarfi is sometimes invited to participate in foreign-policy seminars sponsored by the United States government; last month, he joined a roundtable discussion in Jedda with Liz Cheney, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and a daughter of Vice-President Cheney’s. In addition to his work as a Saudi political journalist and commentator, Batarfi has emerged during the past several years as a source of detailed, firsthand information about bin Laden as a teen-ager. He has talked about his recollections of Osama and has published an interview with bin Laden’s mother, and remains in touch with other members of the family.
In 1971, Batarfi moved in a few doors down from bin Laden, and they played on the same club soccer team. (When he could, Batarfi said, he encouraged bin Laden to play forward, so that the tall youth could use his head to send balls into the opposing team’s goal.) Although Batarfi did not attend Al Thagher, he saw bin Laden frequently during Osama’s years there. Over the course of several interviews, Batarfi told me that he witnessed his friend’s emergence during those years, at about age fifteen or sixteen, as an increasingly committed schoolyard Islamic activist. “In Al Thagher, he was part of an Islamic group,” Batarfi recalled. “He was a prominent member. . . . That group was influenced by the Brotherhood. He was influenced by this philosophy.”
Batarfi’s recollection is corroborated by Jamal Khashoggi, a former acquaintance of bin Laden’s who is now an adviser to Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. The longtime Middle East correspondent Jonathan Randal, in his 2004 book, “Osama,” quoted Khashoggi as saying that Osama “grew up as a Muslim Brother” and did not split from the movement until the mid-nineteen-eighties. The Brotherhood’s influence on bin Laden was particularly striking, Batarfi told me, because the movement’s emphasis on the need for political transformation in the Muslim world differed from the more introspective Islamic theology then prevalent in Saudi Arabia.
The kingdom’s dominant school of Islam is often called Wahhabism by non-Saudis, in reference to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, an eighteenth-century desert preacher who allied himself with the al Saud family when it first established political control over the Arabian Peninsula, and whose descendants are still among Saudi Arabia’s most important official clergy. Many Saudis reject the term “Wahhabism” as pejorative; they regard Wahhab’s ideas as Islam itself, properly interpreted, and they argue that no other label is required. Some Saudis acknowledge their country’s dominant theology as a distinct school of Islamic thought, but they will typically refer to this school as Salafism, a term that refers to the beliefs and practices of the earliest followers of Islam. With some exceptions, adherents of the Salafi school steer away from purposeful political organizing; instead, they often emphasize matters of personal faith, such as the strict regulation of Islamic rituals, and of an individual’s private conduct and prayer. Bin Laden’s group at Al Thagher, Batarfi said, was influenced to some extent by Salafi ideas, because there was no escaping the presence of such ideas in Saudi society, but bin Laden’s group adopted “a more activist or a political agenda,” as Batarfi put it, which was drawn largely from the Muslim Brotherhood’s advocacy for political change in Islamic countries.
In this respect, bin Laden’s years at Al Thagher appear to have been an intellectual prelude to his better-known experiences as a student at King Abdul Aziz University, in Jedda, where he studied during the late nineteen-seventies. At the university, bin Laden was influenced by several professors with strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Among them was Muhammad Qutb, an Egyptian, whose brother Sayyid Qutb had written one of the Brotherhood’s most important tracts about anti-Western jihad, “Signposts on the Road.” (Sayyid Qutb was hanged for treason by the Egyptian government in 1966.) Bin Laden’s early exposure to the Brotherhood’s ideas and recruiters may help to explain why later, in Afghanistan, he was attracted to the causes of so many Egyptian exiles, including his future deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose experiences also included early exposure to the Muslim Brotherhood.
High school shaped bin Laden’s future in another way as well. In Afghanistan, he worked at times with a former Al Thagher biology teacher, a Saudi named Ahmed Badeeb. During the nineteen-eighties, Badeeb took up a new job, as chief of staff for Prince Turki al-Faisal, who was then the head of Saudi intelligence and whose department, in collaboration with the C.I.A., sent hundreds of millions of dollars to support the Afghan war effort. In describing his occasional work with bin Laden on the Afghan frontier, Badeeb has said that they enjoyed a warm personal relationship, one that had its origins in their shared experiences at Al Thagher.
As a young man, bin Laden drove a white Chrysler and a gray Mercedes, often very fast, according to Batarfi. On occasion, he joined gatherings of the larger bin Laden clan. By the early nineteen-seventies, this group, on his father’s side of the family, included a number of half brothers who had studied abroad, in places such as Lebanon and England. Some of Osama’s older half brothers had travelled to Europe and, occasionally, the United States. The leader of this side of the family then was Muhammad bin Laden’s eldest son, Salem, an ebullient, guitar-playing graduate of an English boarding school. By the mid-nineteen-seventies, Salem had acquired a private jet, and he travelled widely, to Switzerland, England, and Texas. At about that time, Osama’s mother arranged for her teen-age son to marry a first cousin, who was from Syria.
The subject of Osama’s youthful travels has been muddled by a number of accounts of his teen-age years, published shortly after September 11th. These have included reports, for example, that bin Laden attended boarding school in Lebanon, where he supposedly engaged in drinking and disco dancing. Some of bin Laden’s half brothers did attend school in Lebanon, but no credible evidence has surfaced that Osama ever did. There have also been published reports that bin Laden joined his family on vacation in Sweden, and that he enrolled in a summer language course in England, but there is some uncertainty about these reports; several people who have met bin Laden say the reported trips amount to cases of mistaken identity.
Khaled Batarfi offered a new account of bin Laden’s travels during the nineteen-sixties and seventies. He said that, as far as he knew, bin Laden had ventured outside the Middle East as a young man only three times. The first time, when he was about ten, he went to London with his mother to receive medical treatment for an eye condition. Bin Laden stayed in England for at least a month and did some sightseeing, according to Batarfi. On a second trip, as a teen-ager, bin Laden joined some friends and relatives on a big-game safari in East Africa. And, finally, according to Batarfi, Osama bin Laden made one trip to the United States, in about 1978.
According to Batarfi, the trip to America came about because bin Laden’s first child, a son named Abdullah, who was born in about 1976, had a medical problem—apparently cosmetic. Bin Laden, his wife, and his toddler son travelled together to the United States for treatment, Batarfi said, although he is not certain where the procedure took place. By his account, only one aspect of the journey made a particularly strong impression on bin Laden: On the way home, Osama and his wife were sitting in an airport lounge, waiting for their connecting flight. In keeping with their strict religious observance, his wife was dressed in a black abaya, a draping gown, as well as the full head covering often referred to as hijab. Other passengers in the airport “were staring at them,” Batarfi said, “and taking pictures.” When bin Laden returned to Jedda, he told people that the experience was like “being in a show.” By Batarfi’s account, bin Laden was not particularly bitter about all the stares and the photographs; rather, “he was joking about it.”
If Batarfi is correct, bin Laden’s American visit took place before he travelled to Afghanistan to participate in violent jihad, and about ten years before he founded Al Qaeda; it might never have surfaced in intelligence and law-enforcement investigations of bin Laden, which began in the midnineteen-nineties. Spokesmen at several government agencies, including the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., said that their Al Qaeda specialists had no information about a visit by bin Laden to the United States. A State Department spokesman said that its consular section had no record of ever having issued a visa to bin Laden, but that the department no longer has complete records of visas that were issued that long ago.
Abdullah bin Laden, Osama’s son, today lives in Jedda and enjoys good health, according to several people who know him. (He did not respond to requests for an interview.) In a story published in a London-based Saudi-owned newspaper in 2001, Abdullah said that he left his father’s household in the mid-nineties, when Osama was preparing to leave Sudan, where he had been living in exile, for a new and uncertain exile in Afghanistan. Not wishing to endure such hardship any longer, Abdullah sought and received his father’s permission to return to Saudi Arabia, where he has since taken up a career in advertising and public relations.
Abdullah runs his own firm, called Fame Advertising, which has offices near a Starbucks in a two-story strip mall on Palestine Street, one of Jedda’s busiest commercial thoroughfares. “Fame . . . Is Your Fame” is the company’s slogan, according to its marketing brochures. Among the firm’s advertised specialties is “event management,” which refers to the staging of attention-grabbing corporate galas and launch parties for new products or stores. The firm makes this promise: “Fame Advertising events are novel, planned meticulously, and executed with efficiency.” On the back of this brochure is printed a single word: “Different.”
Many Saudis follow the search for Abdullah’s father with fascination, and this is particularly true of alumni of the Al Thagher Model School. Some of Osama’s former classmates are now doctors or lawyers; others have followed their fathers into business. They use the Internet to stay in touch. On January 31, 2001, Al Thagher’s Class of 1976 started a message group on Yahoo, where they exchange news about old friends and occasionally discuss questions about religion and politics, a participant told me. That Yahoo group requires a moderator’s permission to join, but a second Al Thagher group for all alumni has publicly posted messages that give the flavor of the group’s discussions, particularly in that autumn after the September 11th attacks. Posted message titles include “Taleban,” “Northern Alliance Atrocities,” “Salman Rushdie article,” and, suggestively, “9 Unpopular Ideas, important to read.”
Al Thagher’s Class of 1976 is approaching the thirtieth anniversary of its graduation; no reunion has been scheduled. The class held its most recent reunion at a beach resort on the Red Sea. The party took place on a wintry night; in all, about fifty Al Thagher alumni turned up to mingle and share a meal. There was no word from Osama.

conservatives

2005-12-24T09:54:00.000Z

The Other American Exceptionalism

By Gerard AlexanderPosted November 28, 2005

Not so long ago, American conservatives seemed to be converting the world to their ideas. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, country after country abandoned socialism for free markets, embracing such Reaganite themes as incentives, individualism, and responsibility. It looked as though the sun would never set on the friends of American conservatism. Yet today, American conservatives have never felt so alone.
This is not a matter of how many people around the world like American conservatives, but of how many are like them. To be sure, many political movements don't have counterparts in other countries. But Europe and America are politically kin, and when in the 1980s Ronald Reagan took his stands for markets and against the Soviets he found ready and stalwart allies in Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, and other indigenous conservatives. Yet all we hear of these days is the "exceptionalism of modern American conservatism." What happened to Europe?
Finding an answer begins with a comparison of contemporary American and European conservatives, especially concerning their basic assumptions—or operating principles—about economics, foreign policy, crime, and morality.
Market vs. State
American conservatives believe that a healthy modern economy is so complex and innovative that most economic decisions have to take place in the private sector, where scattered information is located, and risk may be rewarded or punished. Government is best at enforcing rules of the game and engaging in limited redistribution. When it does much more than that, it creates inefficient regulations and bureaucracies prone to expanding rather than learning.
This basic assumption runs deep in American life, not merely because we've spent too much time in post office lines—everyone on earth has done that—but because we're in a position to compare the post office to responsive, dynamic private businesses of all kinds. Many Europeans think similarly, especially business leaders, free-market activists, policy wonks, center-right politicians (including, apparently, the German Christian Democrats' Angela Merkel), and the occasional center-left leader such as Tony Blair or Gerhard Schroeder.
But most Western Europeans fear that markets will fail to meet their needs and satisfy their interests. They maintain a faute de mieux faith that government is the indispensable actor in economic life. Even when compelled by economic crisis to trim taxes, privatize, and curb spending—that is, even while recognizing implicitly that these measures attract investment and encourage growth—European leaders rarely offer principled criticism of government intervention, much less positive rhetoric about the marketplace. (Jacques Chirac's center-right cabinet is now privatizing state entities, not because private ownership is more efficient but primarily to cut the deficit and pay down the debt.) The European Union's proclaimed drive to become internationally competitive is top-down and government-centered. Not surprisingly, "Thatcherite" and "neo-liberal" continue to be labels insultingly applied and hotly denied. All this is true even for several right-wing "populist" parties, such as France's National Front, which calls occasionally for tax limitation but more often emphasizes protectionism and a welfare state generous to native-born Frenchmen.
These views have not been dislodged, even by serious economic problems. And Europe's economic problems are serious. The unemployment rate is stuck at around 10% in Germany and France, and if anything this underestimates the true figure--even more unemployment is concealed through extensive job-training and early-retirement schemes. The fact that many continental European economies have such mechanisms for sidelining less-skilled workers makes it all the more striking that labor productivity still generally grows faster in the United States. For decades, France and Germany had narrowed the gap in labor productivity with the U.S., but in the past 15 years their progress slowed and then reversed.
The result is that average U.S. per capita income is now about 55% higher than the average of the European Union's core 15 countries (it expanded to 25 in 2004). In fact, the biggest E.U. countries have per capita incomes comparable to America's poorest states. A recent study by two Swedish economists found that if the United Kingdom, France, or Italy suddenly were admitted to the American union, any one of them would rank as the 5th poorest of the 50 states, ahead only of West Virginia, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Montana. Ireland, the second richest E.U. country, would be the 13th poorest state; Sweden the 6th poorest. The study found that 40% of all Swedish households would classify as low-income by American standards.
Predators
A comparable divide in operating assumptions exists on foreign policy. By and large, American conservatives believe that although international conflicts may arise from uncertainty, misunderstanding, and mutual threats, they usually result from simple predation, power-hunger, and hatred. Global cooperation is possible when would-be predators are deterred, which requires muscular firmness. Democracies are uniquely suited to be enforcers of international order because they are least likely to be its transgressors—which is the reason Americans have traditionally championed an integrated and assertive Europe, instead of seeing it as a threat.
Some Europeans share this view, including most British and many Dutch and Danish conservatives, as well as Blair and other Laborites. Once upon a time, the Gaullists thought like this, and José María Aznar and other Spanish conservatives do so still. But most European governments now practice what Americans would recognize as a liberal foreign policy. This is not so much because Europeans inhabit what Robert Kagan calls a "post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity." Instead they insist on seeing misperception, insecurity, and pride as the root of most international conflicts, which accordingly are best defused by reassurance and the careful avoidance of confrontation, ultimatums, and threats. The Spanish government's response to the Madrid bombings—hasty withdrawal from Iraq—was denounced as appeasement by most Americans, but not by most Europeans. Of course, the British response to the London bombings has been quite different, at least so far.
American conservatives believe that the deterrent approach toward international predators should be firmly applied to would-be domestic predators as well. One might expect the same sensibility in Europe, given high crime rates there. Despite enduring stereotypes to the contrary, Europeans now match or surpass America in most crimes, including violent ones (except murder and, to a lesser degree, rape). In per capita terms, Belgium has more assaults than the U.S., the Netherlands nearly the same number, and France is rising fast. England and Wales have more robberies, the Dutch almost as many, and England and Denmark beat America in per capita burglaries and (here joined by the French) in theft and auto theft. After lecturing Americans that expensive welfare states would ensure social peace, many Europeans now find themselves saddled with both high welfare costs and high crime, while American crime rates have dropped. Western Europeans have met high crime rates with policing and prisons, of course, but more notably with multicultural appeals, jobs programs, and policies aimed at "social insertion" of the alienated. As Theodore Dalrymple explains, such policies transmit the message that criminals are victims, too, and their actions understandable responses to trying circumstances. The result, as in foreign policy, is a lack of resolve among the virtuous, wink-and-nod cynicism among offenders, and excuse-making by everyone.
Hard and Soft
European stereotypes hold that American conservatives, under increasing evangelical influence, want morality to be systematically legislated. Actually, American evangelicals spend far more time shaping behavior in the private or civil sphere than through government. They teach personal values like family responsibility, clean living, self-discipline, voluntarism, and moral clarity in the face of wrongdoing. This ambitious project of private-sector character shaping is virtually without counterpart among purely secular Americans. And it is almost nonexistent in Europe, at least beyond the state-sponsored project of inculcating anti-racism, multiculturalism, and laicism as among the highest virtues.
In sum, American conservatives of nearly every stripe agree that the world is a complex and competitive place in which human nature and its limitations play pervasive roles. In such a world, good people are wise to cultivate individual skills and character traits, to limit centralizing power (especially government), to confront rather than duck serious challenges, and to get incentives right, especially for predators, with an eye toward encouraging virtue, and at least restraint.
Different terms have been invoked to distinguish these conservative operating assumptions from their main alternatives. Television personality Chris Matthews is sometimes credited with the notion that Republicans and Democrats are, respectively, the "daddy" and "mommy" parties. Daddy tries to toughen citizens to cope with life's ordeals, while mommy tries to shield them from its harshness. U.C. Berkeley linguistics professor (and Democratic consultant) George Lakoff tweaks this to say that conservatives advocate the "strict father" model for America while progressives are "nurturant parents." The discerning journalist Michael Barone distinguishes between "hard" and "soft" America, representing, respectively, contemporary conservatism and liberalism.
Whatever terms we use to describe the right-wing worldview, American conservatives often develop a sense of "tribal" identification with those who share it, which explains their special bond with many Australian and British conservatives, and even with Tony Blair. This also explains recent conservative interest in Germany's Angela Merkel, who seems to understand economic incentives, and France's Nicolas Sarkozy, who stands out for his toughness on crime, praise for bourgeois virtues like hard work, and emphasis on adapting France's political economy to a competitive world. The problem is that while American conservatives share one of their operating principles with some Europeans and another principle with some others, they don't share the whole bundle with very many at all. To use Barone's terms, most Americans have hard values while the majority of West Europeans have soft ones.
The Churning State
Why have America and Europe diverged so much in their beliefs? Consider two groupings in society: communities of religious faith and sectors that are economically independent of government. Together these form the building blocks of American electoral conservatism, and are the two main generators of daddy party beliefs in America. Both are greatly diminished in Europe.
Barone argues that hard values are inculcated by competition while soft ones are promoted and preserved by "coddling." Adult life in Europe, he suggests, is softened by protectionism, welfarism, and other public subsidies. Despite some variation, three broad economic patterns stand out in Europe. In the first place, proportionately fewer people work. To cut unemployment lines, many of their citizens are encouraged to retire early, on pensions far more publicly-funded than ours. The stand-out cases are France and Germany, Europe's two largest economies, with labor force participation rates 10 to 15 percentage points lower than America's (about 55% in France; over 70% in the U.S.). Second, a larger share of the European workforce is employed by government. Third, Europeans receive more income and benefits from welfare programs in the form of health care, housing, and income support. These benefits reach deep into the middle class.
The result is a noticeably larger share of the population directly dependent on government benefits and services, and therefore directly threatened by any retrenchment of these in favor of private enterprise and private social provisioning. Nobel Prize-winning economist James Buchanan applies the label "churning state" to a welfare state in which cross-subsidies are so extensive and interwoven that virtually everyone is a beneficiary and no one will be the first to surrender his subsidy. And the recipients are often right to be afraid. For example, the unemployed would be foolish to give up generous benefits when for more than a decade their economies have been unable to produce enough new jobs.
Now add the influence of religion. The more religious an American is, the more likely he or she is to vote conservative. Millions of "people of faith" are drawn to, and have their values reinforced by, America's vast and well-integrated religious apparatus of sermons, radio stations, television shows, books, stores, and mega-churches, an apparatus that shapes their beliefs about self-discipline, human nature, evil-doing, and much else.
By contrast, during the past century Europe experienced a drastic decline in rates of religious practice and faith. Whereas some 45% of Americans say they attend weekly religious services, one study in 1990 found comparable rates as low as 19% in western Germany, 13% in Britain, and 10% in France, and these have almost certainly fallen since then. There is no comparable apparatus of evangelization. As the sociologist of religion Peter Berger notes, this makes Western Europe stand out: instead of America being conspicuously religious by global standards, Europe is conspicuously secular.
The Median Voter
Such transatlantic differences can be highly consequential politically. Within a nation, major parties generally craft their platforms and rhetoric to attract the "median voter," that is, the hypothetical voter at the exact center of the political spectrum, whose swing can determine the election. In most European countries, the median voter is both less religious and more dependent on government than the median voter in the United States. This tugs American politics to the right and European politics to the left.
This makes political differences appear even starker than the sociological ones. For example, American liberals when shaping their election platforms have little choice but to sideline "progressive" catchphrases, and instead proclaim their commitment to individual responsibility, the private sector, and toughness on crime and national security. This centrist posturing, especially by Democratic presidential candidates, is so thorough that non-Americans are often unaware that there is a sizable left-liberal minority in the United States. Democrats steer clear of any suggestion that they want to make America more like, say, Europe.
The opposite happens in Europe. Center-right politicians in Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, and elsewhere compete for a very different kind of median voter, leaving them little choice but to defend the welfare state, strict secularism, and a soothing foreign policy (by avoiding talk of toughness at home or abroad). Germany's Christian Democrats, for instance, often compete with the Social Democrats to raise public pensions. European business leaders who understand supply-side incentives, job creation, and taxes and regulation more or less as American conservatives do, censor themselves in order to remain politically relevant. Here, too, the effects can be so thoroughgoing as to obscure the fact that there is a sizable minority of American-style conservatives in every European country. And European conservatives reinforce this misperception by avoiding any suggestion that they want to make their countries more like America.
This explains why so many conservative projects in Europe have rested on the thin reed of individual leaders. Even Margaret Thatcher—who was lucky enough to govern in the face of a divided opposition and in the wake of the 1970s' economic crisis—still felt compelled to endorse a health care system more socialized than many American liberals would favor. State spending began to rise again soon after she was succeeded by fellow Conservative John Major. Helmut Kohl left even less of a market reform legacy. So it's no surprise that the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall have witnessed a great deal of homeopathic cures for, but no serious surgery on, the European welfare state. This is especially striking in a country like France, which has suffered high (8-12%) unemployment for nearly 25 straight years. The record suggests that it is imprudent to invest much hope in rising center-right politicians like Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, however individually promising they appear.
Euro Elite
The perception that Europe is uniformly center-to-center-left is further reinforced by the fact that public expression is monopolized by a collusive journalistic, intellectual, and Eurocratic elite whose "arrogance [is] almost beyond belief," in the words of William Kristol. Its ideologically lopsided political and intellectual elite is so potent that it may shape Europe's political identity as much as secularism and economic dependence do. Mainstream European press coverage of America, free markets, and robust conservatism is so routinely paranoid and hyperbolic that it makes Howard Dean look temperate.
This can conceal important divergences between elites and average citizens. The June 2005 Dutch referendum on the E.U. constitution revealed a profound disconnect between the parliamentary and journalistic classes, on the one hand, who overwhelmingly favored the treaty, and average citizens on the other, who rejected it 62% to 38%. Without the public vote, negative opinion polls would have been explained away by the elite as revealing little more than a shallow, momentary fit of temper. A lot may be obscured by the fact that 15 of the 25 E.U. governments haven't planned even consultative referendums for adopting the new constitution.
Kristol has suggested that, in a way, Europe is stuck politically in America's 1990s, with a cultural and political elite plagued by drift, failure, and scandal--but without the breakthrough achieved here by reform-minded conservatives like Rudy Giuliani and Newt Gingrich. Yet intellectually, Western Europe seems even further behind than just the 1990s. Many Europeans still find it logical to respond to unemployment with protectionism and government jobs programs; leaders routinely speak of corporatist-style "social dialogue" between the state and major interests; a center-right prime minister argues that subsidized agriculture is central to France's economic dynamism; few expect Europeans to act resolutely to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons; and governments try to stem globalization with what one scholar calls a "social democratic Maginot Line."
All this reminds one of nothing so much as the 1970s. The spirit of Jimmy Carter exited the American political stage decades ago, but, like Jerry Lewis, it remains a matinee favorite on the other side of the Atlantic.
Common Cause
The bad news is that real change is going to happen not by cashiering leaders or nudging political parties, but by changing what the voters think and want. And that is long, hard work. The good news is that the ranks of robust conservatives may be expanding in Europe and elsewhere. In Australia and Japan, security threats and the accumulation of market-oriented economic reforms seem to be bringing center-right sectors around to postures that American conservatives can recognize and appreciate. In Great Britain, Thatcher's mission of de-socializing the Labor party has borne fruit. (It is true that government spending has risen under Labor, but it has under the Bush Administration, too).
In Western Europe as a whole, prospects for a "values" revival remain hazy. But another change might help generate daddy-party beliefs: further economic liberalization, which would not only improve the region's economy (cutting unemployment, for example) but, by creating more competitive markets, might spread hard values, at least concerning business. How could liberalization be promoted? Much economic reform is held back by Europeans' fears of the economic unknown, specifically that markets cannot provide at reasonable cost the services and insurance coverage that their governments currently offer (in return for high taxes).
Two mechanisms might erode those fears: first, the potentially powerful demonstration effect of the former Communist countries' success. Today, a contest is underway between economic liberty in east-central Europe—whose growth could demonstrate the efficiency of their less regulated and less taxed economies—and the efforts of the French, German, and other Western European governments to force growth-stifling "harmonizing" measures on the new E.U. members. East-central Europe can only play an instructive role if its economies remain free. American conservatives thus have an interest in maintaining the perceived viability of the market-oriented central European "social model." To this end, the U.S. could offer those countries closer trade ties and moral-diplomatic support in their attempt to stand up to Brussels (and Paris, and Berlin, and…).
A second means of eroding anti-market skepticism would be a campaign of public diplomacy, not by the U.S. government but by the American conservative movement. Such a campaign would show Western Europeans that a great deal of their fears are unfounded. Books like Cowboy Capitalism (2004), by Olaf Gersemann, a German business journalist, have begun to debunk myths about America's poverty, joblessness, social immobility, and quality of life; but more efforts are needed. Blogs remain an undeveloped medium in Europe and might help kickstart the resistance to the European Left's intellectual hegemony. A little encouragement might go a long way.
It is not only American conservatives who have an interest in making the world safe for conservative principles. The story of contemporary American conservatism is in many ways the story of modern America itself. American liberals think they see their own counterparts all over the world, but they have ample reason to feel alone, too. As John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge note in The Right Nation (2004; see Kenneth Minogue, "Exceptionally Conservative," CRB, Summer 2005), "the more you look at [America's] prominent Democrats from an international perspective, the less left-wing they seem." "For the foreseeable future," they write, "the Democrats will be a relatively conservative party by European standards." It may be that our liberals and conservatives have more in common than they realize, and thus much to gain by seeing their common principles prosper around the world.
Gerard Alexander is associate professor of politics at the University of Virginia, and author of The Sources of Democratic Consolidation (Cornell University Press).

afwezigheid

2005-12-24T09:50:00.000Z

Tijdens mijn wekenlange afwezigheid is er zowel in ons land als in het buitenland het één en ander gebeurd. Tijd ontbreekt echter om hierover commentaren te plaatsen.

moskeeën in de USA onder geheim toezicht

2005-12-24T09:49:00.000Z

Moskeeën onder geheim toezicht in VS

pvb
WASHINGTON - De Amerikaanse federale politie FBI heeft in het geheim zonder rechterlijke goedkeuring stralingsmetingen verricht in de omgeving van particuliere domeinen, waaronder moskeeën. Dat hebben bronnen bij de politie vrijdag in Washington bevestigd. Doel van de metingen was om een aanslag van Al-Qaeda te voorkomen. De stralingsmetingen hadden plaats vanaf 11 september 2001 en werden vanaf openbaar toegankelijke locaties verricht. Toestemming van de rechter zou daarom niet nodig zijn geweest.Het tijdschrift U.S. News and World Report berichtte vrijdag als eerste over het programma. Volgens het blad werden meer dan honderd moslimbezittingen in de regio Washington en ten minste vijf andere steden met een verhoogd risico in het oog gehouden. De metingen werden onder meer verricht bij moskeeën, woningen en bedrijven. De woordvoerder van de Raad voor Amerikaans-Islamitische Betrekkingen, Ibrahim Hopper, zei dat de moslimgemeenschap geschokt is door de onthullingen. ,,De indruk wordt gewekt dat moslims er uit worden gepikt alleen omdat ze moslims zijn.'' Zijn organisatie heeft haar ernstige twijfels over de grondwettelijkheid van de controles.Woordvoerder Brian Roehrkasse van het Amerikaanse ministerie van Justitie zei dat de regering zeer bezorgd is over het toenemende aantal berichten, dat Al-Qaeda chemische, biologische, radiologische en nucleaire wapens wil verwerven én gebruiken. Om dit gevaar het hoofd te bieden controleert de overheid de lucht. Zij doet dat op grond van specifieke informatie en richt zich niet op bepaalde personen of groepen, zei Roehrkasse. ,,FBI-agenten dringen niet zonder ordentelijke juridische grondslag binnen in ruimtes die door de grondwet worden beschermd.''Volgens FBI-kringen werden niet alleen panden van moslims gecontroleerd. Het programma zou acht maanden geleden drastisch ingeperkt of gestopt zijn.

PS - Di Rupo

2005-11-08T07:26:00.000Z

Di Rupo vraagt volledige lijst van PS-mandaten op
BRUSSEL - PS-voorzitter Elio Di Rupo heeft alle mandatarissen van de partij per brief verzocht hem voor 25 november een volledige lijst van al hun mandaten te bezorgen, meldt Le Soir vandaag. Het gaat om 3.000 à 4.000 publieke en privémandaten (in een bedrijf met overheidsdeelname). Begin oktober had de leider van de Franstalige socialistische partij op een congres de jacht op ,,parvenus'' geopend. De dinsdag verstuurde brief, die de krant kon inkijken, is daar een eerste uitvloeisel van.,,We maken een woelige periode door'', schrijft Di Rupo. ,,We moeten absoluut tonen dat we in staat zijn positief te reageren.'' Wie zijn mandaten niet of onvolledig aangeeft, kan na een onderzoek geschorst worden als lid van de partij, aldus nog de partijvoorzitter.
ht (belga)08/11/2005

fiscaal...

2005-11-08T07:24:00.000Z

Tom Boonen blijft in België wonen

Eerstdaags gaat Tom Boonen, vóór hij definitief toehapt, het appartementje keuren dat zijn manager voor hem op de kop tikte in het belastingparadijs Monaco. Dat zuiderse optrekje wordt blijkbaar vooral een buitenverbijf, want de wereldkampioen heeft zopas een fraai huis gekocht in de abdijgemeente Postel, een halve boogscheut van Balen. Boonen Monegask, vervreemdend van zijn roots? Een glimlach is gepermitteerd: het mag nu wel helemààl duidelijk zijn dat Tom een Kempenzoon is én blijft.

Ja.... wat moeten we daar van denken??

La banlieue, c'est la france ...

2005-11-07T23:14:00.000Z

Editorial par Pierre Laurent

La banlieue,c’est la France

Le cynisme de Nicolas Sarkozy n’a décidément pas de limites. Interrogé par la chaîne I-Télévision sur son attitude face à la crise des banlieues, le ministre de l’Intérieur déclarait benoîtement jeudi soir : « Je n’ai pas le droit de surréagir. Il n’y a rien qui puisse se faire dans l’agitation et la tension. Le plus difficile pour moi, c’est de rester lucide, de m’extraire du chaudron et de trouver le temps de réfléchir à ce qu’il convient de faire. » S’extraire du chaudron ? On croit rêver ! Après avoir délibérément mis le feu aux poudres, le ministre incendiaire contemple les dégâts avec délectation, et veut prendre son temps. Les populations de Seine-Saint-Denis et d’ailleurs, les élus, les éducateurs qui passent leurs nuits sur le terrain apprécieront.
En réalité, si le gouvernement n’a en ce moment que deux mots à la bouche : « fermeté et justice », on peut légitimement se demander si sa première urgence est de ramener le calme. Il semble davantage préoccupé d’exploiter la situation pour enfoncer un peu plus le clou d’une politique autoritaire et discriminatoire, sans aucune réponse aux urgences sociales des villes et des quartiers concernés. La droite a montré depuis avril 2002 qu’elle est prête à tout pour imposer une politique rejetée par le pays. La semaine écoulée confirme que la provocation, le mépris, le mensonge, l’intimidation, le désordre sont des armes dont il n’hésite pas à user pour parvenir à ses fins.
Incapable de rassembler autour des objectifs de sa politique antisociale, désavoué lors du référendum, en particulier dans les quartiers populaires, aujourd’hui sur la sellette, à nouveau mis en cause depuis la rentrée par les mobilisation sociales du 4 octobre, de la SNCM, de Hewlett-Packard, menant tambour battant des projets de privatisations condamnés dans le pays, le gouvernement n’a qu’une stratégie pour durer : diviser, stigmatiser, désespérer.
Les jeunes de banlieue sont pour Nicolas Sarkozy et ses amis de l’UMP de parfaits boucs émissaires pour éluder le débat sur leurs responsabilités. À la sortie de la réunion tenue jeudi à Matignon avec des maires de banlieue, les médias donnaient abondamment la parole à Marc-Philippe Daubresse, élu UMP du Nord. Mais pas un ne rappelait qu’il était ministre du Logement aux côtés de Jean-Louis Borloo, il y a quelques mois encore. Car allons-nous enfin parler des racines profondes du mal qui ronge la banlieue ? Ce week-end à Bobigny se tiennent, à l’initiative du PCF et du maire de la ville Bernard Birsinger, les seconds états généraux du logement. Combien de caméras et de micros manifesteront la même disponibilité ? On y débattra pourtant sérieusement du fond du problème posé à la banlieue avec des dizaines d’acteurs de terrain.
Car, quoi qu’en dise le gouvernement, les événements de ces derniers jours ne sont pas le reflet d’un unique problème de sécurité en banlieue, mais un terrible constat d’échec des politiques de ségrégation urbaine et sociale imposées depuis des années à ces quartiers et à leurs populations. La banlieue n’est pas un cas à part. La banlieue, c’est la France, celle qui peine et souffre au travail, celle qui chôme, celle que la loi du fric voudrait enfermer dans la précarité, les discriminations, le mal-logement, le sous-équipement public. Sans ambition sociale pour la banlieue, le pays entier ne peut se développer, l’égalité des droits qui fonde les principes républicains n’est qu’un chiffon de papier. La banlieue, c’est là que se joue aujourd’hui l’avenir de tous, l’avenir du modèle social français. Voilà aussi pourquoi Nicolas Sarkozy veut la briser, casser les solidarités dont elle demeure envers et contre tout un précieux creuset.
Dans ce domaine crucial de la vie de nation, il est urgent d’exiger un changement de cap radical de la politique gouvernementale. Plutôt que de passer en boucle les images des voitures brûlées, il faut donner la parole à la banlieue, à ses élus, à tous les acteurs de terrain. Et il faut les écouter enfin et vraiment !
Par Pierre Laurent

France : crise des banlieues

2005-11-07T19:46:00.000Z

événementles colères des banlieues

« Un désespoir immense... », résume Vincent, vingt et un ans. Voilà une semaine que la Seine-Saint-Denis s’est embrasée. Dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi, au moins 150 véhicules ont été incendiés dans ce seul département. Il y en avait autant la veille. La mort de deux adolescents, électrocutés dans un transformateur d’EDF à Clichy-sous-Bois, jeudi 27 octobre, après un contrôle de police, doublée des provocations de Nicolas Sarkozy, a cristallisé une colère qui n’attendait qu’un signal pour se réveiller. Et déclenché une véritable guérilla dont on peine à voir le bout.
Vincent n’en est pas surpris. Il a vécu à Aulnay-sous-Bois, connaît parfaitement Clichy-sous-Bois. Pour lui, le constat est évident. « Tout le monde sait que dans tous ces quartiers règne la misère et on laisse traîner cette situation. Pire, on l’aggrave d’année en année. Comment voulez-vous que ça n’explose pas. Je n’approuve pas cette violence, mais je la comprends. » Et cette fois, assure-t-il, c’est sérieux. Très sérieux. « Ça fait des années que certains attendent ça. Ils ne laisseront pas passer le coche. Et il ne faut pas croire que ce ne sont que des voyous qui font de la violence gratuite. J’ai des amis qui étaient dans le mouvement lycéen de l’année dernière, qui étaient super carré, et qui aujourd’hui sont allés brûler des voitures ! Dans leur tête, c’est une nouvelle manière de continuer la lutte. Je crois qu’il y a un vrai décrochage. »
Clichy-sous-Bois, exemple
des quartiers paupérisés
Le feu des banlieues ne demandait qu’à démarrer. Nicolas Sarkozy a attisé les braises. Réveillant par ses provocations des années de frustration, de rage plus ou moins contenue. Il y a eu cette semaine les violences, inacceptables. Mais au-delà, l’expression d’un ras-le-bol général. Une bronca des quartiers où règnent depuis trop longtemps l’exclusion sociale, la discrimination, la misère, autant économique que culturelle.
Ce n’est pas un hasard si tout est parti de Clichy-sous-Bois. De cette petite ville de 28 000 habitants, si banalement pauvre avec son taux de chômage astronomique, son habitat honteusement dégradé, ses services publics exsangues. Clichy-sous-Bois, berceau des émeutes, reste un exemple de ces quartiers paupérisés où vit une jeunesse disqualifiée d’avance, stigmatisée dans les médias, quand elle n’est pas directement étiquetée « racaille » par un ministre en perpétuelle campagne électorale. Le mal-être des banlieues ne s’est pas construit sur du vent. L’injustice n’est pas qu’un sentiment. « Prenez simplement l’école, explique Samir, un éducateur sportif de Clichy-sous-Bois. Tous les jeunes savent qu’il n’y a pas d’égalité : s’ils font leur lycée ici, ils n’auront pratiquement aucune chance de décrocher une grande école. Comment voulez-vous justifier ça ? »
Clichy-sous-Bois, c’est l’histoire d’une ville qui cumule les handicaps : 20 % de chômage en moyenne, avec des quartiers qui culminent à 40 %, voire 50 % ; une population parmi les plus jeunes d’Île-de-France, dont près de la moitié est âgée de moins de vingt-cinq ans ; trente-six ethnies différentes et de nombreux « primo-arrivants », qui débarquent souvent en grande difficulté financière ; une situation géographique enclavée, sans métro, ni gare ou route nationale ; un budget municipal famélique dans une ville où peu d’entreprises - et la taxe professionnelle qui va avec - acceptent de s’installer... Et comme si tout cela ne suffisait pas, la ville a la particularité de posséder un grand nombre de copropriétés dégradées. Près de 1 570 logements sur 9 000, où s’entassent parfois plusieurs familles obligées de payer 1 000 euros chaque mois à des marchands de sommeil peu scrupuleux. « La cité de la Forestière est même la vitrine nationale de cette copropriété en triste état, où il est très difficile d’intervenir car c’est de l’habitat privé, déplore Stéphane Teste, l’adjoint à la communication. Tout cela conforte un réel sentiment d’abandon et d’exclusion chez les habitants. »
Malgré tout, à la mairie de Clichy, on se dit surpris par l’ampleur des événements. « C’est vrai que Clichy est une ville difficile. Depuis dix ans que notre équipe a été élue, on a traversé un certain nombre de crises, relève Olivier Klein, premier adjoint, chargé de la politique de la ville. Mais on n’a jamais connu une explosion comme celle-là, avec un tel déferlement de violence. » Ici, tout le monde, le maire (PS) Claude Dilain en tête, pointe la lourde responsabilité de Nicolas Sarkozy. « Ses propos ont créé une tension dans les quartiers. Et lorsque des jeunes et moins jeunes, qui vivent l’injustice sociale au quotidien, entendent un ministre parler d’eux comme ça, il est très difficile de les faire revenir à la raison. »
À l’évidence, la propension du premier flic de France à prendre la défense de ses hommes au lieu de réclamer une enquête impartiale, tout comme l’absence de condamnation officielle de l’État après le jet, dimanche soir, d’une grenade lacrymogène de la police dans la mosquée Bilal, ont nourri le sentiment qu’une fois encore la justice ne serait pas du côté des habitants de la cité. « Il y a chez beaucoup de jeunes une vraie révolte contre les institutions, note Olivier Klein. Ils ne croient plus en elles, ils ne se sentent plus concernés, car ils voient que celles-ci ne jouent pas leur rôle d’atténuateur des inégalités. Et l’attitude du gouvernement dans cette affaire n’a fait que renforcer cette conviction et démultiplier la colère. »
Le malaise est profond. Et la défaillance des pouvoirs publics évidente. « Sur l’ensemble de la Seine-Saint-Denis, il manquait 160 postes d’enseignants à la rentrée. Aujourd’hui, 80 sont encore vacants », fait remarquer un directeur d’école. Un comble, alors que les besoins sont énormes. À Clichy-sous-Bois, les trois collèges et le lycée sont classés en zone d’éducation prioritaire depuis 1995. « C’est bien, poursuit notre directeur, sauf que l’éducation nationale a supprimé dans le même temps les classes de perfectionnement qui permettaient de faire des parcours plus individualisés. Aujourd’hui, ce n’est plus possible. » Le niveau scolaire en primaire est faible. Très faible. La moyenne des évaluations nationales en CE2 et en sixième est en dessous de celle de l’ensemble des autres ZEP.
L’exclusion sociale toujours
à la hausse
Pour beaucoup, à Clichy, l’exclusion sociale s’est aggravée ces dernières années. « On a l’impression d’être enfermé ici. Et ce n’est pas nous qui avons les clés, c’est eux... » résume Skarj, un grand gaillard qui s’est lancé dans le rap après s’en être « sorti » grâce au foot pratiqué à haut niveau. « Cela m’a permis de voyager, de m’ouvrir au monde. Mais la plupart des jeunes n’ont pas cette chance. Et pour eux, c’est très dur d’imaginer un autre horizon que la cité. »
Le mot discrimination revient dans toutes les conversations. L’idée que, en France, tout le monde n’est pas logé à la même enseigne. « Le gamin qui a vu son grand frère, pendant des années, se faire jeter avec ses CV à cause de son nom arabe, que voulez-vous qu’il pense ? interroge encore Samir, l’éducateur sportif. Il grandit avec l’idée que la société ne veut pas de lui, voire pire, qu’elle n’a même pas besoin de lui ! Ce genre de truc, ça tue tout espoir dans la tête des jeunes... » Mais pas seulement. Cela les unit aussi. Les fédère autour de cette terrible impression de vivre un destin commun : celui des laissés-pour-compte, des relégués, des méprisés.
À Clichy comme ailleurs, la jeunesse des cités se sent ainsi marquée au fer rouge. Et si par hasard, elle l’oublie, les contrôles incessants des gros bras de la brigade anticriminalité, la fameuse BAC, sont là pour le leur rappeler. La police, c’est l’un des sujets de conversation favoris au pied des barres d’immeubles. Les histoires de Flash-Ball dégainés, de contrôles au faciès et d’humiliations en tout genre ne manquent pas. « Rien que le mois dernier, j’ai été contrôlé trois fois, raconte Vincent. À chaque fois, je me suis senti littéralement agressé. Les flics ne cherchent pas l’apaisement mais juste à te rabaisser, à te faire fermer ta gueule. Moi, à chaque fois que je voulais dialoguer, ils me disaient "arrête de jouer l’intelligent", "fais pas le malin, on peut te briser ta vie". » Un soir, assure le jeune homme, les choses ont mal tourné. « Ils sont venus nous contrôler. Ils ont été vers un de mes copains qui est noir. "Toi, t’es impliqué dans quelque chose !" Ils l’ont menotté, mis dans la voiture et trimbalé comme ça pendant des heures. Il est revenu avec les joues gonflées par les coups. »
Entre jeunes et « condés », le divorce est consommé. Et beaucoup expliquent la fuite désespérée des deux adolescents électrocutés par cette peur viscérale qu’inspirent les hommes en uniforme. « Dans la tête des jeunes, le flic, c’est le méchant, celui avec lequel il n’y a pas de dialogue, raconte Éric, un trentenaire qui produit des rappeurs de Clichy. Et c’est vrai, les policiers ne sont pas là pour ça. Le dialogue, c’est au politique de l’organiser, de le canaliser. Mais comme ils ne le font pas, ou si peu, c’est sur les flics que se déverse toute la haine. »
Pourtant,
de vrais lieux sociaux existent
Évidemment, le discours guerrier du ministre de l’Intérieur n’a fait qu’empirer les choses. Y compris pour la police, prise dans cette impasse. « Maintenant, c’est eux contre nous », résume un jeune, complètement remonté. Finie la parole, bonjour la matraque. Signe des temps, depuis 2002, le commissariat du Raincy, dont dépend Clichy-sous-Bois, a vu ses effectifs consacrés à la police urbaine de proximité (PUP) passer de trente à quinze hommes. Quant à l’antenne de police de proximité, construite à Clichy même en 2002, elle n’a toujours pas été mise en service. « À mon époque, reprend Éric, on n’avait pas la peur des policiers comme maintenant. On ne se faisait pas contrôler sans arrêt. » Et de lâcher dans un souffle : « Je crois que l’on a grandi avec un peu plus d’espoir que les jeunes d’aujourd’hui. »
Les raisons d’espérer existent bel et bien. À Clichy-sous-Bois, le maillage social est une réalité. Et la solidarité qui va avec aussi. Associations, éducateurs, enseignants, tous se démènent pour regagner le terrain perdu. Comme le fait Arrimage, une association de prévention. Par équipe de trois ou quatre, ses éducateurs de rue sillonnent les quartiers depuis des années à la rencontre des jeunes. Ils créent des liens, les épaulent ou les orientent, que ce soit sur les questions de scolarité, de santé, de justice. « On suit une centaine d’enfants par quartier et près de soixante-dix familles, souligne Christian Ruffail, son directeur. C’est un travail de fourmi qui marche vraiment. »
Mais, là encore, les moyens manquent. Cruellement. Financée à 90 % par le département, Arrimage n’est pas encore touchée par la fonte spectaculaire des crédits alloués par le gouvernement ces dernières années et les effets des transferts de charges dus à la décentralisation. Ce n’est pas le cas de la multitude de petites associations qui oeuvrent à Clichy-sous-Bois. « C’est dramatique de voir des associations comme Parcours, qui fait du soutien scolaire auprès de 300 élèves, ou Asti, qui fait de l’alphabétisation, devoir courir les banques pour obtenir des avances de trésorerie, s’agace Ruffail. Tout ce temps passé à sauver les structures, c’est autant de temps en moins sur le terrain. Un vrai scandale. »
D’autant plus rageant que les habitants de Clichy sont extrêmement demandeurs. « Il faut être clair, explique Christian Ruffail, les parents dans ces cités sont de bons parents. Ils n’abandonnent pas leurs enfants à la rue comme c’est répété partout. Ils veulent s’intégrer. » Et quand le directeur d’Arrimage entend Nicolas Sarkozy dire qu’il faut que les immigrés fassent l’effort d’apprendre le français, il bondit. « Ils ne l’ont pas attendu pour vouloir le faire ! Sauf que, faute de moyens financiers, il y a des listes d’attente longues comme un jour sans pain dans les associations qui font de l’alphabétisation. On n’a pas besoin de Sarkozy pour savoir ce qu’il faut faire dans les banlieues. On a besoin de moyens pour faire face à la massification des problèmes. »
En attendant, la colère continue de gronder dans les cités de Seine-Saint-Denis. Sous sa casquette, Éric, le producteur de rap, assure garder espoir. Il veut juste poser une question : « On dit que la France est un pays d’égalité. Mais où commence-t-elle, cette égalité ? »
Laurent Mouloud

France : crise des banlieues

2005-11-07T19:43:00.000Z

Après l'intervention dimanche soir du président de la République à propos de la crise des banlieues et avant celle du Premier ministre ce soir au journal de TF1 qui doit annoncer des décisions pour tenter de la résoudre, François Hollande, premier secrétaire du PS, a estimé que Jacques Chirac «aurait dû parler plus tôt et dire clairement quelle était la politique de l'Etat», alors que depuis onze nuits «des populations entières vivent l'enfer» avec la flambée de violences dans les banlieues : «Quand le chef de l'Etat attend dix jours pour s'adresser aux Français, et de manière brève, et quand le Premier ministre est obligé d'attendre encore un jour de plus encore pour décider d'annonces, je l'espère fortes, je crois effectivement que le gouvernement n'avait pas pris la mesure», a-t-il dit sur France 2. Il a demandé «une décision majeure qui doit être un soutien aux populations de ces quartiers qui souffrent. C'est d'abord un message et des actes de solidarité», citant «des services publics immédiats, une présence de la police permanente, le rétablissement de la police de proximité». «Il faut qu'on mette le paquet sur l'éducation», a ajouté François Hollande qui propose des classes limitées à quinze élèves dans les quartiers sensibles. Il a évoqué aussi une répartition du logement social dans toutes les communes, y compris dans la ville de Nicolas Sarkozy, Neuilly-sur-Seine. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, député socialiste du Val d'Oise, a demandé sur RTL à Nicolas Sarkozy de «se concentrer sur son travail» de ministre de l'Intérieur, de «rétablir l'ordre et rien d'autre», a-t-il dit. Selon l'élu de Sarcelles, Nicolas Sarkozy «a trop d'activités» : «On ne peut pas à la fois être à plein temps ministre de l'Intérieur, à plein temps président de l'UMP, à plein temps président du département des Hauts-de-Seine, quasiment à plein temps candidat contre le président de la République. Aujourd'hui, il est dépassé», a-t-il jugé.De son côté, Le porte-parole du gouvernement Jean-François Copé a souligné que malgré «la situation très difficile» provoquée par ces incendies de voitures et affrontements entre jeunes et policiers, «des actions énormes ont été conduites, avec des résultats très positifs» dans les quartiers sensibles. Façon de répondre aux critiques sur le désengagement progressif de l'Etat. «Dans certains quartiers, les choses seraient bien pires si nous n'avions pas mis en oeuvre tout ce que nous avons mis en oeuvre», a estimé M. Copé sur France Inter. Il a expliqué que la politique de la ville, «c'était du cousu main, du sur-mesure». Il a fait valoir que «la carte des incendies, des violences» montrait qu'ils ont lieu «là où le principe des ghettos n'a pas encore été éradiqué». Les Verts ont exprimé leur «grande inquiétude face à l'incompréhension du président de la République et du gouvernement», considérant que «la répression, comme unique réponse» aux violences urbaines «agit comme une provocation supplémentaire». et qu'il faut apporter «une réponse politique urgente» afin «de proposer un avenir» à tous ceux qui vivent en France. Les Verts exigent «que l'attitude irresponsable du ministre de l'Intérieur, reflet de la politique du gouvernement soutenue par le président de la République, soit sanctionnée».

Steve Stevaert

2005-11-06T09:24:00.000Z

,,Het is mijn fout dat de socialisten het nu moeilijk hebben''
Het mea culpa van Steve Stevaert

Het Fenomeen. Op een documentaire/film na hebben we de jongste maanden nog weinig gehoord van mijnheer de gouverneur van Limburg, Steve Stevaert. ,,Druk, druk, druk, jong.'' Hij werkt nog altijd - tegen het advies van zijn dokter in - veertien, vijftien uur per dag. Voor zijn provincie. Al blijft hij de nationale politiek op de voet volgen. Daarom dat zijn hart een beetje bloedt als hij ziet hoe het de socialistische familie vergaat, nu partij en vakbond met getrokken messen tegenover elkaar staan in het brugpensioendebat.

U bent nu een half jaar gouverneur van Limburg. Valt het wat mee?
Steve Stevaert : ,,Het is wat ik ervan verwacht had. En het is druk. Op 14 november hou ik mijn eerste officiële toespraak. Limburg heeft twee opties: de China-optie en de India-optie.'' Is Limburg te klein misschien?(lacht) ,,Natuurlijk niet. Luister, we hebben in de provincie drie dingen nodig: jobs, jobs en jobs. We kunnen gerust in Limburg producten maken die ze ook in China nodig hebben. Er zijn tientallen miljoenen Chinezen die koopkrachtig zijn. Het zou me verwonderen, mochten we aan die mensen niks kunnen verkopen dat Limburgs is. Bovendien is er ook een logica. In de haven van Antwerpen komen veel schepen dingen lossen uit China. Die gaan niet leeg terug naar daar. Dus, als we daar een klein beetje van Limburg in zouden kunnen leggen, zou dat heel mooi zijn.'' En wat heeft Limburg met India te maken?,,Door een merkwaardige samenloop van omstandigheden heb ik contacten met de Indische regering.'' Pardon?,,Het is heel moeilijk uit te leggen. Ik ken toevallig iemand die tot voor kort niet zo veel te zeggen had in India. Maar ondertussen is die van ontzettend groot belang geworden. Hij was nogal gecharmeerd door mijn ideeën, over de herverdeling en zo... Hij heeft me uitgenodigd - privé - om binnenkort eens op bezoek te gaan.'' Het staat in de bijbelBedoelt u dat het gratis-verhaal school maakt in de grootmacht India?(glimlacht) ,,Inderdaad. Merkwaardig, hè. In Vlaanderen is daar een politiek debat over gevoerd. Maar in landen waar het meer nodig is, gaat dat vlotter. Het gratis-verhaal komt in de hele wereld op. India, Zuid-Amerika... Daar begrijpen ze dat je niet alles op de vrije markt kan gooien. Als alles koopwaar wordt, moeten we sommigen uit de tempel verdrijven. Dat staat zelfs in de bijbel. (gibbert) Zoiets mag een gouverneur nog zeggen.'' ,,Gratis onderwijs, dat is ook zorgen dat er eten is op school en ervoor zorgen dat de kindjes er kunnen geraken. Zo kan je de wereld veranderen. Wel, in India is Sonia Ghandi daar nu mee bezig.'' Maar wat heeft dat met Limburg te maken?,,India gaat ook in Europa zaken willen doen. Indiase bedrijven zullen in Europa oprukken. India is te groot om neutraal te zijn. En wie niet neutraal is, daar ben je best bevriend mee.'' U bent blijkbaar actief op het internationale vlak. Was u dan niet beter ambassadeur geworden?,,Oei. Nu moet ik opletten wat ik zeg. Want zoals je weet moet een gouverneur boven de partijpolitiek staan en heel diplomatisch zijn. Ik heb altijd goed verborgen kunnen houden dat ik fel geïnteresseerd ben in het internationale niveau. Maar ambassadeur? Daarvoor heb ik geen aanleg. Die moet soms in veel woorden weinig kunnen zeggen. Het omgekeerde kan ik beter.'' (hilariteit)U werkt veertien, vijftien uur per dag. U ging het toch rustiger aan doen. Omdat het moest van de dokter, zei u. ,,Ik kan daar niet aan doen. Ik ben geen gouverneur geworden om bloempot te spelen. Ik wil dingen ten goede veranderen. Als ik dat niet kan, stop ik. Een gouverneur is een demente vorm van koning, schrijf dat maar. (gniffelt) Ik zal alles op een gouverneurachtige manier zeggen.'' Wat is dat, een gouverneurachtige manier?,,Je moet absoluut boven de partijpolitiek staan. Ik heb natuurlijk mijn overtuiging. Maar ik moet zien dat ik iedereen meekrijg: links, rechts, progressief, conservatief.'' Verdraagzaamheid troefHoe gaat u aan jobs in Limburg komen?,, Er is een centralisatieoperatie bezig in Europa. Je moet niet meer in vijf landen zitten om in Europa te zijn. We moeten erin slagen in Limburg, of Vlaanderen, bedrijven aan te trekken door een goed omgevingsklimaat te scheppen. Hier is het veilig, aangenaam, verdraagzaam. Dat is onze troef.'' Hoe bedoelt u?,,Kijk naar India en de godsdienst. Indiërs willen dat hun godsdienst gerespecteerd wordt. Wij hebben dat respect. Verdraagzaamheid zal een natuurlijke rijkdom worden. We hebben mensen met veel talent. Die moeten we in de watten leggen. Via hun partners bijvoorbeeld. Als je een kei in een vakgebied hier wil houden, moet je ervoor zorgen dat zijn/haar partner zich hier goed voelt. Anders blijft die niet en ben je dat talent ook kwijt. De mensen moeten zich hier thuis voelen. Dat is onze troef.'' *** Heeft u nog veel contact met de Wetstraat?,,Heel veel. Ik heb er ook veel vrienden.'' Kan dat dan, vrienden hebben in de politiek?,,Als je gouverneur bent, kan dat wel. (lacht) Dan doe je namelijk niet meer mee met de verkiezingen.''Wat vindt u van het Generatiepact? Uw geestelijke vader Willy Claes waarschuwt dat er veel meer nodig zal zijn.,,Intellectueel heeft Claes gelijk. Ik ben er honderdduizend procent van overtuigd dat er na dit Generatiepact een nieuw Generatiepact gaat komen. En daarna nog een. En daarna opnieuw een. In een samenleving waar mensen langer naar school gaan en langer leven, kan je niet korter werken. Die afspraken moeten worden gemaakt.'' Maar de mensen zijn het daar niet mee eens. Ze komen massaal op straat.(onverstoord) ,,Ik denk, in alle bescheidenheid, dat de politiek niet meer moet uitleggen waar het over gaat. De mensen hebben dat al begrepen. Dat zijn geen achterlijke idioten. Denk je dat de vakbonden achterlijk zijn? Ze komen op straat omdat ze bezorgd zijn - terecht - over de houdbaarheid van het systeem.'' ,,Het is geen partijpolitiek als ik zeg dat het me mateloos stoort hoe alles wordt uitgelegd. (windt zich op) Je moet Michel Vandenbosch van Gaia niet willen uitleggen hoe hij een lamsgebraad moet klaarmaken. We moeten de mensen niet uitleggen dat ze langer moeten werken. De mensen willen weten hoe het komt dat de jongeren geen werk hebben.'' Betere gezondheidGoede vraag. Hoe komt het dat jongeren geen werk hebben?,,Ik heb er een antwoord op, maar dat overstijgt de gouverneursdinges . We moeten daar misschien iets zeer links en zeer rechts doen. Meer kan en wil ik daar niet over kwijt.'' Denkt u ook niet dat ze u heel erg missen bij de socialistische partij? Er is nu een ruzie tussen de socialistische vakbond en de SP.A. U slaagde er tenminste in onpopulaire beslissingen te nemen en daardoor aan populariteit te winnen.,,Als je onpopulaire beslissingen goed kan uitleggen, vergeet iedereen dat die beslissing onpopulair is.'' Daar legt u de vinger op de wonde: een goede uitleg is nodig. Die is er nu niet geweest. ,,Wat niet uit te leggen is, moet je niet uitleggen. Willy Claes is, euh, een oprechte socialist. Maar hij dwaalt. Hij denkt dat we de mensen moeten uitleggen dat ze langer moeten werken. Maar dat wéten de mensen al. Dat is niet het probleem. Onzekerheid, dat wel. Je moet ze gerust stellen.'' Hoe doe je dat dan?,,Door te zeggen dat je als socialist aan hun kant staat. Ik sta nu boven de partijpolitiek, ik herhaal het nog eens. Als je de indruk geeft dat je die maatregelen graag neemt, gaat het niet. Dacht je dat ik indertijd graag een huis liet afbreken?'' Maar uw partij zit nu wel in moeilijkheden.,,Als ik er nog was, zou dat niet anders zijn geweest.'' Is uw vertrek niet mee een oorzaak van die moeilijkheden? U wist wat eraan stond te komen.,,Ik ben er mee verantwoordelijk voor. Het is mijn fout, dat is juist.'' Meent u dat? ,, Ja, natuurlijk. We wisten wat ging komen. Maar die problemen zouden er sowieso zijn gekomen. Ik heb altijd gezegd dat ik het een tijdje zou doen. Maar mijn gezondheid liet het niet meer toe. Een partijvoorzitter in een rolstoel, daar heeft ook niemand iets aan. Het gaat nu gelukkig veel beter met mijn gezondheid. De dokter is nog wel kwaad maar hij legt het me zeer goed uit.'' (lacht)Is het Generatiepact op de juiste manier aangepakt?,,Het is niet aan mij om daar een oordeel over te vellen. Ik hoop dat Johan de rust kan terugbrengen, samen met Herwig Jorissen. (de grote man van de ABVV-metaalcentrale, die al heeft aangekondigd dat er nóg stakingen zullen volgen, nvdr.) . Als zij een oplossing vinden, zijn we al stukken verder.'' U blijft een politiek beest, hé. Voelt u zich als gouverneur niet gekooid? U moet nu zo voorzichtig zijn.,,In het openbaar is het een nadeel, ja. Maar achter de schermen kan ik veel meer doen. Je kan ook tegen andere partijen je gedacht zeggen. En ze luisteren nog ook. Niemand twijfelt aan mijn overtuiging. Ik ga daar niet flauw over doen. Als ik zeg dat het probleem bij de metaalcentrale zit, zullen ze het nog wel horen. Er komen nog pacten, wees gerust.''

Frank POOSEN06/11/2005 - Het Volk

émeutes en France

2005-11-05T11:21:00.000Z

Les émeutes restent intenses en Ile-de-France et s'étendent en province

LEMONDE.FR 05.11.05 08h43 • Mis à jour le 05.11.05 11h24

Pour la neuvième nuit consécutive, la France a connu, vendredi 4 et samedi 5 novembre, de nouvelles violences urbaines. Samedi matin, le procureur de Paris, Yves Bot, faisait état d'un total de 897 véhicules incendiés et de plus de 250 interpellations. "Nous avons eu cette nuit, j'ai eu les derniers chiffres, au niveau national, 897 véhicules à avoir été brûlés dont 656 en Ile-de-France", a-t-il déclaré sur Europe 1.

Parmi les voitures incendiées, 241 l'ont donc été en province où le phénomène, apparu la veille, a pris de l'ampleur.
Les forces de l'ordre ont réalisé beaucoup plus d'interpellations de fauteurs de troubles présumés que la veille (253 contre 78). Il s'agissait d'une priorité d'action fixée aux policiers.
Les autorités notent une baisse des affrontements directs entre émeutiers et forces de l'ordre, lesquelles avaient essuyé des tirs à balle réelle dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi. "C'est plutôt un harcèlement de la police que de l'affrontement", a-t-on résumé de source policière.
M. Bot a estimé à propos de ces événements qu'il s'agissait de "violences organisées". "Par qui ?, s'est-il interrogé. Si j'étais en mesure d'apporter une réponse précise, les personnes seraient déjà sous les verrous. Mais on voit une manière d'agir qui est organisée. Cela répond à une stratégie (...) qui inclut une véritable tactique mobile".
"Cela se fait, a-t-il ajouté, par des unités mobiles de jeunes - ou de moins jeunes puisqu'ils sont masqués - qui arrivent sur des scooters, balancent une bouteille enflammée sur un véhicule puis repartent. Il est extrêmement difficile de les interpeller."
"Il y a des bandes organisées, a-t-il poursuivi, et il est incontestable que cela se fait de manière qui donne toute l'apparence de la coordination entre elles. D'ailleurs, on peut lire sur certains sites des blogs qui incitent d'autres villes à se joindre au mouvement de la région parisienne."
"C'est un mouvement qui est dirigé essentiellement contre les institutions de la République, a-t-il estimé, mais ce n'est pas un mouvement qui prend une tournure communautariste. Objectivement, c'est la seule chose que l'on peut dire."

Ces violences sont intervenues quelques heures après un nouvel appel au calme, lancé vendredi par des maires des communes du département de Seine-Saint-Denis et par le frère d'un des deux jeunes morts par électrocution le 27 octobre. Le maire UMP d'Aulnay-sous-Bois, Gérard Gaudron, en a pour sa part appelé à une marche silencieuse samedi dans sa ville.
Environ 1 400 policiers, gendarmes et CRS avaient été déployés en Seine-Saint-Denis. Dans les départements voisins, gagnés par la violence, les effectifs policiers ont été renforcés et les unités sont "plus mobiles et réactives" qu'auparavant, a-t-on souligné à la préfecture. Un hélicoptère muni d'un projecteur-caméra a été dépêché sur place.

SEINE-SAINT-DENIS. Dans le département de la Seine-Saint-Denis, où les troubles ont commencé il y a une semaine après le décès accidentel de deux adolescents dans un transformateur EDF, divers incendies ont touché des bâtiments.Dans la commune d' Aubervilliers, deux entrepôts ont été incendiés. Au total, 700 sapeurs-pompiers ont été mobilisés dans le département où une quinzaine de communes ont été touchées par des incidents dans la nuit.
A La Courneuve, le feu a été mis à une crèche. A Montreuil, un magasin Leader Price a été incendié ainsi qu'un parking et un concessionnaire automobile. Trois blessés légers sont à déplorer dans cette ville.A Pantin, la police a interpellé sept mineurs qui transportaient dans leur sac à dos des "projectiles incendiaires" et des bouteilles d'essence.
A Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, un engin incendiaire a été lancé contre le mur de la synagogue, tandis qu'à Villetaneuse, un bureau de poste a été incendié. Toujours à Pierrefitte, plus d'une centaine de personnes ont été évacuées pendant la nuit après le déclenchement d'un incendie dans un parking souterrain sous leurs immeubles.
D'autres incidents ont été signalés dans le département, par exemple à Epinay-sur-Seine, où une cinquantaine de jeunes cagoulés ont saccagé une dizaine de voitures.
Un engin incendiaire a par ailleurs été lancé sur la façade du commissariat de Saint-Denis.
ESSONNE. Un policier a été blessé par deux pavés dans le quartier de Coquibus, proche de la cité sensible des Tarterêts de Corbeil-Essonnes, où une concession Opel et un dépôt de pneus ont été incendiés. La mairie de Saint-Michel-sur-Orge a été ravagée en partie par un incendie tandis qu'une école maternelle et primaire à Brétigny-sur-Orge a été détruite en partie.
VAL D'OISE. Une dizaine de voitures ont été incendiées entre Vauréal et Jouy-le-Moutier, aux environs de Goussainville et Garges-les-Gonesse, selon la préfecture du département. Cinq personnes ont été interpellées sur les lieux. Le feu a été mis à une boulangerie et à un bureau de ventes en préfabriqué.
YVELINES. Parmi les incidents recensés figurent l'incendie d'une école maternelle d'Achères.
HAUTS-DE-SEINE. A Suresnes, un incendie s'est propagé de véhicule en véhicule dans un parking souterrain, entraînant la destruction de 36 voitures.A Clamart, selon une source policière, un enfant de dix ans a été interpellé avec une bouteille d'essence dans les mains tandis que dans le même département, à Boulogne, la police a arrêté un fauteur de trouble qui aurait aspergé quinze véhicules légers.
SEINE-ET-MARNE. A Meaux, un véhicule des sapeurs-pompiers a été détruit. Le bâtiment du collège Jean-Monet de Torcy a été à moitié détruit.
VAL-DE-MARNE. A Champigny, un bus a été vidé de ses occupants et incendié.
HAUTE-NORMANDIE. Les chauffeurs de la compagnie des transports en commun d'Elbeuf (Seine-Maritime) ont décidé d'exercer leur "droit de retrait" et n'ont pas pris leur service samedi matin, après la destruction par incendie d'un bus de leur société, a-t-on appris de source policière. Vendredi soir à Cléon, près de Rouen, des inconnus ont lancé des bouteilles incendiaires à l'intérieur d'un autobus, avant de s'enfuir. La conductrice et tous les passagers ont pu descendre juste avant que le véhicule ne s'embrase et ne soit totalement détruit.
Par ailleurs, au Havre, deux hommes encagoulés soupçonnés d'avoir tenté de mettre le feu à une voiture ont été interpellés dans la soirée, selon la police. Dans cette ville, sept véhicules ont été incendiés dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi, et cinq la nuit précédente. "Cela correspond à une activité un peu plus importante que d'habitude", assure-t-on de même source.
Dans l'Eure, selon la préfecture, huit véhicules ont été incendiés au cours de la nuit de vendredi à samedi, dont cinq dans les quartiers sensibles de Louviers.
MIDI-PYRÉNÉES. Sept voitures ont été incendiées dans des quartiers de la périphérie de Toulouse, où la police a procédé à trois interpellations, a déclaré en milieu de nuit la préfecture de région. A minuit, précisait-elle, le calme était revenu dans les quartiers troublés.
BRETAGNE. Onze voitures ont été incendiées à Rennes et plusieurs feux de poubelles sont également à déplorer, a-t-on appris auprès des pompiers.
PAYS-DE-LA-LOIRE. A Nantes, quatre voitures ont brûlé dans le quartier de Bellevue à 21h30, mais tout est rentré dans l'ordre par la suite, d'après les pompiers.
NORD. Quatorze voitures ont été incendiées dans la soirée à Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Wattrelos, Hem et Mons-en-Baroeul, a déclaré la préfecture. Aucune interpellation n'a été effectuée.
PICARDIE. A Amiens, six voitures ont été incendiées et un camion de pompiers caillassé pendant une intervention dans les quartiers nord de la ville, selon la préfecture de la Somme. Deux jeunes majeurs ont été interpellés par la police, a-t-on précisé de même source.
Deux bus ont été entièrement détruits et deux autres partiellement endommagés par un incendie dans un entrepôt extérieur proche du centre-ville de Soissons (Aisne). Trois voitures ont par ailleurs été incendiées dans le quartier de Presles dans la même ville. Aucune interpellation n'a eu lieu.
Dans l'Oise, trois voitures ont été incendiées, dont l'une à proximité d'un lycée, à Méru, a-t-on appris auprès de la préfecture, qui a précisé qu'aucune interpellation n'avait eu lieu.
AQUITAINE. Dix véhicules et une salle pour les jeunes ont été incendiés dans l'agglomération de Bordeaux dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi, a indiqué la préfecture de Gironde.
Les véhicules incendiés ont été recensés à Bordeaux ainsi que dans plusieurs communes de sa banlieue comme Lormont, Blanquefort et Bègles. Dans cette dernière ville, dont le député-maire est le Noël Mamère (Vert), une voiture municipale et une salle pour les jeunes située dans une cité ont également été incendiés. De nombreux feux de poubelles ont par ailleurs été signalés dans l'agglomération.
La nuit a été calme dans les autres départements de l'Aquitaine à l'exception de Pau, où onze véhicules de tourisme ont été incendiés dans le quartier sensible de l'Ousse-des-bois.
ALSACE. Dix-sept véhicules ont été incendiés dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi dans plusieurs quartiers de Strasbourg, a-t-on appris de sources concordantes. Les voitures ont été incendiées dans les quartiers de Cronenbourg, Hautepierre et Cité de l'Ill, a-t-on appris auprès des pompiers et de la police. Aucun n'affrontement direct n'a eu lieu avec les forces de l'ordre et aucune interpellation n'a été signalée.Entre le 27 octobre et le 3 novembre au soir inclus, 1 260 véhicules ont été incendiés en Seine-Saint-Denis, dans le Val-d'Oise, les Yvelines, l'Essonne, les Hauts-de-Seine, le Val-de-Marne et la Seine-et-Marne, selon la police.

Le Monde.fr (avec AFP et Reuters)

Anglican Church and homosexuals

2005-11-05T10:34:00.000Z

LONDON - The first openly gay Episcopal bishop said Friday he believed that the wider Anglican Church will eventually embrace homosexuals, but perhaps not in his lifetime.

We learned that with people of color, we have learned that with women and now we are learning that about gay and lesbian people." said the Right Rev. Gene Robinson, whose promotion to bishop of New Hampshire caused a bitter rift among the world's Anglicans.
Robinson was visiting Britain to join celebrations of the 10th anniversary of Changing Attitude, a group which promotes the acceptance of gay clergy. Robinson is not permitted to preach or preside at any Church of England services during his visit.
He met privately Thursday with Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, who is struggling to hold the Anglican Communion together despite vehement and apparently irreconcilable differences over whether gays should serve as priests and bishops. Conservatives believe that is contrary to the Bible, and have condemned moves by Anglicans in the United States and Canada to affirm faithful homosexual relationships.
The Episcopal Church is the U.S. province of the 77-million-member Anglican Communion.
Robinson described the meeting as "cordial," while Williams' office said it was "friendly but candid." Neither side has disclosed the substance of their discussions.
"I believe that the acceptance of gay and lesbian people into the life of the Church is something that is going to happen," Robinson said in an interview with British Broadcasting Corp. radio.
"It may not happen in my lifetime, but that is all right. It will happen in God's own time.
"What I will say in the short run is that no one is asking any other province of the Anglican Communion to raise up gay and lesbian people and to ordain them as priests or consecrate them as bishops.
"We are only asking that we be allowed to do this in our own context, which is admittedly different to that of most of the world," Robinson said.

Frankrijk : de haat van de banlieue

2005-11-05T04:48:00.000Z

De haat van de banlieue

REPORTAGE. DE haat van de banlieue
Niemand heeft vat op relschoppende jongeren in Parijs

De brede, arme, troosteloze rand rond de Franse hoofdstad staat in brand. Jongeren zijn er doordrenkt met een onbestemde haat. 'DIT komt ervan als je ons jarenlang als beesten behandelt. Dan beginnen we ons als beesten te gedragen. En het werkt blijkbaar. Niemand kijkt ooit naar ons om. We bestaan niet, tellen niet mee. Maar nu er rellen zijn, is iedereen plots geïnteresseerd. De politie is er, de politici, de pers'' Hij is een jaar of twintig, de zwarte jongeman die op ons is komen toegelopen. Twee glinsterende oorbellen in zijn oren, een dikke gouden ketting om de hals. Een beetje gangsta -look, maar ook niet helemaal. Hij is niet gevaarlijk, legt hij uit. Hij heeft niets te maken met de auto die honderd meter achter hem in lichterlaaie staat. Maar we zouden er wel beter aan doen dicht in de buurt van de politie te blijven, anders zouden we al onze spullen wel eens kwijt kunnen raken. ,,Je moet dat begrijpen hé, het is hier een heel arme buurt. Een duur fototoestel veroveren is een buitenkansje dat zich niet elke dag aandient.'' Enkele uren daarvoor - toen de zon nog niet onder was - hadden we nog ongestoord door de smalle straat tussen de woonblokken van Clichy-sous-Bois gewandeld. Links en rechts werden er wat vijandige blikken geworpen, want vreemdelingen zijn nu eenmaal niet zo gewenst. Zeker niet als ze een fototoestel bij zich hebben. Nu het donker is, ziet de omgeving er veel dreigender uit. ,,Het is ook gevaarlijk'', zegt de zwarte jongen, en hij kijkt even schichtig naar enkele andere jongeren die naast de auto zijn komen staan. Achter ons zijn er nog enkele op komst. ,,Maak maar snel dat je wegkomt. Het is de hoogste tijd.'' Clichy-sous-Bois is al een week onrustig. Het begon na de dood van twee jongens die zichzelf geëlektrocuteerd hebben toen ze zich voor de politie verstopten in een transformatorcabine. Maar daar gaat het al lang niet meer om. ,, C'est la haine '', vertelt een meisje. ,,Het is de haat.'' Net als in de gelijknamige Franse film die in 1995 ophef maakte door een messcherp beeld te schetsen van het leven van de jongeren in de Parijse banlieue. Jongeren die zich vergeten voelen, die het idee hebben dat ze niets betekenen en die in relschoppen een manier gevonden hebben om van zich te laten horen. Kat en muisDeze nacht zijn er in Clichy-sous-Bois geen grote confrontaties tussen jongeren en ordetroepen. Het is niet zoals de eerste dagen, toen de straten bezaaid lagen met stenen en er een spoor van uitgebrande auto's werd getrokken. ,,Toen was het hier echte stadsguerrilla'', vertelt een Parijse fotograaf die het allemaal meemaakte. ,,Net Beiroet, om het met enige zin voor overdrijving te zeggen.'' Nu is het veel meer een kat-en-muisspel. Maar eentje waarbij de kat geen zin heeft om mee te spelen. De politie is er wel, massaal zelfs, maar de agenten hebben duidelijk de opdracht zich op de achtergrond te houden, zeker niet te provoceren. En dus staan de tientallen combi's opgesteld voor de brandweerkazerne en in een straat een beetje aan de zijkant van de wijk. Ze zijn er alleen voor het geval de toestand zo uit de hand loopt dat ze echt moeten ingrijpen. Het is rond 22 uur als de eerste auto in de buurt in brand vliegt. Een kleine Franse wagen op een parking zo'n vijfhonderd meter van de massale ordemacht. Maar er komt geen reactie. Zelfs de brandweer laat zich niet zien. De auto brandt gewoon uit. Even later: een bestelwagen. Weer geen reactie. Nog wat later: een nieuwe auto, deze keer vlakbij de kazerne. Maar weer komt er geen reactie. De agenten hebben zelfs nog niet de moeite gedaan hun gevechtskledij aan te trekken. Maar lang zal dat niet meer duren. Plots komt een groepje jongeren van tussen de blokken op de agenten aangelopen. Ze gooien een molotovcocktail naar de combi's en spurten weer weg. Voor iemand goed beseft wat er gebeurd is, zijn ze al lang verdwenen tussen de appartementsblokken. De politiestrategie heeft succes. Echte rellen blijven uit, de jongeren houden er na een tijdje vanzelf mee op. In Clichy-sous-Bois tenminste. Een half uur verderop in Aulay-sous-Bois, Bobigny, Bondy en Le Blanc-Mesnil is de toestand wel weer helemaal uit de hand gelopen. In die andere voorsteden zijn de problemen net dezelfde als in Clichy-sous-Bois. Veel jongeren zonder doel, massale werkloosheid, een grote invloed van criminele bendes omdat de politie zich amper nog in de hete wijken vertoont, veel anonieme en vervallen hoogbouw. En bovenal: grauwe troosteloosheid. In een dikke band van tientallen kilometers dik rond de Franse hoofdstad. Enkele miljoenen mensen wonen er naar schatting. Veel van hen zijn tientallen jaren geleden naar Frankrijk gekomen en hebben al die tijd gewerkt. Maar voor de jongste generatie is dat werk er niet. ,,En het is een vicieuze cirkel'', zegt Mohammed Charef, een Algerijn die al dertien jaar in Clichy-sous-Bois woont, ,,en werkt''. ,,Maar hoe slechter de reputatie van deze wijken wordt, hoe kleiner de kans op werk. Een jongere die tijdens een sollicitatiegesprek zegt dat hij uit Clichy-sous-Bois komt, wordt op voorhand afgeschreven door werkgevers.'' Geen tomaten Mamad wijst voor de aanhoudende rellen met een beschuldigende vinger naar de Franse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, Nicolas Sarkozy. ,, Racaille - uitschot'' noemde die de jongeren toen ze op straat kwamen na de dood van de twee tieners. ,,Ik begrijp dat niet. Als havenarbeiders in het zuiden van Frankrijk een boot kapen uit protest, dan is dat een protestactie. Als landbouwers betogen en ondertussen wat dingen kapot slaan, dan zijn dat 'boze landbouwers'. Maar als jongeren kwaad worden, op straat komen en dingen kapot slaan, dan zijn het meteen criminelen. Wij hadden - zoals de landbouwers - ook wel met tomaten willen gooien. Maar we hebben geen tomaten. Wij hebben alleen stenen.'' En Mamad is dan nog een gematigde jonge stem. Net als Samir is hij een van de ,, grands frères '' van Clichy-sous-Bois. De ,,grote broers'' hebben de taak op zich genomen de andere jongeren wat te kalmeren. Ze moeten bemiddelen tussen de overheid en de straat. Soms lukt het, ,,omdat we die jongeren al jaren kennen en ze respect hebben voor ons''. Maar soms krijgen ook zij geen vat en moeten ze zich snel uit de voeten maken. De ,, grands frères '' werken voor de gemeente, maar als ze moeten kiezen dan staan ze toch eerder aan de kant van de jongeren. Mamad heeft niet per toeval een wit T-shirt aan met achteraan de namen 'Benna' en 'Traoré', de namen van de gestorven jongens. Op zijn borst staat er ,, Mort pour rien'' (gestorven voor niets) en de letters A.D.M.. ,, Au-delà des mots '' (niet vatbaar in woorden), legt hij uit. ,,Het is hoog tijd dat ze echt iets doen voor ons. De tijd voor mooie woorden is voorbij.'' De Egyptenaar Ramadan heeft er allemaal geen boodschap aan. Hij staat met verbijstering in de ogen te kijken naar de plaats waar hij enkele uren tevoren zijn twee vrachtwagens had geparkeerd in Bondy. Al twintig jaar heeft hij een vaste routine op marktdagen. Hij komt aan rond 5 uur , gaat een koffietje drinken met zijn metgezel, inspecteert daarna zijn vaste standplaats om te zien of ze proper genoeg is om zijn fruit en groenten uit te stallen. Daarna begint hij zijn vrachtwagens uit te laden. Zo zou hij het ook donderdagmorgen doen, maar toen hij terugwandelde naar zijn vrachtwagens, stonden die allebei in lichterlaaie. Een van de twee kon hij nog blussen, de andere was niet meer te redden. Van de duizenden euro's aan fruit zijn alleen nog wat verkoolde mandarijnen over. Hij probeert zich rustig te houden, maar hij trilt van woede. En dan, na even nadenken, barst hij toch los: ,,Luiaards zijn het. Allemaal. Ze doen zelfs geen moeite om werk te vinden. Neen, dan leven ze liever van een uitkering, die ik betaal.'' Taxichauffeur Azedine denkt er net zo over. Hij is geboren in Algerije, maar woont al 25 jaar in Frankrijk. ,,En ik ben dus Fransman'', zegt hij trots. ,,Een Fransman die hard werkt. Maar die dan wel moet toekijken als jongens uit zijn buurt de auto van zijn vrouw in de fik steken. Zomaar, omdat ze daar zin in hebben. Opvoeding, daar mankeert het die gasten aan. Die hebben geen respect meer. Nergens voor. Ze kennen god noch gebod.'' Niemand voelt zich geroepen om de jongeren daar zelf op aan te spreken. In Aulnay-sous-Bois hebben enkele mannen het even geprobeerd, maar het is een fiasco geworden. Ze werden gewoon weggelachen. ,,Hier in Bondy is er niemand die zoiets durft'', zegt Veronique. ,,Je hoort niets en je zegt zeker niets. Dat is hier de wet. Zelfs de politie komt nooit meer in deze wijk. De bendes zijn hier de baas. Voor mij is het echt genoeg geweest. Ik ga verhuizen, want wat moet er anders worden van mijn kinderen. Die zien elke nacht brandende auto's, horen het lawaai van de politiesirenes,... Ik vraag mij af hoeveel kinderen getraumatiseerd uit deze rellen zullen komen.'' ,,Kalmeer nu toch''Ondertussen is het voor de bewoners van de getroffen voorsteden elke ochtend bang wakker worden en hopen dat hun auto er nog staat. ,,Eigenlijk zouden we in onze auto's moeten slapen'', zegt een van de weinige blanke buurtbewoners. ,,Deze auto hier bijvoorbeeld is van een mevrouw die daar woont.'' Hij wijst naar de zoveelste verdieping van het woonblok achter zich. ,,Het was een gloednieuwe Peugeot 607. Nu is er alleen nog een uitgebrand wrak over. En ze weet het nog niet eens. We kunnen haar niet bereiken.'' Niemand weet hoe de rellen nu moeten stoppen. De procureur van Bobigny, François Molins, probeerde het met een persconferentie waarin hij absolute openheid beloofde en een uiterst grondig onderzoek naar de dood van Zyed Benna en Bouna Traoré. Politici zoals minister van Binnenlandse Zaken Sarkozy wisselen gespierde taal af met genuanceerde boodschappen. De ordediensten stromen in almaar grotere getale naar de voorsteden. Maar het haalt voorlopig niets uit. Ook Syakah Traoré, de broer van Bouna, probeerde het. ,,Kalmeer nu toch en stop het plunderen. Het is niet zó dat we onze stem moeten laten horen.'' Maar hij weet niet of ze naar hem wél zullen luisteren. ,,Dit is het verhaal van een maatschappij die van een torengebouw valt'', klinkt het aan het einde van de film La Haine . ,,Tijdens de val herhaalt ze steeds: er is nog niets aan de hand, er is nog niets aan de hand,... Maar wat telt is niet de val, maar de landing.'' De Parijse banlieue lijkt geland. Wie raapt haar nu op?

Bladzijde 1-3: berichtgeving Parijs.
Steven De Bock - De Standaard

Bin Laden

2005-11-04T11:21:00.000Z

In Bin Laden's Words

By BRUCE B. LAWRENCE

It began with an e-mail message from an editor last spring: "Would you please write an essay for a new collection of writings we're putting out?" Instead of the reflexive, "No, I'm too busy," I found myself agreeing to write an introduction for the first-ever English translation of the major declarations of Osama bin Laden.
Although bin Laden has become a legendary figure in the West, the body of his statements has until now never been available to the public. Occasional fragments are cited, and a few speeches have been reproduced in the press or made available on the Internet. Yet official pressures have ensured that for the most part, his voice has been tacitly censored for English speakers, at the same time that it has entered an alternative sphere largely confined to Arabic speakers.
Bin Laden's rise to prominence mirrors the latest phase in the Information Age, the techniques of which he has adroitly mastered. In a 10-year period from 1994 to 2004 that coincides with the emergence of a virtual universe — moving from print to the Internet, from wired to wireless communication around the globe — bin Laden has crafted a series of carefully staged statements designed for new media. They include interviews with Western and Arab journalists, handwritten letters scanned onto discs, faxes, and audiotapes, and above all video recordings distributed via the first independent Arabic-language news outlet, the Qatari satellite television station Al-Jazeera. Those are the texts that were sent to me and proposed as the core of a volume dedicated to making informed critical discussion of Osama's outlook possible for a broader public, one not limited to secretive government agencies and counterterrorism experts.
When the publisher, Verso, contacted me, I was on the cusp of finishing two other books, each with an element from bin Laden. The first was an anthology of literary sources on violence, including bin Laden's 1996 declaration of war against America, which I examined as a departure from other representations of violence largely because its impact expanded through the Internet, TV, and audiotapes. The second book contextualized the Koran over time, contrasting bin Laden's use of scripture with that of other modern interpreters, notably Muhammad Iqbal from Pakistan and W.D. Mohammed of the Muslim American Society.
Though familiar with bin Laden's thought, I still was not prepared for the task ahead. During the summer all other projects had to be put on hold. Before introducing the statements, I had to locate them. I assisted Tom Penn, an editor for Verso, as he tirelessly tried to track down the available literary output of bin Laden. While the Al-Jazeera recordings were close at hand and readily obtainable, many of the audiotapes had appeared on Islamist Web sites that were subsequently shut down. Also elusive were interviews with journalists: Some were only partially preserved, or released in summary censored form, often in garbled translations. And then there were the statements attributed to bin Laden that, in fact, proved not to be his.
Compounding the procurement problem was Verso's decision to annotate the writings. I had to annotate not just the context of each pronouncement but also bin Laden's use of a dizzying array of scriptural and historical sources. He begins the 1996 declaration, for instance, with a quick succession of Koranic citations, one of which declares: "I only wish for reform, to the degree that I am able; and I can only succeed through God, in whom I repose my trust, and to whom I turn." The speaker exhorting his people to reform is the prophet Shu'aib. Though wealthy, he is said to have earned his wealth by acceptable means and also to have committed himself to social justice. The inference, evident to any Arabic listener, is that bin Laden compares himself and his own mission with that of his Koranic predecessor.
Beyond the Koranic dicta were less obvious references. Students in Britain and the United States were hired to trace the most difficult of his references in the 24 documents that make up this volume. In some cases, there was no antecedent. Because bin Laden speaks an arcane, almost neoclassical style of Arabic, the lyrical flourishes that punctuate many of his letters to Arab audiences are not citations but original compositions. Avoiding colloquialisms, he often gives his message a contemporary resonance by improvising verse or rhymed prose that identifies him with the earliest heroes of Islamic history. In a sermon delivered in 2003 on a major feast day in the Islamic calendar, he praises the September 11 hijackers and goes on to compare the twin towers of the World Trade Center to the idols lodged in the Kaaba of Mecca, destroyed by the Prophet Muhammad when he returned to his home city victorious in 630. Other Islamic rejectionists advocate total separation between Islam as pure monotheism and Judaism and Christianity, both tainted with idolatrous practice, but few combine ideological conviction with the rhetorical subtlety and performative finesse that characterize Osama bin Laden.
We learn three things by reading bin Laden in his own words.
First, bin Laden shifts his style after September 11. He retains the same, anti-imperialist agenda but tries to benefit from the forces that 9/11 unleashed. Responding to the U.S.-led war, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, bin Laden becomes more alert to his own role on the world stage. He crafts letters to Muslim audiences with the confidence of a man already writing his own history. The letters reveal him to be a calculating, highly literate polemicist. Stateless, he creates his own image of an Islamic supernation that replaces all current Muslim nation-states. He projects himself as the counterweight to both American hegemony and Arab perfidy. He is the Nasser of the new century, trying to rouse Muslim audiences as much through his rhetoric as his action. He even turns the tables on the Western media. In his view, it is they, not he, who perpetuate terror. "Terror is the most dreaded weapon in the modern age and the Western media are mercilessly using it against their own people," he declares in an October 2001 interview with Al-Ja-zeera. Why is the Western media establishment so anti-humane? Because, in bin Laden's view, "it implants fear and helplessness in the psyche of the people of Europe and the United States. It means that what the enemies of the United States cannot do, its media are doing!"
Second, bin Laden not only assails the Western media, but he also talks over the heads of Arab and Muslim governments. He appeals directly to the youth, those with education and skills who still find themselves on the margins of wealthy societies and under the thumb of corrupt autocrats. He invites the overeducated and undervalued to become the vanguard of a war against religious enemies, Jews and Christians. Through selective citations from the Koran as well as the moral example of the Prophet, he claims that Muslims have always fought against their Abrahamic cousins, and the stakes have never been higher than now. "Resist the current Zionist-Crusader campaign against the umma, or Islamic supernation," he urges young Muslim men, "since it threatens the entire umma, its religion, and its very existence."
Third, to underscore the extremity of the current crisis, bin Laden invokes a new, Islamic form of just-war theory. For both classical Christian and Islamic theorists, as well as for their contemporary successors, just war has revolved around causes for going to war and methods of waging war. Collapsing both into one comprehensive argument, bin Laden defines the current war as a war "against religious enemies" that is nothing less than a war for survival on the part of the Islamic supernation. "We should see events not as isolated incidents," he warns, "but as part of a long chain of conspiracies, a war of annihilation in all senses of the word." Because "the Zionist-Crusaders" have launched World War III, he argues, random, unannounced violence against enemy civilians, including women and children, is now justified in the name of Islam.
Bin Laden's project couples faith and fighting with relentless insistence on the need to act, and his messages continue to have an appeal. Tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands revere him for his bold stand against the world's sole remaining superpower and its allies, Muslim and non-Muslim. Ironically, during the 80s the CIA helped him to become a local hero in the Afghan war against the Soviets, but during the 90s and into the new century it was media technology that made him into an international celebrity. Bin Laden could not have achieved global prominence without audiocassettes, the Internet, and satellite television, especially Al-Jazeera. His legacy is more secure than his life: No matter when or how he dies, he will not easily be dislodged from his perch as the most famous/infamous Arab of the 21st century.
If I have learned one enduring lesson from months of reflection on the words of Osama bin Laden, it is that the best defense against World War III is neither censoring nor silencing him but reading what he has actually written and countering his arguments with better ones. He has left a sufficient record that can, and should, be attacked for its deficiencies, its lapses, its contradictions, and, above all, its hopelessness.
Most striking is the absence of any social dimension. Bin Laden never examines the different structural features of the various Muslim societies in which jihad is to be waged: Afghanistan is not Iraq is not Israel/Palestine. Morally, he denounces a host of evils. Some of them — unemployment, inflation, and corruption — are social. But no alternative conception of the ideal society is ever offered. The absence of any social program separates Al Qaeda not just from the Red Army Faction or the Red Brigades, with which it has sometimes mistakenly been compared, but — more significantly — from the earlier wave of radical Islamism in the mid-20th century. Both Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Abu'l Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan tried to transform their societies into a just Islamic order (nizam-i mustafa, the model order of the Prophet, in Mawdudi's elegant phrase). In place of social objectives, bin Laden accentuates the need for personal sacrifice. He is far more concerned with the glories of martyrdom than with the spoils of victory. Rewards belong essentially to the hereafter.
Bin Laden's is a creed of great purity and intensity, capable of inspiring its followers with a degree of passion and principled conviction that no secular movement in the Arab world has yet matched. At the same time, it is obviously also a narrow and self-limiting one: It can have little appeal for the great mass of Muslims. Like their Jewish and Christian counterparts, contemporary Muslims need more than scriptural dictates, poetic transports, or apodictic slogans to chart their everyday life, whether as individuals or as collective members of a community, local or national.
The future evoked by bin Laden does not portend a return to the past, either the distant glories of 7th-century Arab caliphs or the 20th-century pan-Islamism of the beleaguered Ottoman caliphate. Despite references to the glories of the Ottoman Empire, bin Laden does not clamor to restore a caliphate today. He seems at some level to recognize the futility of a quest for restitution. He sets no positive political horizon for his struggle. Instead, he vows that jihad will continue until "we meet God and get his blessing!"
Some have suggested that the war against Al Qaeda can be won if the United States takes steps to engage in serious dialogue with its enemy. That is the counsel from Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, a Harvard policy expert on conflict resolution: "Though dismissed widely, the best strategy for the United States may well be to acknowledge and address the collective reasons in which Al Qaeda anchors its acts of force. Al Qaeda has been true to its word in announcing and implementing its strategy for over a decade. It is likely to be true to its word in the future and cease hostilities against the United States, and indeed bring an end to the war it declared in 1996 and in 1998, in return for some degree of satisfaction regarding its grievances. In 2002, bin Laden declared: 'Whether America escalates or de-escalates this conflict, we will reply in kind.'"
There are major problems with this idyllic strategy. Which American official would "acknowledge and address" the U.S. role in the current conflict? Neither President Bush nor Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice seems likely to accept that challenge, but who could represent the United States and speak for its role if not they? And how would they, or any elected official, undertake that task today, three years after bin Laden spoke his "conciliatory" words? The bin Laden declaration cited above came before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. There are now two theaters in the war on terror, Afghanistan and Iraq, and in each, asserts bin Laden, it is the "Zionist-Crusader alliance" that initiates terror and forces Al Qaeda to respond in kind. Alas, there is no "degree of satisfaction," short of complete American withdrawal from the current sites of conflict, that would lead bin Laden to "reply in kind."
More important, neither ignoring bin Laden nor trying to address his concerns will tackle the root causes of the antipathies that pit the United States and its allies against a resilient, localized network of anti-imperialist Muslim warriors. In what might have been his own epitaph, bin Laden wrote the following poem in February 2003:
Let me be a martyr,dwelling in a high mountain passamong a band of knights who,united in devotion to God,descend to face armies.
The attraction of knights will continue until such time as more-humane heroes can attract the idealism of Muslim youth. Unlike bin Laden and his Al Qaeda cohorts, future Muslim leaders, if they are to succeed, must work within the state system; their task, unlike his, must be to find a better way not only to liberate Muslim homelands but also to forge a brighter future for those liberated. In the meantime, reading the words of Osama bin Laden is a sober reminder of how hard, yet necessary, it is to wage war against Al Qaeda with the pen — through the press, the Internet, and television — and not just with the sword, whether on the plains of Iraq or in the mountains of Afghanistan.
Bruce B. Lawrence is a professor of Islamic studies at Duke University. He has edited and written an introduction to Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, to be published by Verso this month.

France : violence

2005-11-04T11:17:00.000Z

Entretien avec Malek Boutih, secrétaire national en charge des questions de société

Comment réagissez-vous aux propositions du ministre de l’Intérieur en matière d’immigration ? Nicolas Sarkozy se livre à un savant mélange entre les problèmes de violence, de banlieue, de flux migratoires et de religion. Ce discours n’a rien de surprenant chez un homme qui considère l’immigration sous l’angle purement sécuritaire. Avec, en contrepartie, une proposition en forme de provocation sur le droit de vote des immigrés. Ne doit-on voir dans cette proposition qu’une stratégie purement électorale ? La stratégie de Sarkozy m’importe peu. Ce qui me préoccupe, c’est que la gauche ne se laisse pas manipuler par ce type de discours. Il nous appartient surtout de démontrer que les déclarations du ministre ne seront pas suivies d’effet. Pas plus qu’il n’y aura de projet de loi sur le droit de vote des étrangers. Le sujet déclenche déjà un tollé à droite, et il est à parier qu’il ne figurera même pas dans le programme de l’UMP en 2007. Ces propos doivent, en revanche, nous rappeler à nos obligations. Sans doute Nicolas Sarkozy se sent-il pousser des ailes pour se livrer à une telle provocation sur le thème de l’immigration. Peut-être lui laissons-nous trop de champ libre. C’est pourquoi nous devons avoir un discours offensif, fondé sur la responsabilité et la générosité.Quelles sont les conditions d’une alternative crédible à la politique conduite par le gouvernement ? Nous devons, d’abord, nous interroger sur la question des flux migratoires, en rappelant que c’est le même Nicolas Sarkozy qui a inspiré des lois qui ont totalement désorganisé l’immigration dans le pays. D’où, aujourd’hui, un nombre anormalement élevé de sans papiers, avec des conséquences sociales et humaines souvent dramatiques. Si la gauche retrouve le pouvoir, en 2007, elle devra disposer d’un vrai programme, en réfléchissant sur l’impact de l’immigration dans les relations Nord-Sud. La situation du continent africain est, à cet égard, préoccupante. Si nous n’y prenons garde, ce qui s’est produit récemment dans le désert marocain, peut prendre des proportions plus importantes encore en Europe et ailleurs en Afrique. Notre rôle est donc d’impulser une nouvelle dynamique économique, de l’autre côté de la Méditerranée. L’instauration du droit de vote des étrangers aux élections municipales vous paraît-il possible ? La situation peut se débloquer rapidement, par voie parlementaire ou référendaire. Ce qui suppose, dans le premier cas de figure, d’obtenir l’assentiment de l’Assemblée et du Sénat. Compte-tenu de la coloration de la Haute assemblée, ce scénario paraît exclu. S’ils sont élus en 2007, les socialistes pourront, en revanche, organiser un référendum pour faire aboutir cette proposition, à condition de définir au préalable une politique d’immigration cohérente et responsable. Les Français attendent de nous une véritable ligne directrice sur ce thème. Nous n’avons pas le droit de les décevoir.

Israeli Defense Minister interview in Newsweek

2005-11-04T11:13:00.000Z

‘A Military Option Is Not on the Agenda’

In a wide-ranging interview, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz rules out strikes against Iran and raises doubts about whether Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has what it takes to forge a permanent peace.

By Michael Hirsh
Newsweek

Nov. 3, 2005 - Shaul Mofaz is a tough Likudnik, but he’s also shown a pragmatic willingness to negotiate with his enemies. The Israeli defense minister was born in Tehran, and he believes diplomacy can still work despite Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s call last week for Israel to be “wiped off the map.” Mofaz has forged a deep working relationship with younger Palestinian leaders such as Mohammed Dahlan, the Palestinian civil-affairs minister and security chief for Gaza. And Mofaz suggests that real peace will have to await their ascension to the president's office. As the man responsible for implementing the Gaza disengagement plan, Mofaz also met last week with President Hosni Mubarak, along with Egypt’s defense minister and intelligence chief, forging a previously unreported agreement on regional security. This week he is in Washington to meet senior U.S. officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. On Wednesday he sat down for an interview in his suite at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel with NEWSWEEK’s Michael Hirsh.
Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: Let’s talk about Iran. This is a very personal issue for you in some ways. I understand you were born in the same city, Tehran, as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president.

Shaul Mofaz: Yes, I was born in Tehran, and I came to Israel when I was 9 years old, in 1957 … I can tell you that what Ahmadinejad said about erasing the state of Israel from the map, [combined with Iran’s] surface-to-surface missiles and the fact that they have a high desire for achieving nuclear power, is a real threat against the state of Israel but also against all the Western countries. Under the nuclear umbrella in the future [Iran] will be a threat to all the world.
As a person who knows Iranian culture, what do you think is going on inside the Iranian regime? Do you think Ahmadinejad was speaking for the Iranian government, and that his views represent a new level of extremism for the regime? Or were his comments to a group of anti-Zionist students just an indiscretion on his part?It is a new level of extremism in the regime. I'm not sure what it reflects for the population. I know there is a gap between the Iranian people and the regime ... I believe for the time being the diplomatic channel is the main one, and the United States along with the European countries should put this on the table of the U.N. Security Council, to talk about sanctions and a very deep and large inspection of all Iran’s nuclear locations.
Are you concerned that the Iranian game is to draw out the negotiations so they can get to the point where their nuclear program is advanced enough and dug deeply enough into tunnels that there is no longer any military option against it?Well, a military option is not on the agenda today.
Today?It’s not on the agenda. But … we know that the Iranians are supporting and harboring terror. They support Islamic Jihad, they support other terrorist organizations, including Hizbullah. Remember the Karin A, the ship we captured in January 2002. That occurred after [the late Palestinian President Yasir] Arafat met with representatives of Iran, and they produced a special line of armaments for the Palestinians. The goal was to send 50 tons of arms to the hands of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinians promised the Iranians in return they would give them security for Iranian terror groups coming to Israel. This was the deal. We were very lucky to expose it. But I believe. as I said, that this type of threat can be brought to the Security Council with the leadership of the United States and the European countries.
But Iranian support of Hizbullah and other groups is not the main focus of that diplomatic effort. The diplomacy is focused almost entirely on the nuclear issue. Do you have any leverage over the Iranians against their alleged support for terrorist groups other than rhetoric?The main threat is the nuclear … But speaking about the support for Hizbullah, there is another side too: Syria. They support Hizbullah financially, and they are not allowing the Lebanese Army to come to the south of Lebanon to deal with security there.
Clearly there are a lot of reasons to be skeptical about whether the European-led negotiations with Tehran can forge a solution. Is that really the only option? Is there no military leverage at all?I believe today we should make the best effort in the diplomatic channel. And there is a chance that by putting pressure on Iran, a decision in the U.N. Security Council [will] delay or stop an Iranian nuclear capability.
Is it really satisfactory to you to merely delay the Iranian nuclear program when you see this as an existential threat to Israel?I believe we should make our best effort to achieve the maximum we could achieve by diplomatic channels, before thinking about other channels.
But what would satisfy your security concerns?What would satisfy us is that the Iranians do not reach a point of no return in enriching uranium.
But right now they’ve converted quite a bit of yellowcake into UF-6 [the feedstock for enrichment]—some 30 tons—and are upgrading their Natanz enrichment facility. We have a few years until they reach this point [enrichment], and I hope the diplomatic effort will delay this.
Some analysts have concluded that the Israelis don’t have a military option any longer—as you once did against Iraq’s Osirik reactor—because the Iranian program is too complex, too spread out, and dug in too deep.I’m telling you that a military option is not on the table now.
Regarding the disengagement from Gaza, there are deep concerns about the rising power of Hamas and whether they’re re-equipping, and infiltration over the open border with Egypt. Just last week it was revealed that two Palestinians were captured coming across the Negev Desert into the West Bank. How concerned are you about this and Mahmoud Abbas’s ability to deal with all this?The disengagement was so rapid that they [the Egyptians] couldn’t prepare themselves for responsibility in this area. But since they took responsibility for the Philadelphi corridor [on the border between Gaza and Egypt], the amount of smuggling has decreased. There are still some measures they need to be taking, but the deployment of border guards is effective. And they are stopping the smuggling of arms and people from one side to the other. But still they have to do more.
Is there intelligence cooperation?Well, mainly there is cooperation between two central operational “rooms” on the Egyptian and Israeli sides.
The fact that you caught these two guys coming in from the Negev—is that evidence that you’re sharing operational intelligence with the Egyptians? Or did you just get lucky?We understood a year ago that area of the Israeli-Egyptian border between Karem Shalom to Eilat, we don’t have a fence. So we needed to operate in a different way. We have more troops in this area, we are going to have a lot of sensors and devices to make sure we will see the picture and have intelligence. So we are becoming more effective.
So I gather that you don’t see a need to put a lot more pressure on the Egyptians on this issue?I was in Egypt last week. I had a meeting with President Mubarak, the defense minister and the minister of intelligence. We decided they will increase their activity along the Philadelphi area, the two operational rooms will start to coordinate their activity along the border, and they should deploy patrol boats … And they promised me they would be more effective in the coming period. Also we decided we would be more cooperative on other issues [including] global terror.
On the Roadmap [plan for peace], are the U.S. and Israel in complete agreement that the next moves have to come from President Abbas, or Abu Mazen, as he is also called?The implementation of the withdrawal plan was very painful, very difficult, but very bold step for Israel. We think that today it is the Palestinian turn to take action. We should move forward on the first phase of the Roadmap plan and President Bush’s vision. The first phase is the dismantlement of the terrorist infrastructure. … But there is no move on the Palestinian side since the declaration of Abu Mazen in the Sharm al-Sheikh summit on Feb. 8, in which he said he would create one authority, one rule, under one gun. And still there is no one gun. More than that, our feeling is that Abu Mazen’s intentions are good, to move forward, but there is a vacuum of leadership under him. There are some [views] among the Palestinian leadership that it is not our problem, it is Abu Mazen’s problem … The Palestinian security groups are not effective. They are not taking any active steps against the Palestinian terror groups, there is no one man that is controlling all Palestinian security, and there is a lack of chain of command and control of Palestinian security groups.

What is very important is that the election of the Palestinian Parliament will take place on Jan. 25. Everybody knows that Hamas intends to participate in this election, and we believe that a terror organization that is committed to the destruction of Israel cannot be part of this election. We will not interfere … but on the other side we are not going to support it.
Weren’t you quoted as saying that peace will take a generation to achieve?No, I said that Abu Mazen has good intentions but there is a lack of activity in Palestinian security groups and they are not united under one man. So I said for a permanent agreement [to be achieved], it will be the next generation of the leadership—which exists today. They are waiting for the day after Abu Mazen. I don’t want to mention names … Abu Mazen is doing his best, but he doesn’t have the support among the other leaders of the Palestinian people.
© 2005 Newsweek, Inc.

France : guérilla urbaine

2005-11-04T11:03:00.000Z

Banlieues

L'Europe alarmée par la «guérilla urbaine»
Les émeutes font les gros titres de la presse.

«Intifada des banlieues» ou «soulèvement des immigrés» font des titres choc dans la presse européenne. La France serait face à une «guérilla urbaine» alimentée par la «désespérance», la «colère» et la «haine», sur fond de «lutte pour le pouvoir» entre Nicolas Sarkozy et Dominique de Villepin. Comme bon nombre de médias européens, le journal de Munich Süddeutsche Zeitung (centre gauche) s'en prend au ministre de l'Intérieur, expliquant qu'il est «devenu un visage de haine pour tous ceux qui sont sans espoir dans les banlieues».

A Zurich, le Tages Anzeiger publie en une un dessin montrant Sarkozy en pompier tentant d'éteindre les voitures en feu à l'aide d'une lance à incendie reliée à un bidon d'essence. Dans le quotidien conservateur britannique The Times, le correspondant à Paris, Charles Bremner, relève, lui, le long silence de Jacques Chirac, qui a attendu une semaine pour lancer son appel au calme «depuis le palais de l'Elysée, à seulement 9 kilomètres, mais des années-lumière du "Neuf-Trois"».
Pour le principal quotidien de Stockholm, Dagens Nyheter, c'est Jean-Marie Le Pen qui «gagnera les élections» si la crise continue. En Grèce, Ta Néa (socialiste) titre : «La haine recouvre Paris, les heurts dans les ghettos des immigrés mettent fin aux rêves présidentiels de Sarkozy.» Dans le quotidien praguois Lidove Noviny, la correspondante à Paris décrit Clichy-sous-Bois comme «un monstre de béton» pire que les quartiers de HLM construits en Tchécoslovaquie sous le communisme. A Moscou, les scènes de voitures en feu et de CRS harnachés comme pour la guerre font l'ouverture des journaux télé depuis deux jours, après la «nuit de cauchemar» vécue par un groupe de touristes russes piégés au coeur des «pogroms» de Seine-Saint-Denis. La chaîne NTV a révélé comment «un groupe de vingt-cinq adolescents, essentiellement d'origine arabe», s'est emparé du bus des touristes, alors qu'ils prenaient le thé.
Hier, le ministère des Affaires étrangères portugais a même proposé une protection consulaire aux Portugais résidant en région parisienne : «Tout citoyen portugais se sentant en insécurité [...] peut prendre contact avec nos services», a annoncé un porte-parole.

Bush ... in vrije val

2005-11-04T11:00:00.000Z

Populariteit George W. Bush op historisch dieptepunt

WASHINGTON - Het vertrouwen van de Amerikanen in hun president is opnieuw naar een dieptepunt gezonken. Nog slechts 35 procent van de bevraagden verklaarde dat George W. Bush zijn werk goed doet, zo blijkt uit een peiling van zender CBS, uitgevoerd van 30 oktober tot 1 november.Daarmee staat Bush op een historisch dieptepunt. Enkel voormalig president Richard Nixon deed nog slechter bij het begin van diens tweede ambtsperiode. Een van de redenen voor de dalende populariteit van Bush is de polemiek rond Lewis ’Scooter’ Libby, de kabinetschef van vice-president Dick Cheney die vorige week ontslag nam nadat hij was aangeklaagd in de zaak-Plame. Slechts 35 procent van de Amerikanen staat nog achter het beleid van Bush, terwijl 57 procent het afkeurt.In november 1997 stond 57 procent van de Amerikanen achter het beleid van Bill Clinton, toen net begonnen aan zijn tweede ambtstermijn. De populariteit van Ronald Reagan bedroeg in 1985 zelfs 65 procent.De populariteit van Richard Nixon daarentegen, was in november 1973, na het uitbreken van het Watergate-schandaal eerder dat jaar, gedaald tot 27 procent.
ht

Vlaams Belang : Islamofoob

2005-11-02T14:10:00.000Z

'Vlaams Belang is islamofobe partij'

pdw
Externe links bij dit artikel
Het interview met Jewish Week

BRUSSEL - Vlaams Belang-voorman Filip Dewinter noemt zijn eigen partij in een interview met het Amerikaans-joodse dagblad Jewish Week een islamofobe partij, zo meldt de krant De Morgen vandaag.
Dewinter herhaalt in het gesprek dat het Vlaams Belang niet verschilt van zijn voorganger Vlaams Blok. Het interview moet nog verschijnen, maar staat al op de website van Dewinter. Op de vraag waarom joden op een xenofobe partij zouden moeten stemmen, antwoordt hij: ,,Als het dan toch een 'fobie' moet zijn, laat het dan 'islamofoob' zijn. Ja, we zijn bang voor de islam (...) Zouden joden niet voor een partij moeten stemmen die de verspreiding van de islam in Europa wil stoppen?''Volgens Dewinter zijn er in België weinig rechters die weerstaan aan politieke druk.

SP.A en ABVV

2005-11-02T05:29:00.000Z

Rood staat op scheiden

SP.A-voorzitter Johan Vande Lanotte haalde de voorbije dagen zwaar uit naar de socialistische vakbond. ,,Ruziestokers'', noemde hij ze. Vervolgens startte hij zélf een informatiecampagne om het Generatiepact uit te leggen. Partij en vakbond stonden nog nooit zó lijnrecht tegenover elkaar. Het jaar 2005 zal allicht de geschiedenis ingaan als het jaar waarin de socialistische partij en haar vakbond definitief hun eigen weg insloegen. Op 1 mei ontstond er al een discussie over de algemene sociale bijdrage en sindsdien is het eigenlijk nooit meer helemaal goed gekomen. Deze slechte verstandhouding bereikte de afgelopen dagen haar hoogtepunt met een paar krasse uitspraken van SP.A-voorzitter Johan Vande Lanotte, die duidelijk maakte dat zijn partij volledig achter het Generatiepact blijft staan. ,,Het ABVV heeft ongerustheid gecreëerd met halve waarheden en hele leugens'', herhaalt Vande Lanotte vandaag in onze krant. Daarmee lijkt de breuk binnen links groter dan ook, bevestigt politicoloog Carl Devos. ,,De regering zit niet in een crisis, het rode huishouden wel.'' Juiste informatieVande Lanotte zal nu doen wat hij al lang had moeten doen: de achterban juist en volledig informeren, een taak waarin het ABVV volgens hem grondig tekort geschoten is. Het zal er op neerkomen de kleine modaliteiten waarover wel nog onderhandeld kan worden zo goed mogelijk te verkopen. Alleen met een evenwichtige communicatie kan het rode schisma misschien nog gelijmd worden.
Helena WILMET02/11/2005

France - adolescents morts, ville en état de diège

2005-11-01T13:06:00.000Z

SOCIÉTÉ - France - 'L'humanité'

La marche qui fait reculer la violence

L’appel au calme lancé devant la mairie de Clichy-sous-Bois (93), lors de la marche silencieuse organisée samedi à la mémoire de Ziad, dix-sept ans, et Bouna quinze ans, les adolescents morts électrocutés après s’être réfugiés dans un transformateur EDF par peur d’être poursuivis par la police, semble avoir fait effet. Après deux nuits marquées par des affrontements entre les forces de police, arrivées en renfort de l’ensemble du département, et plus d’une centaine de jeunes révoltés par un drame dont ils rendent la police responsable, les Clichois se sont réveillés dans le calme. Certes, des échauffourées se sont encore produites dans la nuit de samedi à dimanche et vingt-deux jeunes ont été interpellés, mais la police a reconnu que la nuit avait été « beaucoup plus calme que les deux autres ». Pour les habitants cependant, difficile - d’oublier l’image de leur ville en état de siège, l’odeur du caoutchouc brûlé, les jets de pierres et les carcasses de voitures renversées.

« On est làpour la paix »

Pour dire non à la violence et exprimer leur solidarité avec les familles des victimes, ils étaient près de quatre cents à s’être donné rendez-vous samedi, devant le parvis de la mairie. Dans la foule, beaucoup de jeunes, mais aussi des travailleurs sociaux et des élus. « Il faut stopper l’engrenage de la violence, revendique Jean Brafman, conseiller régional communiste. Il n’y a rien d’acceptable dans les violences exercées par les jeunes, mais les violences qui leur sont exercées n’ont aucune excuse. Ils réagissent à des événements qu’ils ne comprennent pas et s’ils s’attaquent à des bâtiments publics, c’est parce qu’ils se sentent abandonnés par l’État. » Avant le départ du défilé, les appels au calme se succèdent. « On n’est pas là pour casser, pour brûler. On est là pour la paix », lance Larbi Chouaib, président de la communauté musulmane de Clichy-Montfermeil.
Puis c’est au tour du maire Claude Dilain (PS) de prendre la parole. « J’ai demandé au ministre de l’Intérieur et obtenu une enquête impartiale pour que toute la lumière soit faite sur la chronologie des événements. » Soulignant que tous les regards sont braqués sur la ville, il ajoute : « Montrons à la France que, malgré notre douleur, nous savons rester dignes. » Puis surprise, Ahmad, vingt-cinq ans, prend le micro. Sur son tee-shirt blanc, on peut lire « Mort pour rien ». À lui tout seul, il porte le malaise des jeunes issus de l’immigration. « Il n’y a pas de logement, pas de travail, pas de budget pour la mairie de Clichy, on nous met dans des caves, et ça, il faut le dire à monsieur Sarkozy. Nous voulons être reconnus, intégrés. » Applaudissements dans le - public. « Il a tout dit », souffle une voix.
Peu à peu, le cortège se met en marche, direction le quartier du Chêne-Pointu. Des carcasses de voitures calcinées barrent la rue. Sur les murs des HLM, une phrase est taguée : « Bouna, on t’aime. » Dans les rangs, la colère est palpable. « Je comprends ces jeunes qui se sentent exclus, enfermés dans des ghettos. À Clichy, on fait tout pour qu’ils s’en sortent, mais les propos de Sarkozy attisent leur colère. Nous, on nettoie nos poubelles au Kärcher, pas nos cités », souligne Claudine Thévenot. Les conversations tournent autour de la responsabilité de la police. Des jeunes font même circuler la scène d’une intervention policière musclée filmée sur un téléphone. Samedi, pourtant, l’hypothèse de la course poursuite semble s’être - effondrée. Interrogé sur son lit d’hôpital, le troisième jeune qui s’était réfugié dans le transformateur a déclaré qu’il s’était mis à courir parce que d’autres jeunes faisaient de même. Mais le doute - subsiste.

Des gerbesde fleurs
« Les contrôles sont parfois violents et abusifs, dénonce Ames avec virulence. Je comprends que des jeunes de quinze ans soient tétanisés lorsqu’une voiture de police freine brusquement à leurs côtés et qu’ils préfèrent fuir plutôt que rester et risquer de se faire embarquer. » Sabrina connaissait bien Bouna. Un bouquet de roses à la main, elle marche pour lui rendre hommage. « C’était un garçon gentil, intelligent, serviable. Il ne méritait pas ça. » Le cortège s’immobilise devant le transformateur EDF où les jeunes ont trouvé la mort. Des gerbes de fleurs sont déposées à l’entrée tandis que des jeunes femmes éclatent en sanglots. Les familles se mettent à prier. Au retour, les parents des victimes appellent une fois encore les jeunes à « rester calmes ce soir, demain, et toute l’éternité ». « Nous allons continuer le combat de notre intégration de manière digne », promet l’un des pères. Et les associations musulmanes de conclure : « La croyance doit se manifester par de bons actes, et ces actes passent par la carte d’électeur. »
Hélène Duvigneau

FAVV en site.... waarom falen administraties zo vaak??

2005-10-31T19:39:00.000Z

Website met risicogebieden vogelgriep slecht bereikbaar

BRUSSEL - Het Federaal Agentschap voor de Veiligheid van de Voedselketen (FAVV) stelt vast dat er nog steeds problemen zijn met de toegankelijkheid van de website die toelaat op een kaart na te gaan waar de gevoelige natuurgebieden voor vogelgriep gelegen zijn. ,,Op piekmomenten zijn lange wachttijden nodig vooraleer de kaarten geopend kunnen worden'', zegt het FAVV.,,Wat in eerste instantie een goede oplossing leek om de burger te informeren, blijkt niet opgewassen tegen de massale belangstelling'', geeft het voedselagentschap toe.
Het FAVV zegt dat het probleem werd onderschat en verontschuldigt zich voor het ongemak en de frustratie waartoe dit geleid heeft. Maandag zullen alternatieve oplossingen voor het probleem worden uitgewerkt, luidt het.
BELGA (BELGA)29/10/2005

The American Left

2005-10-31T16:10:00.000Z

Partisan War Syndrome

The left falls victim to a debilitating affliction

By David Sirota
October 17, 2005

A disease is running rampant through the American left these days. Its symptoms are intense and increasingly pervasive in every corner of the self-proclaimed "progressive" coalition. A good name for the disease could be "Partisan War Syndrome" - and it is eating away at what remains of progressives' ideological underpinnings and the Democratic Party's ability to win elections over the long haul.
The disease is simple to understand: It leads the supposedly "ideological" grassroots left to increasingly subvert its overarching ideology on issues in favor of pure partisan concerns. That may sound great at first glance. Democratic Party officials always talk about a need for "big tent unity" and subsequently try to downplay ideology. But as a trait of the grassroots and not just the party, Partisan War Syndrome could be positively devastating not just for issue advocacy, but also for Democrats' political aspirations as well.
The main symptoms of Partisan War Syndrome are hallucination, delirium and obsessive compulsive behavior, with those afflicted losing almost all perspective about what winning politics really is all about. Washington, D.C., of course, could be declared a Hot Zone outbreak area, with this disease afflicting virtually every self-described strategist, operative, and lawmaker that operates in the progressive name. But it is starting to seep out everywhere-even on the Internet blogs that the mainstream media reflexively defines as the "left," "liberal" or "progressive" base.
Certainly, this disease can be difficult to detect. The mainstream media regularly portrays the so-called Democratic base as a highly ideological, "liberal" or "progressive" monolith, supposedly pressing an insulated, spineless D.C. Democratic establishment to move to the "left." This portrayal creates the image that there really is a cohesive, powerful ideological force on the left, one that is committed to convictions and issues before party-much like there is on the right. This image is reinforced by the mainstream media's constant characterization of Internet blogs and the "netroots" as an extension of this monolith-as if a medium automatically equals an ideology.
As proof that such a monolith exists, the media writes stories about this or that Democratic politician-no matter how conservative he or she is - pandering to or courting the "left" by once in a while taking a mundane Democratic Party position and then blogging about it. We also see an entire counter-industry to this mythical monolith in the form of organizations like the Democratic Leadership Council, which raise corporate money, put out reports attacking the supposedly all-powerful "left," and commission polls to discredit what, in reality, is a straw man.
And it is a straw man. To be sure, there used to be a powerful ideological force on the left that constituted the Democratic Party base. And there are still remnants of that ideological movement left in various progressive labor, environmental and civil rights organizations, and disparate Internet blogs. But look no further than the 2004 Democratic presidential primaries to see that the ideological movement as a whole is in tatters. In that race, primary voters - supposedly a representation of this "ideological" base -supported John Kerry on the basis of his personal profile as a Vietnam War veteran and his supposed "electability." It was the most non-ideological of choices in what we were supposed to believe was the most ideological of races.
This blunting of the left's ideological edge is a result of three unfortunate circumstances. First, conservatives spent the better part of three decades vilifying the major tenets of the left's core ideology, succeeding to the point where "liberal" is now considered a slur. Second, the media seized on these stereotypes and amplified them - both because there was little being done to refute them, and because they fit so cleanly into the increasingly primitive and binary political narrative being told on television.
And third is Partisan War Syndrome - the misconception even in supposedly "progressive" circles that substance is irrelevant when it comes to both electoral success and, far more damaging, to actually building a serious, long-lasting political movement. This is the syndrome resulting from the shellshock of the partisan wars that marked the Clinton presidency. It is an affliction that hollowed out much of the Democratic base's economic and national security convictions in favor of an orthodoxy that says partisan concerns and cults of personality should be the only priorities because they are supposedly the only factors that win elections. It is a disease that subverts substance for "image" and has marked the last decade of Democrats' repeated failures at the ballot box.
Again, just look at 2004 for proof of Partisan War Syndrome's negative effects: Kerry's "profile" and "electability" - venerated by the supposed "ideological" base as the most important asset - were made impotent by the vicious attacks on his military service, and more importantly, by the fact that his lack of an ideological rudder allowed him to be vilified as a "flip-flopper."
Some may argue that putting partisanship ahead of everything else during the 2004 presidential election was only a fleeting trait of a progressive base desperate to defeat George W. Bush. But a look at the left's current landscape shows that's hardly the case. Partisan War Syndrome rages on today like a pandemic in parts of the left's grassroots base.
Hallucination
The first major symptom of Partisan War Syndrome is wild hallucinations that make progressives believe we can win elections by doing nothing, as long as the Republican Party keeps tripping over itself. You can best see this symptom each time another GOP scandal comes down the pike. The scandal hits, Republicans respond with a pathetic "I am not a crook" defense, and both Democratic politicians and grassroots activists/bloggers berate a "culture of corruption." Yet, then these same critics largely refuse to demand concrete solutions such as public funding of elections that would actually clean up the system, and would draw a contrast between the left and the right. We see hallucinations of a victory in the next election as long as we just say nothing of substance, as we have for the last decade. But like a mirage in the desert, it never seems to materialize.
These hallucinations are the only logical explanation as to why the Democratic Party remains without an official position on almost every major issue in Congress. Just look at the last year: Democrats have no clear party position on Iraq, energy, bankruptcy, trade, tax cuts, Supreme Court nominees or corruption, other than to criticize Republicans.
In fairness, Iraq may be an exception when it comes to the grassroots. There is undoubtedly a palpable - and growing - core of progressives outside the Beltway who put their desire to see American troops withdraw above their partisan loyalties. Much of this base flocked to Howard Dean's campaign for the presidency, and still fuels the blogs' teeming traffic. It is why in recent weeks we have seen 2008 presidential hopeful Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.) make statements in support of withdrawing troops - because he feels the power of an ideological force within his midst, and he sees that in order for Democrats to capitalize on the Bush administration's mismanagement of Iraq, Democrats have to actually take a position of contrast.
But then, even an issue as critical as Iraq can be subverted by the hallucinations that come from Partisan War Syndrome. As just one example, take progressives' constant genuflecting anytime Sen. Hillary Clinton's (D-N.Y.) name is mentioned. She is forever portrayed as a champion of the left, with everyone who's anyone in politics assuming that she will have rock-solid support from the Democratic base despite her loud and continuing support for the Iraq War, and rather quiet Senate record on other progressive issues. The assumption speaks volumes about a "base" with an ideology so afflicted by a haze of hallucination that it believes the best politics even in such a polarized environment are those that avoid contrast.
On almost every other issue it is the same. The hallucinations subvert overarching ideology or concrete actions on issue after issue, save a few disparate pieces of token legislation that the party refuses to seriously push, and which the supposedly all-powerful "liberal" base does not demand through the blogs, liberal pundits, or any of its other powerful channels of influence. Unions, environmental organizations and others fight the good substantive fight. But with the base in a state of hallucination, there is no cohesive ideological grassroots movement to push along those substantive efforts.
As New York Times columnist Frank Rich recently wrote, the tragedy in allowing the hallucinations to continue indefinitely goes beyond just election losses. "The Democrats are hoping that if they do nothing, they might inherit the earth as the Bush administration goes down the tubes," he wrote. "Whatever the dubious merits of this Kerryesque course as a political strategy, as a moral strategy it's unpatriotic. The earth may not be worth inheriting if Iraq continues to sabotage America's ability to take on Iran and North Korea, let alone Al Qaeda." The same could be said for every other issue that progressives are trying to avoid in the face of the 2006 elections.
Delirium
The next most obvious symptom of Partisan War Syndrome is delirium. Out of power for so long, the left is desperate for anyone that has the appearance of an electoral winner, no matter what the actual positions of that winner are. Other than maybe the war in Iraq or abortion, it increasingly does not seem to matter to the Democratic base where a candidate stands on much of anything, as long as that candidate has the so-called right "profile." Intangibles like a candidate's personal background and charisma - while certainly important - are now seen by parts of the grassroots as the penultimate asset for a candidate. In vogue today are macho males - tomorrow, who knows? As long as you are the "in" thing and put a "D" behind your name, much of the supposedly "ideological" base doesn't really care what positions or record you have. It is as if progressives believe Democrats have been losing elections only because their candidates aren't out of Central Casting.
What's troubling is that this kind of delirium is most commonly found on the Internet blogs, supposedly the progressive ideological bastion, but increasingly a place only of traditional partisan prioritization. Case in point was the recent brouhaha over Ohio's upcoming 2006 U.S. Senate race. Iraq War veteran Paul Hackett, who had recently lost a high-profile House race, decided to run for the Senate after Rep. Sherrod Brown earlier said he would not. Brown, however, reversed himself just as Hackett was preparing to announce his intention to run.
The situation was inarguably awkward. But what followed was illustrative of the delirium plaguing the progressive base.
Within hours of Brown's announcement, "progressive" Internet blogs lit up with intense criticism of Brown. And let's be clear - Brown's move was tactically clumsy. But the attacks went well beyond criticism of his decision to be a candidate to the core of who he is, showing that the supposedly "ideological" base is, in part, anything but. In many parts of the base, there is no ideology at all.
How does the Brown-Hackett controversy show us this? Because nobody - not even the critics - disputes that Brown has been one of the most effective, successful, team playing, outspoken and articulate heroes for the progressive ideological movement in Congress for more than a decade, while Hackett has no voting record on any issue at all. Even on his signature issue, Iraq, Hackett never supported withdrawing troops. An activist base motivated by ideology would have rejoiced that one of their ideological brethren, Brown, was running for higher office, especially against someone with so little record. Remember the 2002 Pennsylvania Republican primary? The right-wing's ideological base cheered when archconservative Pat Toomey decided to challenge moderate Sen. Arlen Specter.
Instead, parts of the progressive base did the opposite, attacking the ideological champion; calling him "untrustworthy" for his tactical decision despite his years of steadfast trustworthiness casting the tough progressive votes; and venerating the other candidate with no ideology or voting record to speak of but whose "profile" they liked. Even Mother Jones magazine published an article on its Web site lamenting the fact that Brown's candidacy meant Democrats were supposedly "shooting down" Hackett. The magazine, one of the supposed progressive ideological lions, then pumped up Hackett attacking Brown as a "very liberal Democrat" - as if its base readership should think that was a strike against him.
This delirium in parts of the grassroots left is not limited to Senate races - it is afflicting the early 2008 presidential jostling. In straw poll after straw poll on Internet blogs, former Gen. Wesley Clark leads other potential Democratic contenders. This is the same Wesley Clark who, according to a recent edition of Roll Call, was on Capitol Hill trying to convince progressive Democratic lawmakers to back off their support for legislation that would withdraw troops from Iraq.
None of this, of course, is meant to imply that "profile" isn't important - of course it is. But there is little - if any - rock-solid evidence that it is far and away the most important factor. And yet even without such evidence, "profile" has superceded actual issues as THE most important quality to not only the Democratic Party apparatus but also to parts of the "ideological" base - a distressing signal that the delirium is intense.
Similarly, none of this is meant to slight either Clark or Hackett, both of whom certainly have assets beyond just their profiles, and who could end up turning out to be progressive champions. The examples provide far more of a telling commentary about the grassroots base than about these particular candidates. And that commentary is clear: parts of the grassroots have taken on the establishment's condescending, self-fulfilling prophecy that personality, charisma, image and "profile" matter more to voters than anything of substance. It's hard to say which is more troubling - that this profile-always-trumps-substance delirium both insults voters' intelligence and has no actual basis in reality, or the fact that many who claim to speak for an ideologically motivated base actually don't care about issues at all. Either way, it is troubling - and dangerous - for the left.
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
The third symptom of Partisan War Syndrome is a version of obsessive compulsive disorder that focuses on incessantly on "framing," "narrative" and building "infrastructure." No matter what you read about Democratic politics these days, everything seems to come back to these concepts - as if the left's problems are rooted exclusively in how politicians, activists and leaders talk about issues, and how these folks can get out that rhetoric, rather than the actual positions - or lack thereof - they are taking.
No one doubts that "framing," "narratives" and "infrastructure" are important. Republican pollster Frank Luntz, long considered the master of the trade, has certainly helped Republicans frame their odious agenda in the most effective ways. And the slew of right-wing think tanks and talk radio venues has certainly helped get Luntz's propaganda out. Similarly, University of California, Berkeley, Professor George Lakoff, who has also done some groundbreaking work on the subject, has been an invaluable asset to Democrats, as has the new group of left-leaning talk radio, blogs and think tanks.
But the idea that the left's big problems are all about rhetoric and delivery systems and nothing about substance is a defense mechanism designed to deny the deeper questions of conviction and guts. Obsessive focus on "framing" economic policy negates a bigger question about why large swaths of the Democratic Party and the "progressive" base aren't bothered by corporate-written trade deals that sell out American jobs, and are too afraid to support new regulations on Corporate America for fear of being labeled "anti-business." Similarly, obsessive focus on "framing" Democrats' current national security policy avoids more serious inquiries into why many Democrats still stand in lock-step with neoconservatives and President Bush on the War in Iraq.
Obsessive-compulsive focus on "framing" and "infrastructure," in short, is only as effective as the principles being framed, and the ideology being supported. George Lakoff is clearly a very talented strategist, but his effectiveness is limited - not by his own talents or work, but by his side's unwillingness to give him the materials to frame in the first place. Think of it this way: If you frame the original Mona Lisa, you've got a priceless portrait. If you frame a poster you bought at the mall of the Mona Lisa, you've got something that may look nice, but is in reality worthless. Believing that the public will only look at the frame and not the actual picture may soothe party operatives who purport to have silver-bullet prescriptions, but it is, to put it mildly, wishful thinking.
The importance of being ideological
To be sure, it is impossible to paint a picture of the entire "progressive" base in one stroke. After all, the base is not just a monolith (regardless of what the media would like you to believe). There still remain some institutions, pundits, blogs and grassroots power organized specifically around ideology and issue positions. But a quick glance at some of the most prominent "liberals" on newspaper op-ed pages or at a small but growing segment of "progressive" blogs makes clear that, unlike on the right, efforts to strengthen an ideology on the left face a clear roadblock with the advent of Partisan War Syndrome.
"Liberal" columnists write with little sense of an overarching ideological umbrella. A cadre of bloggers and blog commenters increasingly give and take away their support for candidates based on questions of political tactics and "profile," not issues. The left's emerging new ideological infrastructure still at times seems afraid to openly push the Democratic Party to embrace more progressive themes.
Make no mistake about it - we cannot expect political parties to resist Partisan War Syndrome. In fact, we can expect parties to actively spread it. Just like corporations exist only to make money, political parties exist solely to win elections, no matter how opportunistic and partisan they have to be.
But while it may be acceptable for politicians and parties to exhibit cynical, conniving, convictionless behavior, it is quite alarming for the supposed idealistic "ideological" foot soldiers supporting them to operate in the same way. The former has elections to think about. But the latter is supposed to be about broader movements that are larger than just the next November. And without the latter, the best-run, best-funded party in the world will always emanate a self-defeating image of standing for nothing.
This, in part, explains why the Democratic Party emanates such an image today: It is not only the spineless politicians in Washington who have no compass, but also a large and vocal swath of the base that lacks ideological cohesion as well. The politicians are, in a sense, just a public representation of that deeply-rooted lack of conviction. Put another way, looking at the typical evasive, jellyfish-like Democratic politician on the nightly news is like putting a mirror up to a growing swath of the grassroots left itself.
Why should this be troubling to the average progressive? First, it is both soulless and aimless. Partisanship is not ideology, and movements are not political parties - they are bigger than political parties, and shape those parties accordingly through pressure. As much as paid party hacks would argue otherwise, the most significant movements in American history did not emanate from the innards of the Democratic or Republican Party headquarters, and they did not come from groups of activists who put labels before substance: They spawned from millions of people committed to grassroots movements organized around ideas - movements which pushed both parties' establishments to deal with given issues. Without those movements transcending exclusively partisan concerns, American history would be a one-page tale of status quo.
Second, even for those concerned more about electoral victories than ideology, this Partisan War Syndrome that subverts ideological movements ultimately hurts electoral prospects. Today's Republican Party, for instance, could not win without the corresponding conservative ideological movement that gets that party its committed donors, fervent foot soldiers and loyal activists. That base certainly operates as an arm of the GOP's party infrastructure - but few doubt it is fueled less by hollow partisanship, and more by their grassroots' commitment to social, economic and religious conservatism.
This is why resisting Partisan War Syndrome and doing the hard work of rebuilding an ideological movement is both a moral imperative and a political necessity for the left. A grassroots base that is organized around hollow partisan labels rather than an overarching belief system - no matter how seemingly energized - will never defeat an opponent that puts ideological warriors ready to walk through fire on the political battlefield. If we do not rekindle that same fervor about actual issues on the left, we will continue living in a one-party country, losing elections into the distant future, and most disturbing of all, watching as our government serves only to protect those in power.

David Sirota is the co-chairperson of the Progressive Legislative Action Network (PLAN) and a Senior Editor at In These Times. He also writes for Working Assets, and is a twice-a-week guest on the Al Franken Show. His forthcoming book Hostile Takeover will be released by Random House’s Crown Publishers in Spring 2006.

Vande Lanotte haalt uit naar ABVV en VLD

2005-10-31T15:53:00.000Z

Vande Lanotte haalt zwaar uit naar ABVV en VLD

Sp.a-voorzitter Johan Vande Lanotte verwijt de socialistische vakbond ABVV en regeringspartner VLD foutieve informatie te verspreiden over de inhoud van het generatiepact.

ABVV en VLD hebben er volgens Vande Lanotte alle belang bij om het voor te stellen alsof je volgens het generatiepact pas met zestig op pensioen kunt. Dat zegt hij in een interview met het weekblad Humo. Vande Lanotte stoort zich aan het beeld als zou het generatiepact enkel over het optrekken van de brugpensioenleeftijd gaan. Volgens hem bevat het pact vijf belangrijke punten: investeringen om jongeren aan het werk te krijgen, het welvaartsvast maken van de uitkeringen, bijkomende financiering van de sociale zekerheid, het helpen van werknemers aan een andere baan na een herstructurering en het geleidelijk aanpassen van het aantal jaren dat je gewerkt moet hebben om met brugpensioen te mogen gaan.

"Liberale stoerdoenerij"

"Dat de brugpensioenleeftijd wordt opgetrokken tot zestig jaar, klopt dus niet", zegt Vande Lanotte. "Verhofstadt had er beter over gezwegen (...). Wellicht was het liberale stoerdoenerij. (...), "zegt Vande Lanotte. Hij noemt ABVV en VLD objectieve bondgenoten, omdat ze er allebei belang bij hebben de zaken voor te stellen als zou brugpensioen pas vanaf zestig mogelijk zijn. In een ander interview met Humo verwijt ABVV-voorman Xavier Verboven de sp.a dat ze voor de middenklasse heeft gekozen. "Blijkbaar denken ze dat daar hun kiezers zitten. Bon, we zullen zien wat dat geeft bij de verkiezingen", zegt Verboven. Vande Lanotte ontkent dit en kaatst de bal terug. "De partij is gericht op alle mensen, de vakbond is vandaag maar met één groep bezig: de mensen tussen vijftig en zestig die nog een baan hebben. Het ABVV beseft blijkbaar niet dat ze een oorlog tussen de generaties creëren als ze het pact afwijzen", aldus Vande Lanotte in Humo.

Nog meer acties op tilNa de algemene staking en de grote betoging tegen het generatiepact dreigen de vakbonden met een reeks acties.
In Humo waarschuwt Vande Lanotte het ABVV voor dergelijke acties. Hij verwijst daarvoor naar de vrijdagstakingen die de vakbond in de jaren tachtig organiseerde tegen de besparingsplannen van de toenmalige regering, waar ook de socialisten deel van uit maakten. "Wat heeft de vakbond toen bereikt? De regering is gevallen en er is een rechtse coalitie aan de macht gekomen, die meteen tot de sociale afbraak is overgegaan. (...) We zijn nu nog dingen aan het rechttrekken die de rechtse partijen toen hebben doorgeduwd", zegt Vande Lanotte.

Opus Dei

2005-10-30T19:31:00.000Z

A look inside the hidden world of Opus Dei.

By Paul Baumann

Some know it as the diabolical secret organization of monk-assassins depicted in the The Da Vinci Code. Others recall it in vague connection with Robert Hanssen, the FBI agent who spied for Russia. Those inside the beltway may be familiar with the role it played in the conversion to Catholicism of Sen. Sam Brownback, Robert Bork, and syndicated columnist Robert Novak—though apparently none of them numbers himself among the roughly 3,000 members the group claims to have in the United States. (Nor, despite rumors, do Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, former FBI director Louis Freeh, or Sen. Rick Santorum.)

Opus Dei has unquestionably gotten a lot of bad press, originally because of the prominence of some members in Franco's cabinet toward the end of his regime. But the group has also been accused of, among other things, obsessive secrecy, an authoritarian ethos, being in cahoots with right-wing forces in Latin America, accumulating an indecent amount of wealth, and brainwashing its members. The organization denies all these allegations. Whether Opus Dei's adepts ultimately strike one as saintly is, as John Allen might say, “a matter of interpretation.” Allen, the Vatican correspondent for the liberal National Catholic Reporter, a contributor to CNN and National Public Radio, and most recently author of Opus Dei: The First Objective Look Behind the Myths and Reality of the Most Controversial Force in the Catholic Church, has earned a reputation for balanced, informed reporting. He does not simply reflect the leanings of the liberal weekly paper that is his primary outlet. Here, that reputation gives credence to much of what Opus Dei members tell him in defending the group's philosophy and practices. In that sense, Allen may be too liberal for his own good.

What is Opus Dei? First, it is not the nefarious secret society portrayed in The Da Vinci Code. It is a mostly lay group of both men and women devoted to spiritual excellence, although several thousand priests belong. The movement was founded in Madrid in 1928 by Josemaria Escriva (1902-75), a charismatic Spanish priest whose 1939 book, The Way, is considered a spiritual classic by his devoted followers. From the beginning, Escriva targeted top students at universities, and Opus Dei (which means “the work of God”) soon acquired a reputation for elitism. (Today, there are 15 Opus Dei universities, including some of the finest in Spain.) Escriva claimed that God revealed to him the way for ordinary people to become saints, not by renouncing the world, but by excelling in it. The group purports to school members in spiritual practices that enable them to sanctify their lives and their secular work. In being the best laundress or surgeon or lawyer you can be, you are doing God's work, not just pursuing worldly goals. Opus Dei's avid proponents believe that shirt collars are more diligently laundered in Peru, and toilets more faithfully scrubbed in Indiana because of the difference the conservative religious organization makes in the lives of its 85,000 adherents worldwide.
Idealism should not be discounted as the secret of the movement's appeal. Aspirants join because they have discovered a religious vocation: They want to become saints. As a Catholic organization, Opus Dei is somewhat anomalous. In many ways, it is structured like a religious order (such as the Jesuits or Franciscans), and it is led by clerics. Like those in religious orders, members take a vow of obedience, which Opus Dei calls a “contract.” Much of the group's spiritual discipline—including daily Mass and prayer, regular instruction from a spiritual “director,” weekly confession, and, for some, “mortifications” (self-flagellation)—evokes the stringency common in religious orders before the reforms of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). And like priests and women religious, Opus Dei's core adherents, who are called “numeraries” and number roughly 16,000, are celibates who live segregated by gender in Opus Dei residences. At the same time, however, the group thinks of itself as a lay movement—most of its members, whether celibate or not, are not ordained and continue to pursue secular occupations—and the movement criticizes the “clericalism” of Catholics who expect the clergy to do the heavy spiritual lifting for them. Opus Dei claims to have anticipated the Second Vatican Council's “universal call to holiness,” a dramatic shift away from the Church's historical emphasis on the superior spiritual dignity of the ordained priest in contrast to that of the layperson. Yet skeptics argue that the group, whose piety and theology are very traditional (celibacy is rarely a secular vocation), operates like a sectarian movement, or even a cult, and has set itself up, with the connivance of the Vatican, as a “church within the Church.”
Because Opus Dei transgresses traditional boundaries separating clerical and lay life, the Church had difficulty finding the right canonical status for the organization. Officially, it is the Catholic Church's only “personal prelature.” The movement's head, a bishop, resides in Rome, and members place themselves, for the purpose of spiritual formation, under his authority. Therefore, Opus Dei enjoys a kind of “extraterritoriality” from local dioceses and their bishops that is usually granted only to religious orders of priests and nuns. This unusual status has increased the organization's independence—and its critics' suspicions.
Suspicions about the group's allegedly eccentric character were confirmed for some by the spy scandal surrounding Robert Hanssen, which included a bizarre, voyeuristic, sexual dimension as well. Hanssen and his wife were “supernumerary” members of Opus Dei. Supernumeraries comprise the bulk of Opus Dei's membership (affiliation is also available as an “associate” or “cooperator”). Most supernumeraries are married, and their spiritual practice mirrors that of celibate numeraries. Hanssen actually confessed his spying to an Opus Dei priest. In a good example of why Opus Dei's myopic spirituality is worrisome, the priest told Hanssen to stop spying and to give his blood money to charity, but not to turn himself in. His family—at one level Opus Dei is all about (large) family values—came first.
Opus Dei's reconciliation of Catholic supernaturalism with modern economic and professional accomplishment—Hanssen was a computer whiz—confounds expectations. On the one hand, the group's valorization of worldly achievement and economic individualism has a Protestant feel to it. Historically, material success was a sign of divine election, of God's blessing, within Protestantism. Max Weber, of course, linked the Protestant ethic with the rise of capitalism. Sociologist Joan Estruch (Saints and Schemers, 1995) has applied that analysis to Opus Dei, exploring how its discipline of hard work, thrift, and devotion to educational excellence has appealed to elites in Catholic cultures, like Spain's, undergoing modernization.
Many Catholics in Europe and in the United States regard the movement as politically reactionary, extreme in its spiritual and worldly ambition, and devious. The group's manner of “recruiting,” especially of college students, has been criticized as overbearing or worse. There is even an organization, the Opus Dei Awareness Network, dedicated to exposing the group's methods. But Opus Dei has its admirers, who see it as a defender of traditional moral values, especially of the family, as well as a providential source of evangelical enthusiasm, orthodoxy, and unquestioned loyalty to Rome. Chief among those admirers was John Paul II, who presided over the speedy canonization of the movement's founder. Critics, however, saw Escriva's 2002 canonization as a sure sign of the organization's ill-gotten wealth and malign influence.
These conflicting views form the background to the story John Allen tells. On the whole, Allen thinks Opus Dei has been more sinned against than sinning. He compares the group's stringency to acquiring a taste for Guinness Extra Stout, and wants to give the organization (and Extra Stout) every benefit of the doubt. For example, he rejects objections raised over Escriva's hasty elevation to sainthood by two veteran observers of the Church, Kenneth Woodward, former Newsweek religion editor, and Cambridge historian Eamon Duffy. “The canonization of the founder of Opus Dei is the most striking example in modern times of the successful promotion of a cause by a pressure group,” Duffy insisted. Woodward called it “a scandal.” Escriva's authoritarian temperament and sometimes violent behavior were never fully investigated by the Church, say critics.
Allen argues that those promoting Escriva's cause mastered the bureaucratic procedures and outworked their opponents. “Opus Dei may have played hard and fast, but they played by the rules,” he writes. Opus Dei had the financial resources to press Escriva's case and, most important, the strong support of John Paul II. Where critics saw a miscarriage of justice, one that brought the Church's claims to speak the truth into question, Allen sees a clash of worldviews and a failure to understand how the Vatican operates. On the question of Escriva's sanctity, which is after all the heart of the matter, he cops a plea.
Too often, the “objective look” promised in the book's subtitle means leaving things at the he-said, she-said level. Amassing an enormous amount of testimony, if not evidence, Allen examines a long list of Opus Dei's alleged offenses, including its social elitism, secrecy, nefarious influence in the Vatican, conservative secular politics, manipulative methods of indoctrination, gruesome physical mortifications, pursuit of wealth, and sexist treatment of women. In nearly every instance, Allen judges the organization to be as much a force for good as for ill. In short, Opus Dei's bad rep is largely the result of poor communication.
In making his case, Allen wants to remind readers that a good deal of religious belief and practice is only understandable when considered from a variety of perspectives, what he calls a Rashomon approach, after the 1950 Kurosawa film in which a disputed event is recalled in wildly different ways by different participants. That judgments about disputed questions “come down to matters of interpretation” and “different frames of reference” are insipid observations, however. That people view reality from “radically different perspectives” is where a “look behind the myths and reality” of a religious group should begin, not end.
Especially unsatisfactory is Allen's treatment of Escriva and the cult of personality surrounding the saint. He acknowledges that Escriva's writings, largely a collection of pious aphorisms, are thought “banal” by many. Indeed, they read like a cross between the gnomic utterances of Yoda and the bullying of Donald Rumsfeld. They also make clear Escriva's extreme views on Church authority. “Obedience, the sure way,” begins entry 941 in The Way. “Blind obedience to your superior, the way of sanctity. Obedience in your apostolate, the only way; for, in a work of God, the spirit must be to obey or to leave.” Submission to religious authority is understood to be a good in itself. The language and images of war suffuse Escriva's writing, as does his contempt for those who are “lukewarm” in their vocation.
As it turns out, Allen's conclusion is a useful, if unintended, example of the Rashomon experience itself. After 350 pages of bending over backwards to show how Opus Dei's public image is distorted by “the cultural gap that separates Anglo-Saxon corporate thinking from the rest of the world,” Allen makes a number of sensible suggestions for reforming the movement, all of which fall into that gap. He urges the group to be more transparent in dealings with others and in identifying its operations and reporting its finances, to collaborate with other Catholic groups, whose liberal tendencies Opus Dei has long resisted, and to become more open and self-critical.
But if Escriva's writing is any guide, “saints” do not value this sort of compromise. Being a saint is not “a matter of interpretation” or a question of developing a taste for one brand of reality over another. Saints don't believe in choice or taste, but in the will of God. For Opus Dei, the business of making saints is not one option among many—it is the only option. I fear that in explaining why Opus Dei is misunderstood, Allen seems to have misunderstood it. If Opus Dei's vision of the spiritual life is powerful and compelling—even beautiful and exhilarating—to its adherents, it is precisely because it understands itself to be not just one way of looking at reality, but the only way.
Allen's recommendations to Opus Dei are based on the liberal (and also Catholic, I would argue) virtues of tolerance, public accountability, individual autonomy, dialogue, and a willingness to change in response to altered circumstances. Yet Opus Dei is a proudly illiberal institution, one whose spiritual identity demands the rejection of any “lukewarm” acceptance of what is understood to be moral error. As Allen acknowledges, a defining characteristic of Opus Dei members is that they cannot admit the possibility that Church teaching could be wrong. Obedience and loyalty, self-sacrifice, ascetic discipline, moral certainty, absolute devotion to the Church, especially to the papacy: These are the virtues Opus Dei seeks to instill. If I were in charge of Opus Dei, I would take Allen's recommendations with a large grain of salt, for if adopted they will bring into the group the moral and cultural forces for which Opus Dei was so obviously conceived as an antidote.

Paul Baumann is editor of Commonweal.

homofobieprijzen 2005

2005-10-30T07:42:00.000Z

PERSMEDEDELING
Gent, vrijdag 28 oktober 2005

Holebifederatie nomineert voor de Homofolie- en Homofobieprijs 2005

De Holebifederatie maakt de nominaties voor de Homofolie- en Homofobieprijs 2005 bekend. Deze prijzen worden jaarlijks uitgereikt aan iemand die zich respectievelijk inzette voor de emancipatie van holebi’s of uitblonk in holebi-onvriendelijkheid. De discussie rond holebi-adoptie heeft duidelijk de keuzes beïnvloed. Holebi's nomineerden de politici die voor het wetsvoorstel voor de openstelling van adoptie stemmen voor de Homofolieprijs. De CD&V werd aangeduid als kanshebber voor de Homofobieprijs. Dat de partij haar standpunt over adoptie wijzigde, appreciëren holebi’s duidelijk niet.

Voor de Homofolieprijs zijn ook de makers van het één-programma ‘Thuis’ genomineerd. ‘Thuis’ bracht op mooie en realistische manier een lesbische relatie in beeld. De derde genomineerde voor de Folieprijs is de diversiteitscampagne van het ministerie van Defensie opgezette die aandacht besteedt aan de doelgroep holebi’s. De campagne is een voorbeeld van een holebivriendelijk beleid in de openbare en privé-sector.

Ook de Gezinsbond wordt genomineerd voor de Homofobieprijs, omwille van de holebi-onvriendelijke uitspraken van voorzitter Roger Pauly. Hij verklaarde “dat een kind beter af is met een vader en een moeder, zoals dat normaal is.” De derde kanshebber voor de Fobieprijs is de Congregatie voor de Katholieke Opvoeding. Die schreef een instructie die oproept om homoseksuele kandidaat-priesters te weren uit de seminaries.

Iedereen kon op de website van de Holebifederatie voorstellen doen voor de Homofolie- en Homofobieprijs. Uit deze lijst werd een shortlist samengesteld waarop holebi’s en holebigroepen kunnen stemmen.

“Het is opvallend hoe sterk mensen bekommerd zijn om het adoptiedossier.", zegt Mieke Stessens. "Dit toont eens te meer aan met hoeveel ongeduld holebi’s wachten op de openstelling van adoptie. Wij hopen dat de politici dit signaal begrijpen en er hun conclusies uit trekken.”
De plechtige uitreiking van de twee prijzen vindt plaats op het Bal Fédéral, op zaterdag 17 december in Zaal Harmonie in Antwerpen.
Voor meer informatie kan u terecht bij Mieke Stessens woordvoerster Holebifederatie mieke.stessens@holebifederatie.be 0475-43 16 41

Libby to be indicated in CIA Leak Case

2005-10-28T17:39:00.000+01:00

Source: 'Scooter' Libby to Be Indicted in CIA Leak Case

Vice President Cheney's Chief Aide Will Resign After His Indictment is Announced, Sources Tell ABC News

Oct. 28, 2005 — - Vice President Dick Cheney's chief advisor I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby will be indicted today in the CIA leak investigation, sources close to the case told ABC News. Top White House strategist Karl Rove will evade charges for now.
A source close to the White House told ABC News that Libby's "boxes are packed" and that he will resign from his post after the indictment. Papers containing information pertaining to the investigation will be made public this afternoon while Patrick Fitzgerald, the special prosecutor appointed to lead the investigation, will make remarks on the case at 2 p.m. ET.
Rove, deputy White House chief of staff and Bush's closest adviser, appears to have escaped indictment, but Fitzgerald is expected to continue his investigation.
Rove's lawyer, Robert Luskin, said he was told by Fitzgerald's office that investigators had "made no decision about whether or not to bring charges" and would continue their probe into Rove's conduct. Rove has testified four times before the grand jury and has maintained that he discussed Wilson's wife with reporters on the condition of anonymity and was only trading information that came from other reporters.
"We are confident that when the Special Counsel finishes his work, he will conclude that Mr. Rove has done nothing wrong," Luskin said in a statement.
Long, Tangled Journey to Indictment
Fitzgerald has been investigating the disclosure to reporters of the identity of CIA covert operative Valerie Plame. The case goes back to February 2002, when CIA officials asked former diplomat Joseph Wilson, Plame's husband, to investigate a report that Saddam Hussein had tried to obtain uranium from Niger in the late 1990s for the production of nuclear weapons. Wilson concluded that the report was false. The documents related to the alleged sale were ultimately determined to be forgeries.
However, President Bush made reference to a purported uranium deal between Iraq and Africa in his State of the Union address in January 2003. Six months later, Wilson publicly accused the Bush administration of twisting intelligence and exaggerating the threat from Iraq to justify going to war, prompting criticism from conservatives and Bush supporters. Six days after a critical op-ed penned by Wilson appeared in The New York Times, conservative columnist Robert Novak wrote that "two senior administration officials" had told him that Wilson's wife was a CIA operative and had suggested sending him on the trip to Africa -- and he identified her as Valerie Plame.
Novak wasn't the only reporter who apparently had learned about Plame's identity. Several reporters had had conversations with administration officials about a CIA link to Wilson's wife.
One of the officials who allegedly talked to reporters was Libby. Before the CIA leak investigation began, one of the words most commonly used to describe Libby was "discreet." He has testified before the grand jury, and testimony shows that he met three times with a New York Times reporter before the Plame leak, initiated a call to an NBC reporter and was a confirming source about Wilson's wife to Time magazine. Like Rove, he is said to have talked to reporters under anonymity and was only trading information that he had heard from other reporters.
Administration Dogged by QuestionsThere have also been questions about Cheney's alleged role in the CIA leak.
The New York Times has reported that notes from a previously undisclosed June 12, 2003, conversation between Libby and Cheney suggest Libby first learned about Plame from Cheney himself. This appears to contradict Libby's grand jury testimony that he first heard about Plame from journalists.
With the outing, Plame's career as a covert CIA operative has ended. The leak of her identity has sparked the questions: Who revealed Plame's identity, and why? These questions have dogged the Bush administration as weapons of mass destruction -- the initial rationale for the United States attacking Iraq -- have never been found and the death toll continues to mount. Wilson has claimed that the leak was made in retaliation for his criticism of the Bush administration's argument for going to war in Iraq.
Knowingly disclosing the identity of a covert agent like Plame could be a violation of the Intelligence Indentities Protection Act and could land a person in prison for up to 10 years.
Reported by ABC News' Jonathan Karl.

Which way did they go, George ?

2005-10-28T17:27:00.000+01:00

Which Way Did They Go, George, Which Way Did They Go?

LESBIAN NOTIONS By Libby Post

Poor George W. Bush!First, the man who really calls the shots at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Karl Rove, had to go into hiding. Remember?This past summer, he’d been implicated for exposing the name of Valerie Plame, the covert CIA agent who also happens to be the wife of former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who criticized the Bush Administration over Iraq.Then, Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, and the bankrupt morality of Bush cronyism was brought front and center.Michael Brown, the incompetent whom Bush picked to head FEMA (now considered the Feeble Emergency Management Agency), acted out Abbott and Costello’s “Who’s on First” routine as a one-man play, while thousands of poor, mostly African-American, New Orleans residents lost everything.Then, Tom DeLay, House Majority Leader and Bush hatchet man on the Hill, was indicted—not once, but twice—for campaign fraud and money laundering.As a fellow Texan, DeLay has built a political operation in the Longhorn State that has served Bush well, but appears to be a matchstick structure soon to go up in flames.Then, Bush needed to come up with a new Supreme, and in order to maintain the gender balance (well, the gender configuration) at the Court, he nominated Harriet Miers, the White House counsel whose lack of judicial record (she only had been a lawyer, not a judge) has Bush’s base up in arms.The conservative cadre who anointed Bush the savior of the right expects him to dance its dance, and select a Court nominee who will vote to strike down Roe v. Wade, block any gay-rights laws, and turn back the legal hands of time in this country.Other than being a born-again, Miers, for the most part, is a blank slate. That’s not OK for folks who want a guarantee that their brand of ultraconservative, strict-constructionist constitutionality will be the order of the day.Poor Bush! It’s all starting to fall apart.What’s a guy who hasn’t had an original thought in his life, and who surrounds himself with sycophantic yes-men and –women, to do?He’s losing his friends. He’s losing his credibility. He’s losing his grip on his political base. He’s losing the public-relations war. He’s losing any claim to a positive presidential legacy.But Bush’s losses do not necessarily translate into gains for the lesbian and gay community.Sure, it’s great that individually, we can walk around with a “we-told-you-so” attitude. I, for one, am proud that I still have my Kerry-Edwards bumper sticker on my car.But how far can that really take us?How can we, as a community and a potentially powerful political force, capitalize on the crumbling of the conservative coalition?First, we need to expose its politics as a sham. Hurricane Katrina showed us that compassionate conservatism is an oxymoron.While the right has formed antigay coalitions with black clergy throughout the country, those same clergy woke up the day after Hurricane Katrina to see a government they supported refusing and unable to help their own people.Perhaps this is the right time for GLBT groups throughout the country to reach out to their local African-American clergy to build new bridges and work together to help our domestic refugees down South.Second, we need to raise the visibility of GLBT groups throughout the country to show the compassion and concern we routinely have shown for people affected by disasters.From AIDS to 9/11 to Hurricane Katrina, the GLBT community did not sit on its hands, and wait to be told what to do.We’re well aware of the need to do something, to make change.After all, if we don’t do things for ourselves, no one is going to do it for us. Thankfully, our action is just not limited to doing for ourselves.We understand that we need to take our compassion and concern beyond the borders of our gay ghettos, and touch the lives of anyone, anywhere in need.Third, we need to make it clear, over and over again, that we’re here, we’re queer, and we ain’t going away. This is no time to seek refuge in a closet. We need to be clear about who our families are, who our children are.We need to work on the midterm elections, side by side with folks who share common goals, and defeat those in the House and Senate whose politics are not only dangerous to us, but also deleterious to the nation.We need to run for office as well. Openly gay elected officials do make a difference.Having a seat at the table beats knocking on the door anytime.And, yes, we may just need to march on Washington as well.If we do all this and work together, we may be able to show Bush and his cronies which way to go: out the door.Libby Post is the founding chair of the Empire State Pride Agenda. She is a political commentator on public radio, on the Web, and in print media. She can be reached through this publication, or at LesbianNotions@qsyndicate.com.

War with Iran?

2005-10-28T14:02:00.000+01:00

Are we going to war with Iran?

Dan Plesch evaluates the evidence pointing towards a new conflict in the Middle East Tuesday October 18, 2005

The Sunday Telegraph warned last weekend that the UN had a last chance to avert war with Iran and, at a meeting in London last week, the US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, expressed his regret that any failure by the UN security council to deal with Iran would damage the security council's relevance, implying that the US would solve the problem on its own.
Only days before, the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, had dismissed military action as "inconceivable" while both the American president and his secretary of state had insisted war talk was not on the agenda. The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have found that Iran has not, so far, broken its commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although it has concealed activities before.

It appears that the UK and US have decided to raise the stakes in the confrontation with Iran. The two countries persuaded the IAEA board - including India - to overrule its inspectors, declare Iran in breach of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and say that Iran's activities could be examined by the UN security council. Critics of this political process point to the fact that India itself has developed nuclear weapons and refused to join the NPT, but has still voted that Iran is acting illegitimately. On the Iranian side there is also much belligerent talk and pop music now proudly speaks of the nuclear contribution to Iranian security.
The timing of the recent allegations about Iranian intervention in Iraq also appears to be significant. Ever since the US refused to control Iraq's borders in April 2003, Iranian backed militia have dominated the south and, with under 10,000 soldiers amongst a population of millions, the British army had little option but to go along. No fuss was made until now. As for the bombings of British soldiers, some sources familiar with the US army engineers report that these supposedly sophisticated devices have been manufactured inside Iraq for many months and do not need to be imported.
But is the war talk for real or is it just sabre rattling? The conventional wisdom is that for both military and political reasons it would be impossible for Israel and the UK/US to attack and that, in any event, after the politically damaging Iraq war, neither Tony Blair nor George Bush would be able to gather political support for another attack.
But in Washington, Tel Aviv and Downing Street, if not the Foreign Office, Iran is regarded as a critical threat. The regime in Tehran continues to demand the destruction of the state of Israel and to support anti-Israeli forces. In what appeared to be coordinated releases of intelligence assessments, Israeli and US intelligence briefed earlier this year that, while Iran was years from a nuclear weapons capability, the technological point of no return was now imminent.
Shortly after the US elections, the vice-president, Dick Cheney, warned that Israel might attack Iran. Israel has the capability to attack Iranian targets with aircraft and long-range cruise missiles launched from submarines, while Iranian air defences are still mostly based on 25-year-old equipment purchased in the time of the Shah. A US attack might be portrayed as a more reasonable option than a renewed Israeli-Islamic confrontation.
The US army and marines are heavily committed in Iraq, but soldiers could be found if the Bush administration were intent on invasion. Donald Rumsfeld has been reorganising the army to increase front-line forces by a third. More importantly, naval and air force firepower has barely been used in Iraq. Just 120 B52 and stealth bombers could target 5,000 points in Iran with satellite-guided bombs in just one mission. It is for this reason that John Pike of globalsecurity.org thinks that a US attack could come with no warning at all. US action is often portrayed as impossible, not only because of the alleged lack of firepower, but because Iranian facilities are too hard to target. In a strategic logic not lost on Washington, the conclusion then is that if you cannot guarantee to destroy all the alleged weapons, then it must be necessary to remove the regime that wants them, and regime change has been the official policy in Washington for many years.
For political-military planners, precision strikes on a few facilities have drawbacks beyond leaving the regime intact. They allow the regime too many retaliatory options. Certainly, Iran's neighbours in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf who are worried about the growth of Iranian Shia influence in Iraq would want any attack to be decisive. From this logic grows the idea of destroying the political-military infrastructure of the clerical regime and perhaps encouraging separatist Kurdish and Azeri risings in the north-west. Some Washington planners have hopes of the Sunnis of oil-rich Khuzestan breaking away too.
A new war may not be as politically disastrous in Washington as many believe. Scott Ritter, the whistleblowing former UN weapons inspector, points out that few in the Democratic party will stand in the way of the destruction of those who conducted the infamous Tehran embassy siege that ended Jimmy Carter's presidency. Mr Ritter is one of the US analysts, along with Seymour Hersh, who have led the allegations that Washington is going to war with Iran.
For an embattled President Bush, combating the mullahs of Tehran may be a useful means of diverting attention from Iraq and reestablishing control of the Republican party prior to next year's congressional elections. From this perspective, even an escalating conflict would rally the nation behind a war president. As for the succession to President Bush, Bob Woodward has named Mr Cheney as a likely candidate, a step that would be easier in a wartime atmosphere. Mr Cheney would doubtless point out that US military spending, while huge compared to other nations, is at a far lower percentage of gross domestic product than during the Reagan years. With regard to Mr Blair's position, it would be helpful to know whether he has committed Britain to preventing an Iranian bomb "come what may" as he did with Iraq.
· Dan Plesch is the author of The Beauty Queen's Guide to World Peace.

Iran : israel should be wiped off the map

2005-10-27T16:31:00.000+01:00

2005-10-26 Ahmadinejad: Israel should be wiped off the map

Iranian President says Islamic umma will not allow its historic enemy to live in its heartland. By Stefan Smith - TEHRAN

Iran's hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad openly called Wednesday for Israel to be "wiped off the map" and lashed out at Muslim nations which recognise the Jewish state, setting off a storm of protests.
"The establishment of the Zionist regime was a move by the world oppressor against the Islamic world," the president told a conference in Tehran entitled "The World without Zionism".
"As the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map," said Ahmadinejad, referring to a slogan which Iran's revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used before his death in 1989.
His remarks triggered a swift response from Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom who said Iran was a "clear and present danger".
"We believe that Iran is trying to buy time ... so it can develop a nuclear bomb," said Shalom.
The White House said the call "underscores the concerns we have about Iran's nuclear operations", while the German foreign ministry said the comments were "completely unacceptable".
Ahmadinejad's comments were the first time in years that such a high-ranking Iranian official has openly called for Israel's eradication, even though such slogans are still regularly used at regime rallies.
"The skirmishes in the occupied land are part of a war of destiny. The outcome of hundreds of years of war will be defined in Palestinian land," he thundered in a fiery speech on what he called an "historic war between the oppressor and the world of Islam".
Addressing some 4,000 students, Ahmadinejad also called for Palestinian unity, resistance and "the annihilation of the Zionist regime".
His arrival at the conference drew chants of "Death to Israel", but Ahmadinejad quickly told students -- all of whom wore black and were sporting green headbands -- to shout the slogan louder.
"The Islamic umma (community) will not allow its historic enemy to live in its heartland," said the president, an austere veteran of Iran's hardline Revolutionary Guards who swept to a shock victory in a June election.
"Anyone who signs a treaty which recognises the entity of Israel means he has signed the surrender of the Muslim world," Ahmadinejad said, warning Muslim leaders who recognise Israel they "face the wrath of their own people."
"We should not settle for a piece of land," he said of Israel's pullout from the Gaza Strip.
Ahmadinejad's uncompromising tone represents a dramatic change from that of former president Mohammad Khatami, a mild-mannered cleric whose favoured topic was "dialogue among civilisations" and who led an effort to improve Iran's relations with the West.
"If these remarks were indeed made, we condemn them in the strongest terms," said French foreign ministry spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei.
As a key member of the European Union, France has been leading efforts to "engage" Iran on issues such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, human rights and the Middle East peace process.
But Ahmadinejad appeared to signal that the EU's policy was effectively dead -- asserting that he viewed relations in terms of an "historic war" between Islam and the West.
"It dates back hundreds of years. Sometimes Islam has advanced. Sometimes nobody was winning. Unfortunately over the past 300 years, the world of Islam has been in retreat," he lamented.
"One hundred years ago the last trench of Islam fell, when the oppressors went towards the creation the Zionist regime. They are using it as a fort to spread its aims in the heart of the Islamic world."
The term "oppressor" is used by the clerical regime to refer to the United States, and in the plural form generally also includes Britain and Israel.
Prizes were also on offer at the one-day event organised by the Islamic students' association for the best anti-Zionist caricature and in a letter-writing competition also themed: "The world without Zionism".
The event comes ahead of Friday's "Qods Day" events, a regime-organised rally of anti-Israeli sentiment that generally draws huge crowds in Tehran and other cities.

2005-10-25T18:40:00.000+01:00

For the first time, a majority of Americans believe the Iraq war was the "wrong thing to do", according to a poll published in The Wall Street Journal.

Fifty-three percent of those asked in the Harris Interactive survey felt that "taking military action against Iraq was the... wrong thing to do", against 34 percent who thought it was correct, the newspaper said.
The percentage of people opposing the US-led invasion of the country in March 2003 was up from a figure of 49 percent in a parallel poll in September, rising above 50 percent for the first time since the surveys began.
A year before, in September 2004, both sides were even at 43 percent.
The latest poll also found that 66 percent of Americans believed President George W. Bush was doing a "poor" or "only fair" job of handling Iraq, against 32 percent who deemed it "excellent" or "pretty good".
With the number of US military fatalities in Iraq approaching 2,000, 44 percent of those polled said the situation for US troops in Iraq was getting worse, compared to 19 percent who thought it was improving.
Sixty-one percent were not confident US policies in Iraq would succeed, two points higher than in September.
The poll asked the opinions of 1,833 people online from October 11-17.

The Price of Offshore - Tax havens - belastingparadijzen

2005-10-25T11:58:00.000+01:00

Tax Justice Network

http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Briefing_Paper_-_The_Price_of_Offsh

http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=2 ore_14_MAR_2005.pdf

USA and armed conflicts

2005-10-24T11:23:00.000+01:00

The Atlantic Monthly November 2005 The Agenda
Foreign Affairs

Declare War
It's time to stop slipping into armed conflict

by Leslie H. Gelb and Anne-Marie Slaughter
.....
Most wars are unpredictable messes. Their zigs and zags, we are reminded by the Pentagon epistemologist Donald Rumsfeld, are determined by an unstable alchemy of known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. No nation can plan a war perfectly. Yet in Iraq even the most credulous of Washington insiders had to know before our 2003 invasion that key White House assertions—we could pay for the war out of Iraqi oil revenues; we could secure that vast and raucous country with a little over 100,000 troops—flatly contradicted what almost all civilian and military experts were saying publicly and privately. Much that has gone wrong in Iraq could have been foreseen—and was.

But Iraq is only the latest in a long line of ill-considered and ill-planned American military adventures. Time and again in recent decades the United States has made military commitments after little real debate, with hazy goals and no appetite for the inevitable setbacks. Bill Clinton, having inherited a mission in Somalia to feed the starving, ended up hunting tribal leaders and trying to nation-build. Ronald Reagan dispatched the Marines to Lebanon saying stability there was a "vital interest," only to yank them out sixteen months later, soon after a deadly terrorist attack on the Marine barracks. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson settled us slowly into a war intended to prevent another "domino" from falling to communism, but in a manner that tore the nation apart and ultimately led to defeat. Too often our leaders have entered wars with unclear and unfixed aims, tossing away American lives, power, and credibility before figuring out what they were doing and what could be done.

Our Framers could not have foreseen the present age of nuclear missiles and cataclysmic terrorism. But they understood political accountability, and—as their deliberations in Philadelphia attest—they knew that sending Americans into battle demanded careful reflection and vigorous debate. So they created a simple means of ensuring that debate: in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution they gave Congress the power to declare war.
Declarations of war may seem to be relics of a bygone era—a time more deeply steeped in ritual, when ambassadors in frock coats delivered sealed communiqués to foreign courts. Yet a declaration of war has a great deal to recommend it today: it forces a deliberate, public conversation about the reasons for going to war, the costs, the risks, the likely gains, the strategies for achieving them—all followed by a formal vote.
Debates over war powers are nothing new. A recent book by the University of California at San Diego political scientist Peter Irons, War Powers, concludes that although the president has steadily accumulated de facto war powers, the Framers clearly—and correctly—intended to locate those powers in Congress. A report issued this year by the Constitution Project, a group of eminent academics and policymakers assembled by Georgetown University's Public Policy Institute, sounds the same note. For these experts and countless other lawyers and constitutional scholars, the solution is for Congress to step up and reassume primary responsibility for sending the nation to war.
The problem is that Congress wants power without responsibility. Most legislators fear the political costs of bucking the commander in chief when the nation appears under threat. Others worry that the president's control of vital intelligence places him in a far better position to judge the need for war. The obvious answer is to demand that the information be shared, but here the president can claim that a debate risks spilling secrets to the enemy.
As a result, Congress has often preferred form over substance. Early in the history of the Republic, when President James Madison asked for a declaration of war against Algiers to stop the Barbary pirates, Congress declined, but authorized him to use "such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite." Over time such authorizations have become fast tracks to war. Congress votes up or down on the president's often vague military proposals, without accepting responsibility for judging the objectives of the war and the plans for waging it.
In the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress tried to fix this problem by passing the War Powers Act, which states that troops sent into combat by the president must be withdrawn within sixty days unless Congress specifically approves an extension of combat. Trouble began immediately. Richard Nixon vetoed the act; when Congress overrode the veto, he simply reaffirmed his right to go ahead with war regardless of what Congress said. But Nixon's concerns were unwarranted: the War Powers Act was much more a symbolic assertion of congressional power than an actual constraint on the executive. It is naive to believe that any Congress would vote to pull back troops just sixty days after they'd been deployed.

The War Powers Act was a halfhearted effort to counter presidential unilateralism. The Framers imagined a more solemn act—a formal congressional process and declaration that would be far more difficult for the president to ignore. We propose a new law that would restore the Framers' intent by requiring a congressional declaration of war in advance of any commitment of troops that promises sustained combat. The president would be required to present to Congress an analysis of the threat, specific war aims, the rationale for those aims, the feasibility of achieving them, a general sense of war strategy, plans for action, and potential costs. For its part, Congress would hold hearings of officials and nongovernmental experts, examine evidence of the threat, assess the objectives, and explore the drawbacks of the administration's proposal. A full floor debate and vote would follow.

In the case of a sudden attack on the United States or on Americans abroad, the president would retain his power to repel that attack and to strike back without a congressional declaration. But any sustained operation would trigger the declaration process. In other words, the president could send troops into Afghanistan to hunt down al-Qaeda and punish the Taliban in response to 9/11. But if he planned to keep troops there to unseat the government and transform the country, he would need a congressional declaration. (Without one, funding for troops in the field would be cut off automatically.)
This process would put considerable pressure on the president to develop his case with far greater care than has been the norm over the past fifty years. And by normally requiring legislators to act before troops are in the field, it would also help save them from a natural propensity to duck their constitutional duty.

Passing this legislation might not be easy. But the time is right. Liberals and conservatives alike have become increasingly concerned about the carelessness and costs of wars over the past forty years. A law that established a clear and solemn process for taking the nation to war, while acknowledging the joint responsibility of Congress and the president, could command broad support—especially if it were framed as a return to our constitutional roots. Moderates and liberals would presumably go along. The bill would satisfy their concerns about how easily the United States has gone to war, with subsequent regrets about either the war itself or how it was fought.

But in the wake of the Iraq War such a law might also appeal to many conservatives and neo-conservatives—particularly those who have come to feel that the United States is not getting the foreign-policy results it should, despite its awesome military power. Since the Vietnam War, hawks have felt that we tend to lose wars not on the battlefield but at home. The public, they correctly argue, becomes disenchanted with combat as casualties and costs mount, particularly if no steady progress toward victory can be seen. Demands to bring the troops home begin. The enemy becomes emboldened, and we begin to lose—first psychologically and then literally.
But a more public vetting of the decision to go to war, culminating in a solemn declaration of war by Congress, would most likely ensure stronger public support for the war, by involving the people in the decision and assuring voters that the war had not been launched hastily or under false pretenses. Setbacks and sacrifices might be less surprising and more easily accepted. Because the declaration process would address problems beforehand, it would help us win wars once they started.

The process and the declaration itself would strengthen American credibility—and negotiating power—in the diplomatic run-up to war. Troublemakers abroad have seen the pressure that our government feels to cut and run when conflict turns ugly. Beyond that, many have doubted that the White House would follow through on its threats at all. Saddam Hussein apparently didn't think either President Bush would have the support to attack him. Nor did the Haitians think President Clinton had the stomach for war after he precipitately yanked U.S. troops out of Somalia. But if a president ran the declaration gauntlet and built public support, he would gain enormous credibility for his threats.
And in those cases where the president was unable to persuade Congress to make war, the United States would almost always be better off. The legislation we propose would not diminish the president's considerable stature as commander in chief as he made his case to Congress. If his arguments still failed, the case could not have been very compelling. Far better if we knew that before the killing began.

Today a transportation bill gets more deliberation than a decision to send American troops to war. It seems safe to assume that this is not what the Framers intended. They worked hard to ensure that the power to spend American lives and treasure be exercised collectively and wisely. Their solution is written into the Constitution itself. Returning to the Constitution's text and making it work through legislation requiring joint and deliberate action may be the only way to give the decision to go to war the care it deserves.

dirk van der maelen - tweede bij de 'politici van het jaar'

2005-10-24T11:05:00.000+01:00

Dirk Van der Maelen tweede bij de 'politici van het jaar'

http://www.dirkvandermaelen.be/index.php?id=2098

Zawahiri and Bush : Iraq is the central battlefield

2005-10-23T11:30:00.000+01:00

Iraq Is the Battlefield

By Jon Kyl

"Ayman al Zawahiri and George W. Bush don't agree on much," the Wall Street Journal noted in a recent editorial. "But al Qaeda's No. 2 leader and the U.S. President are in accord on one thing: Iraq is the central battlefield."
People of good faith will argue for a long time about the wisdom of invading Iraq in 2003. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression and support for international terrorism, I believe he had to be removed, and that it was better to do so before international sanctions had deteriorated to the point that he was able to substantially re-arm. But either way, now that we are deeply committed, it is critical that we see the mission through to completion - that is, the establishment of a stable, representative Iraqi government that provides for its own security and poses no threat to its neighbors.
An extraordinary letter Zawahiri wrote to Iraqi insurgent leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi - intercepted and recently released - makes abundantly clear that al Qaeda views Iraq as only an initial battle to be won. "The goal," describes the Journal, "is a fundamentalist Islamic regime that begins in Iraq, extends into the neighboring secular nations of the region, assaults Israel and moves on from there. Just because the U.S. might decide to pull out of Iraq hardly means that al Qaeda will stop trying to kill Americans."
Fortunately, thanks to the dogged efforts of U.S. troops and our allies, Zawahiri is hardly operating from a position of strength. Thought to be in hiding in the mountains of Pakistan, he complains in the letter of relentless pursuit, laments the capture of high-level al Qaeda leaders, and asks Zarqawi to send him $100,000.
Even so, Zawahiri's fanatical dedication to the destruction of the United States and the freedom and democracy we represent is shared by thousands of violent Islamist fundamentalists around the world. Many have slipped into Iraq to join the insurgency; others - along with millions of poor and disaffected around the world who are vulnerable to the attractions of extremism - are surely watching what happens there.
In the face of this reality, those who would have us withdraw prematurely from Iraq face the burden of explaining how such a move would not play directly into the hands of America's mortal enemies, who seek not only our defeat but our annihilation. Even pressure for a strict timetable for withdrawal demoralizes the nascent Iraqi government and people, and encourages insurgents clinging to the notion that they can simply wait us out. Terrorists are only emboldened by their tactical victories; their strikes against the U.S. in Beirut, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, East Africa, and the U.S.S. Cole culminated in the attacks of September 11, 2001.
The consequences of quitting Iraq short of victory would be cataclysmic. Set aside the fact that it would almost certainly fall into civil war, with terrible bloodletting and the creation of significant new terrorist havens, like Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban. As bad as our defeat in Vietnam was, no one seriously considered the Viet Cong a direct threat to the American homeland. The terrorists now fighting our troops in Iraq are different: They would like nothing better than to move their operations back to the United States itself. Again, this is not a matter of speculation - it's already happened.
A terrorist victory in Iraq would embolden violent political extremists everywhere. The failure of democracy would extinguish hopes throughout the region and set back progress around the world. If the American public loses the stomach for this fight, it will validate the terrorists' strategy - most famously articulated by Osama bin Laden, who called us a "weak horse" - and encourage more attacks.
"You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you," Leon Trotsky famously observed on the eve of the Russian Revolution. Terrorists are going to fight us whether we fight them or not. Better to accommodate them.

Sen. Kyl serves on the Senate Finance and Judiciary committees and chairs the Senate Republican Policy Committee

2005-10-23T09:30:00.000+01:00

Après le vote par la droite d'une loi imbécile sur l'enseignement de l'histoire des colonies.
Ce passé colonial mal digéré

par Hervé NATHANQUOTIDIEN : samedi 22 octobre 2005 - Libération

La mémoire coloniale, c'est comme le refoulé. Chassez-le, il revient au galop. Nous assistons avec la loi du 23 février 2005 instituant l'enseignement «positif» de l'histoire des colonies françaises au resurgissement des fractures politiques anciennes, à droite comme à gauche. Cette loi imbécile a été l'oeuvre du lobby des nostalgiques de l'Algérie. Le soir de son examen, à l'Assemblée nationale, on constatait une surreprésentation des élus des circonscriptions où se sont installés en 1962 les rapatriés chassés d'Algérie. Ces parlementaires ont fait sauter le couvercle que le général de Gaulle avait imposé après l'indépendance de l'Algérie, à coups de lois d'amnistie. L'Algérie, c'est simple, à droite, on ne devait plus en parler. Et la droite procoloniale s'était ralliée, avec Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, au régime de la Ve République sans trop barguigner, laissant la cause de l'Algérie française à une extrême droite ultraminoritaire. Le pouvoir gaulliste pouvait alors mettre en place la «politique arabe de la France», dont l'axe était, et est toujours, l'appui aux dictatures issues des luttes nationales.
A gauche, la césure n'était pas moins douloureuse. L'attitude envers la décolonisation a scindé la SFIO de Guy Mollet, qui avait envoyé le contingent en Algérie, et la gauche chrétienne, qui fonda le PSU autour de Mendès France. Le PCF lui-même adoptant une position bien en retrait de son anticolonialisme originel. Il a fallu attendre 1971 et le congrès d'Epinay puis 1974 et les assises du socialisme pour que la famille se réunisse. A l'image de la droite, cela se fit en mettant un mouchoir sur ce passé. Difficile, en élisant à la tête du Parti socialiste l'homme qui affirmait en 1954 «l'Algérie, c'est la France», de poser un regard critique sur l'époque des colonies. En 1981, ce fut François Mitterrand qui réintégra les généraux factieux de 1961 dans leur carrière, provoquant un tollé dans le parti. Mais le PS était tout à sa victoire et l'incident passa. En revanche, le gouffre perdure entre la gauche de gouvernement et l'extrême gauche. Pour celle-ci, la lutte anticoloniale, et l'épopée des «porteurs de valises», fut un combat fondateur. Les plus vieux trotskistes d'aujourd'hui sont nés à la politique avec cette référence. Ils la portent toujours, à tel point que le crible de l'anticolonialisme d'antan leur sert encore, en partie, pour analyser le conflit israélo-palestinien. C'est ainsi qu'on peut analyser la tolérance de certaines organisations d'extrême gauche vis-à-vis de musulmans militants, comme Tariq Ramadan, lors du Forum social européen. L'extrême gauche, pendant la guerre d'Algérie, avait minoré, sinon occulté, l'inspiration religieuse de la lutte des Algériens pour soutenir ce qui lui paraissait primordial, le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination. A l'inverse, la gauche traditionnelle semble, sur l'histoire du voile, avoir retrouvé les réflexes, voire le vocabulaire, d'antan vis-à-vis de l'islam, brandissant la laïcité française et républicaine comme un étendard de la civilisation contre la barbarie.
Au colloque de Blois (Libération du 24 octobre), nombre d'historiens ont appelé à un véritable effort des études sur la colonisation, et la décolonisation. Il est temps : la génération de la guerre d'Algérie est sur le point de quitter la scène politique, à l'image de Jacques Chirac qui servit comme lieutenant dans le bled. Elle mérite un bilan, un vrai.

Oscar Wilde

2005-10-23T07:02:00.000+01:00

Maudit soit scar Wilde

Les archives retrouvées de sa condamnation démontrent qu'à la vindicte de la société victorienne s'est ajoutée la candeur d'un écrivain... acharné à se perdre

Quoi de neuf sur Oscar Wilde ? L'intégrale des sténographies du procès, retrouvées par Merlin Holland, le petit-fils du poète, et publiées pour la première fois en français. C'est passionnant. Parce que, sous la forme haletante de questions et réponses entre avocats et accusé, on assiste au combat désespéré d'un homme seul contre une société qui le traque.Chacun sait qu'Oscar Wilde s'était jeté lui-même dans la gueule du loup, en assignant pour diffamation le marquis de Queensberry, père de son jeune amant Alfred Douglas, le beau et diaphane « Bosie ». Le marquis avait déposé au club fréquenté par Wilde une carte de visite ouverte, avec cette inscription : « Pour Oscar Wilde, pédale et sodomite » (sic). Ce Queensberry était une brute, dont un autre fils venait de se suicider, victime d'un chantage consécutif à sa liaison avec Rosebery, ministre des Affaires étrangères puis Premier ministre. L'acharnement du marquis contre Wilde, le retournement du procès et la condamnation du poète s'expliqueraient en partie par cet épisode peu connu. Queensberry, qui accusait l'homosexualité de lui avoir pris un fils, voulait à tout prix se venger. Il aurait menacé Rosebery de dévoiler ses moeurs si le Premier ministre n'obtenait pas la condamnation de Wilde. Une hypothèse vraisemblable dans le climat sordide de l'Angleterre victorienne.Au procès, on l'accuse d'avoir écrit avec « le Portrait de Dorian Gray » un roman hautement immoral. L'écrivain réaffirme son credo : « Je me préoccupe exclusivement de la littérature, c'est-à-dire de l'art. Le but n'est pas de faire le bien ou le mal, mais d'essayer de créer quelque chose qui aura une certaine forme de beauté. » Une des revues où écrivait Wilde ayant publié une nouvelle d'un inconnu, « le Prêtre et l'Acolyte », récit des amours entre un curé et un enfant de choeur, l'avocat du marquis lui demande s'il considère cette oeuvre comme blasphématoire. « Non, je l'ai trouvée mal écrite. » Mais ceci, Mr Wilde ? Et de citer le passage de la mort de l'enfant. « Il [le prêtre] passa ses bras autour du beau corps de son servant tant chéri. Leurs lèvres s'unirent dans un dernier baiser d'amour sublime, et tout fut terminé. » La réponse décontenance l'avocat. Il comptait prendre au piège Wilde, et voilà qu'il s'entend dire : « Ce sont de répugnantes fadaises. »

Impossible d'incriminer Wilde de prosélytisme homosexuel : la « cause » ne l'intéresse pas. Quand on lui reproche d'avoir fait dire par le peintre Basil à Dorian Gray : « Je dois admettre que j'ai follement adoré », il se contente de rétorquer : « C'est un emprunt à Shakespeare, je regrette de le dire. » (Rires dans la salle.) Les autres chefs d'accusation touchent à la vie privée du poète. On lui fait grief d'avoir loué Bosie, son cadet de vingt ans, pour ses « lèvres vermeilles, aussi bonnes pour la musique des mots que pour l'égarement des baisers ». On le harcèle surtout au sujet des garçons de passe qu'il emmenait à l'hôtel. L'avez-vous embrassé ? Mis dans votre lit ? Avez-vous posé la main sur son sexe ? Et tout cela en public. Wilde nie en bloc. « N'est-il pas suffisant que j'apporte un démenti général sans avoir été exposé à l'ignominie de cette interminable succession de détails imaginaires ? » Hélas pour lui, c'étaient de tout jeunes gens et - scandale suprême - ils exerçaient des professions jugées « infâmes » : cocher, palefrenier, valet, marchand de journaux. Voyez ! s'écrie avec jubilation l'avocat du marquis. Cet adepte de l'art qui s'accointe avec des domestiques ! « Sa thèse est qu'il a un coeur si magnanime, si noble, si démocratique [rires dans la salle] qu'il ne trace pas de frontières sociales et qu'il éprouve le même plaisir à dîner avec un jeune balayeur des rues qu'avec le plus cultivé des artistes. » Fière protestation de Wilde, qui répond par un hymne à la jeunesse.N'empêche, il s'était enferré. La partie adverse était trop forte pour cet esthète qui s'acoquinait avec des larbins. Le tribunal était parfaitement renseigné sur les nuits de Wilde au Savoy. On referme le livre à la fois émerveillé du brio de l'accusé et stupéfié de sa candeur. Il savait qu'on n'aurait aucun mal à le confondre. Alors pourquoi avoir attaqué le marquis qui n'avait fait qu'écrire ce qui se murmurait dans tout Londres ? Soif inconsciente du martyre ou, plus probablement, pressentiment que la prison donnerait seule à son oeuvre, entachée d'une certaine frivolité mondaine, le poids de douleur qui lui manquait.

« Le Procès d'Oscar Wilde », préface de Merlin Holland, traduit par Bernard Cohen, Stock, coll. « la Cosmopolite », 432 p., 19 euros.
En même temps que la relation intégrale de son procès, les derniers ouvrages d'Oscar Wilde (1854-1900), écrits en prison et considérés comme ses plus beaux textes, donnent lieu à de nouvelles éditions :« De profundis », chez Stock dans la collection « la Cosmopolite » (192 p., 15 euros), et « la Ballade de la geôle de Reading » en poche chez Gallimard dans la collection « Folio ».

Al Zarqawi

2005-10-22T19:08:00.000+01:00

WASHINGTON - U.S. intelligence officials say Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has expanded his terrorism campaign in Iraq

In interviews, U.S. government officials said the threat to U.S. interests from al-Zarqawi compared with that from bin Laden, whom al-Zarqawi pledged his loyalty to one year ago.
The director of the National Counterterrorism Center considers bin Laden a strategic plotter who is deep in hiding and out of regular contact with his followers, while al-Zarqawi is involved broadly in planning of scores of brutal attacks in Iraq.
"He is very much a daily, operational threat," said Scott Redd, who is in charge of the government's counterterrorism strategy and analysis.
In figures not made public before, counterterrorism officials say that Zarqawi's network of contacts has grown dramatically since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and now includes associates in nearly 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Europe.
Those Muslim extremists are members of at least 24 groups, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to much smaller organizations in Indonesia.
Al-Zarqawi is now seen as the top general who is putting in place al-Qaida's long campaign to establish an Islamic society throughout the Middle East, with Iraq at its heart.
The 38-year-old Jordanian got a taste of extremism when he went to
Afghanistan in 1989 to join the jihad against the Soviet Union. He has evolved into a media-driven terror mastermind who is blamed for bombings across Iraq, including Shiite mosques, and the beheadings of foreign hostages, beginning with American Nick Berg in May 2004.
Al-Zarqawi is a hero to extremists. One of the London suicide bombers equated al-Zarqawi with bin Laden and al-Qaida's No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahri. In a video released last month, the bomber cited the three as his heroes.
Like bin Laden, al-Zarqawi has managed to evade capture, despite the attention he has garnered and a $25 million U.S. bounty.
U.S. officials say al-Zarqawi is believed to be traveling around the Euphrates River Valley of western Iraq's Anbar province — an area the size of Florida, much of which is uninhabited desert.
Current and former government officials say he moves as often as every four hours. They say he relies on an extensive "early warning system" of associates who use Iraq's cellular network, high-power cordless phones, computers and other means to let him know when U.S. and Iraqi forces are moving toward his location.
All these officials spoke on condition of anonymity because of the information's sensitive nature.
Al-Zarqawi keeps a low profile and does not talk on cell phones, intelligence officials said. He is thought to be protected by various tribes, which, like all Muslims, follow a Quranic code requiring them to shelter one another.
He also is helped, said one U.S. intelligence official, by the fact that there is not a large, constant American military presence in Anbar, but rather pockets of forces that are bolstered during operations. Iraq's largely Shiite security forces do not want to go to the Sunni-dominated area, either.
U.S. and Iraqi forces have managed to kill or capture a number of al-Zarqawi's deputies, most recently Abu Azzam, in battles and air strikes
U.S. intelligence officials said they nearly have captured al-Zarqawi several times. They got exceptionally close in February when he was pursued by U.S. forces in Anbar. But he jumped from his vehicle and hid under an overpass while his driver and another associate were captured.
His network remains somewhat of a puzzle. The U.S. officials say precise figures on its size are hard to come by, as are details about how his associates coordinate with the native Iraqi insurgency, largely made up of Sunnis.
One U.S. intelligence official said just 2 percent to 5 percent of attacks, generally those involving suicide bombers, can be directly blamed on al-Zarqawi.
Al-Zarqawi has 2,000 to 5,000 hard-core fighters, while the larger Iraqi insurgency easily numbers over 20,000, with over 100,000 broadly defined supporters.
The persistence of their attacks and subsequent media exposure have made al-Zarqawi the public face of al-Qaida and the broader insurgency. He has become so central to al-Qaida's operations that some evidence suggests he is providing money to bin Laden.
In a letter released this month containing the group's battle plan, top deputy al-Zawahri asked al-Zarqawi to send money — 100,000, without being clear about denomination. The letter's authenticity is in dispute.
The letter and other communications also point to some differences between al-Qaida's central leadership and al-Zarqawi, including over whether to Zarqawi should be attacking Shiite Muslims and the direction of the jihad.
Al-Zawahri sees Iraq as the beginning of a campaign to set up an Islamic society in the Middle East and wants al-Zarqawi to think outside of Iraq.

Regering was vorige week een puinhoop

2005-10-22T18:02:00.000+01:00

Regering mist kansen

Vorige week, met de beleidsverklaring van eerste minister Guy Verhofstadt in de Kamer, leek het erop dat zijn regering haar tweede adem had gevonden. Een begroting in evenwicht, een Generatiepact, een zelfverzekerde premier. Verhofstadt was vertrokken voor de rest van de legislatuur. Dat was een uitgemaakte zaak. Zelfs de nachtvluchten konden daar niets meer aan veranderen. Ja, er wás natuurlijk kritiek op de eenmalige maatregelen die de begroting spekten, en op de fiscale amnestie, pardon de fiscale regularisatie, en op de taks op obligatiefondsen. Maar dat is een klassiek verschijnsel. Ik heb nog nooit een begroting weten opstellen, door welke regering dan ook, die op alle banken op applaus werd onthaald. Dat leek dus wel snor te zitten.Amper een week later moeten we onze mening herzien. Verhofstadt II is niét goed bezig. De delicaat heropgebouwde geloofwaardigheid is van zeer korte duur geweest. Zeven dagen later is ze weer helemaal weg.

Wat we deze week hebben meegemaakt aan tegenstrijdige, ongeloofwaardige en belachelijke verklaringen van ministers grenst eigenlijk aan het ongelooflijke.Neem nu premier Verhofstadt. Vijf dagen sprak hij Luc Cortebeeck grandioos tegen, om dan pas zondag toe te geven dat zijn berekeningen eigenlijk wel klopten. Ondertussen was heel de ACV-ban natuurlijk in opstand gekomen, met volgende week vrijdag een staking tot gevolg.Er was ook de taks op de beveks en de sicavs. Johan Vande Lanotte mocht een paar keer zijn mond spoelen toen hij het had over een belasting op het groot-kapitaal. Oeps. Dat was een jammerlijke verspreking, toe te schrijven aan vermoeidheid. Oké.Maar toen begon het pas écht. Didier Reynders, als minister van Financiën, heeft drie verschillende versies van de nieuwe taks verkondigd. Tot hij er zélf niet meer aan uit kon en de mensen de raad gaf naar een andere spaarformule te zoeken. De banken werden ongeveer gek. Nooit vertoond in de Wetstraat. Tot dan toe. Want zijn partijgenoot, staatssecretaris Hervé Jamar, deed nog straffere stoten. In de Kamer werd hij ondervraagd over het feit dat de verlaging van de personenbelasting ook volgend jaar niet zal worden doorgerekend in de bedrijfsvoorheffing. Dat betekent concreet dat nu al voor het derde jaar op rij elke belastingbetaler een renteloze lening geeft aan de staat. Voor sommigen loopt dit op tot 1.000 euro per jaar. Jamar moest dit toegeven. Maar hij suggereerde meteen een oplossing: ”Stap naar uw belastingcontroleur en vraag hem om de bedrijfsvoorheffing te verlagen.” De heer Jamar, als staatssecretaris voor Financiën, wist blijkbaar niét dat dit wettelijk onmogelijk kan. Toen hij dit eindelijk doorhad, kwam hij met de volgende bedenking: ”De mensen vinden een hoge bedrijfsvoorheffing niet erg, dan trekken ze later veel terug...” Hallo? Moet er nog zand zijn? Conclusie. De regering heeft een unieke kans om haar geloofwaardigheid te herstellen, op een dwaze, lullige manier verkwanseld. Zou paars dan toch een structureel probleem hebben? Paul GEUDENS

Politiek en mensen

Sony pakt uit met homo-label

American Muslim

Hadj : Stampede kills 345 pilgrims

It's the demography, stupid

Eid days in Jordan

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Hadj

Arabs and Globalization

Hadj naar Mekka

evaluatie WTO slotverklaring door M.Maes 11.11.11

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The Top Ten - seen from the USA

Hezbollah in Lebanon

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homoseksuele koppels mogen kinderen adopteren

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Fiscale fraude : wetsvoorstel Van der Maelen

Wetsvoorstel Dirk Van der Maelen : bestrijding fiscale fraude

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France : crise des banlieues

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Libby to be indicated in CIA Leak Case

Which way did they go, George ?

War with Iran?

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dirk van der maelen - tweede bij de 'politici van het jaar'

Zawahiri and Bush : Iraq is the central battlefield

Oscar Wilde

Al Zarqawi

Regering was vorige week een puinhoop